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 1 
Introduction 
 
One early spring day in 1962, Chinese authorities presented a diplomatic note to the embassy 
of India in Beijing. The note was one of the first reactions to an emerging pattern of Indian 
policy in the disputed border areas between the two countries.
2
 According to the Chinese, the 
new structure of developments was threatening and provocative: "In the past year and more 
(...) Indian troops have steadily pushed forward, continually set up new check-posts and 
extended their scope of patrol in China's territory" and "as a result, the situation along the 
Sino-Indian border, far from easing, has become increasingly tense since the talks between the 
Prime Ministers of the two countries in April, 1960." The Government of India's view could 
not have been more to the contrary. Indeed, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru thought it 
"absurd" to speak merely in terms of a border conflict when China in fact claimed large 
sections of Indian territory as its own.
3
 In addition to China's stated claim on more than 
50,000 square miles of land which New Delhi considered to be Indian by law, custom and 
tradition, China was, the Indians insisted, unlawfully occupying an  area of 12,000 square 
miles in the Himalayan Ladakh region, "which has always been a part of India".
4
 As a 
consequence of this, all Indian activity in the disputed areas was in fact argued to be perfectly 
legal manifestations of sovereignty on the Indian side of "the international border" – i.e. the 
Indian claim line. It was deemed to be the right and duty of the government "to take all 
necessary measures to safeguard the territorial integrity of India".
5
 What eventually came to 
be known as the "Forward Policy" was part and parcel of what appeared to be such necessary 
measures.
6
 The final objective of the new policy was to establish Indian authority over the 
disputed areas. This had been the primary objective of all Indian China policy since the 
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territorial dispute erupted in the late 1950s. What was novel, however, was the means by 
which the goal was pursued. The Forward Policy represented a marked deviation from earlier 
Indian China policy.  
 This thesis intends to examine the nature of the change in policy towards China. By 
drawing in part on newly declassified sources and archival research, the analysis will discuss 
the origins and causes of India's Forward Policy decision within a broad historical framework. 
What factors can help explain why the Government of India opted for the Forward Policy in 
late 1961? And how can the decision be understood in its historical context? 
 The Forward Policy has later generally been considered to be the triggering cause of 
the 1962 war – a short but intense border war between India and the People's Republic of 
China in the global shadows of the Cuban crisis.
7
 Briefly put, India failed severely in its pre-
war efforts to solve the border dispute and was rapidly defeated during the war. In the history 
of South Asian geopolitics 1962 represents an epochal landmark: "For the first time in the 
nation's life India faced a critical threat to its physical integrity, which it could not meet, of a 
sort vastly more dangerous and humiliating than the sputtering conflict with Pakistan over the 
status of Kashmir."
8
 Half a century later, there is still talk of a "1962 trauma" in India.
9
 
 The most obvious significance of the Forward Policy decision thus emanates from its 
pivotal role in the prelude to war. But the aim here will not be to give a comprehensive 
account of the causes of the Sino-Indian war. The analysis will rather focus on the origins and 
causes underlying one of the crucial Indian decisions that contributed to escalate the border 
dispute. The historical significance of the Forward Policy is not exclusively a product of the 
Chinese response it is often assumed to have provoked. The pre-crisis conceptualisation of the 
policy was in itself interesting as a momentous case of Indian foreign policy making. In 
particular, the process was a revealing example of changing Indian perceptions of China in the 
period. It also illustrated the often underestimated impact of public opinion, press and 
parliament in the early foreign policy making of Nehruvian India. 
                                                         
7
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8
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9
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The Forward Policy in brief 
In essence, the new and proactive policy consisted of an innovative mixture of diplomatic as 
well as military pressure. After the Tibetan revolt of March 1959, border clashes in the 
autumn of 1959 and failed negotiations between the two Prime Ministers in April 1960, 
diplomatic deadlock and increasing public pressure affected Prime Minister Nehru and other 
Indian decision makers. A fresh approach to the dispute seemed pressing. The strained 
atmosphere gradually stimulated a change of policy. Through a complex process of foreign 
and domestic pressure, strategic analysis and political deliberation, a new policy finally took 
shape from November 1961.
10
 By spring 1962, small numbers of lightly armed Indian troops 
were systematically and offensively establishing series of "forward posts" scattered in 
unoccupied, but disputed areas. The Indian soldiers often filled vacuums close to or 
surrounding Chinese military positions and at times even penetrated behind the Chinese lines, 
thus attempting to frustrate their vital lines of supply and communication. While the Chinese 
described this as aggressive unilateralism, it was conceived as a defensive measure by 
government circles in India. As a matter of fact, Nehru's controversial minister of defence, 
Krishna Menon, refuted the term "Forward Policy" in itself, given that it was China that had 
allegedly pushed forward across the international border. He saw India's new policy merely as 
a defensive response to Chinese forward moves in Indian territory.
11
 India's civilian 
intelligence director thought it rather ought to have been called the "No more surrender 
policy".
12
 To the understanding of a leading officer, there was "no reason why we should not 
play a game of chess and a battle of wits with them, so far as the positioning of posts were 
concerned. If they advanced in one place, we should advance in another."
13
 In this 
determined, yet apparently economical fashion, the Chinese advance would be halted and 
possibly even reversed, while at the same time sending firm signals to India's impatient 
domestic audience. It was, in short, planned to be a sort of bloodless victory.  
 On the other hand, later critics have wryly denounced the Forward Policy as smacking 
of an inherently self-contradictory moral crusade, or more succinctly: of an armed 
Satyagraha.
14
 By some, it has simply been dismissed as "reckless" and "irrational".
15
 The 
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basic premises of the Forward Policy may in hindsight seem paradoxical and militarily 
unsound.
16
 But the fact remains that it was adopted in the belief that it would provide an 
efficient counterweight to Chinese expansion and occupation. The scathing posterior critique 
generally concentrates on one fundamental assumption on which the entire Forward Policy 
seems to have been built: the calculation that the Chinese would not respond violently under 
pressure. To the understanding of a leading officer, "this defensive step on our part at best 
might irritate the Chinese but no more."
17
 Nehru and the Indian government not only strongly 
wished to avoid war, they were also certain that the Chinese would abstain from it – despite 
the strategic challenge of India's Forward Policy. In other terms, the policy did not seem 
illogical to the decision makers at that given point in time – despite the harsh criticism of later 
commentators. It will hence be the ambition of this analysis to understand the Forward Policy 
decision within the contemporary context in which it was taken. The ideal must be to 
understand the decision on its own terms. 
 With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the key assumption of Chinese moderation 
in the face of Indian forward movements turned out to be fatally flawed. On 8 September 
1962 a crisis emerged near an Indian forward post called Dhola, on the disputed borders of the 
North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, known as Arunachal Pradesh since 1972).
18
 Fuelled by 
an aggressive Indian interpretation of the Forward Policy and by equally determined Chinese 
countermoves, the Dhola crisis soon escalated. What had originally been envisaged as a 
"game of chess and a battle of wits" had now in fact been reduced to a "giants' version of 
chicken".
19
 And as none of the giants would step back, the situation eventually came out of 
control. On 20 October 1962, China invaded India both in the eastern and western sections of 
the frontier. Thus began a war which still casts Himalayan shadows on the shiny landscape of 
emerging Asia.  
 
Contemporary relevance 
There is a considerable corpus of literature that deals comprehensively with the war. This 
analysis will rather attempt to give a nuanced exposition of a small, but important part of the 
whole. Although the Forward Policy decision has been discussed and reviewed a number of 
times in general analyses of the Sino-Indian border dispute, it has rarely been studied in 
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 5 
depth.
20
 The policy is usually presented as one of many factors leading to conflict, and is 
primarily seen in direct relation to the war itself. The Forward Policy decision has seldom 
been interpreted within a broader historical context. Given that the complex historical process 
leading up to the Forward Policy decision was in itself an interesting illustration of early 
Indian China policy and strategic thinking, the subject merits an individual study. Moreover, 
there has not been done much scholarly work on this particular topic in the recent 20 years, 
the last comprehensive and detailed study being a section in Steven A. Hoffmann's 1990 India 
and the China Crisis.
21
 Given that new primary sources have been declassified and released 
from both Indian and American archives since 1990, a fresh historical approach to India's 
contentious Forward Policy decision would appear to have a valid raison d'être. 
 Furthermore: to the extent that new interpretations of Indian China policy can be 
added, it can also be considered beneficial from a contemporary policy perspective. E. H. Carr 
once argued that the writing of history is "a dialogue between the events of the past and 
progressively emerging future ends."
22
 Interpretations of history carry weight in the 
development of current Sino-Indian relations, and vice versa. The problematic past – which 
still colours Indian perceptions of China – is in many ways increasing in importance, precisely 
because the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship is also increasingly important. Perceptions of 
past and present are interlinked. Just like lofty visions for the future can colour interpretations 
of past events, interpretations of the past can also reflect on visions, and fears, for the future – 
perhaps especially so in post-1962 India.  
 In the changing balance of global power, the two simultaneously rising powers of 
India and China seek to redefine their historically complicated relationship. Publicly, the two 
governments express political optimism for the future of Sino-Indian relations.
23
 This positive 
and reciprocal tone of friendship is most clearly reflected in the very rapidly expanding 
bilateral trade and in political co-operation in new forums such as BRICS and G-20. In the 
period 1990–2010 Sino-Indian trade increased from USD 265 million to USD 61,74 billion, 
growing more than 230 times.
24
 China is now India's largest trading partner and the two states 
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are gradually widening their scope of co-operation to other fields as well. Nevertheless, there 
is another side to the coin. India still has a considerable 1962 complex, despite the political 
and economic visions of future Sino-Indian partnership in Asia and the world.
25
 The border 
dispute that led to war in 1962 has been politically stabilised since 1988, but still remains 
fundamentally unresolved. History would seem to be India's diplomatic magister vitae; the 
humiliating débâcle of 1962 must never be repeated. In other words, a complex mixture of 
political and economic optimism combine with a historical sense of hard learnt realpolitik in 
contemporary India's relations with China.  Given that perceptions of history still play a role 
in contemporary Indian perceptions of China, a critical review of India's pre-war policy seems 
relevant. All the more so in the present times of profound geopolitical change in Asia. 
 
Structure 
Before moving to the historical analysis proper, the nature of the available primary and 
secondary sources will be accounted for in the following section, accompanied by a review of 
some relevant historiographical perspectives. In chapter one, the historical origins that shaped 
independent India's China policy will be outlined. In effect, this complex historical landscape 
furnished the underlying tensions that would characterise Sino-Indian relations, and which 
ultimately provided the root causes of the Forward Policy decision. Having thus examined the 
historical fundaments of India's relations with China, the widening chasm that characterised 
the relationship from 1959 to 1960 will be portrayed in chapter two. This period, from the 
Tibetan revolt to the failure of diplomacy in 1960–1961, formed the immediate background to 
the adoption of the Forward Policy in the "narrow" or formal sense of the term. It will, 
however be argued that a forward policy in a "wide" sense was conceived already by 1959. 
With Indian perceptions and political positions vis-à-vis China hardening, the processes 
leading up to the actual Forward Policy decision on 2 November 1961 will be discussed in 
detail throughout chapter three. The implementation of the Forward Policy and its intended 
and unintended effects will briefly be hinted at – without this being the principal focus of the 
analysis. Finally, a summarising conclusion on the causes and origins of India's Forward 
Policy decision will be given. 
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Historiographical Perspectives 
 
The Sino-Indian border conflict has left a considerable historical footprint. As time has passed 
a number of primary sources have been made accessible to public scrutiny. Together, these 
documents permit several readings of the prelude to war and provide an important key to 
grasp how and why the Forward Policy was adopted by the Government of India. A colourful 
mosaic of historical interpretations has already taken shape on the basis of this complex 
source material. Analyses of the Forward Policy decision can therefore also profit from a 
wide array of established historical perspectives, arguments and theories on the subject of 
Sino-Indian relations in general and the war of 1962 in particular. A survey of the nature of 
the sources will elucidate the empirical foundations on which the interpretations in the 
following chapters are based.  
 
Primary sources 
It has convincingly been argued that the Government of India released too much sensitive 
information during the dispute with China.
26
 As a result of this, there is an unusually broad 
selection of primary sources available for research on the prelude to the 1962 war.
27
 These 
primary sources constitute important windows into the government's policy making and 
approach to the dispute with China. India's liberal democracy also provided its educated élites 
with ample room for a plethora of thoughts and views. These opinions were expressed 
through effective vehicles of communication such as a large press corps, a loquacious 
parliament and general freedom of thought and speech. Accordingly, it is also possible to 
trace the development of the Forward Policy through the eyes of journalists and through 
parliamentary records.
28
 In this analysis, however, the main focus will be on the decision 
makers in the Government of India – and hence on sources pertaining directly to the 
government and the decision makers themselves. 
 
Open sources from the Government of India 
The most voluminous primary source can be found in the Government of India's white papers. 
Seven of these white papers cover the period from summer 1954 to the outbreak of war in 
October 1962. They include presumably all "notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and 
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agreements signed between the governments of India and China" in the given period.
29
 In 
other words, all minor and major messages exchanged between the two governments are to be 
found in these comprehensive collections of diplomatic papers, including the seminal 
personal letters exchanged between the two Prime Ministers. The first white paper was 
published on 7 September 1959 and was followed by updated editions at regular intervals. An 
indication of the importance of the information released, and hence also an indication of its 
valuable nature as a primary source, can be found in the contemporary reception of the white 
papers. Nehru's 1959 decision to accede to a parliamentary request and release what had thus 
far been confidential information, resulted in a thitherto unknown escalation of public 
criticism and parliamentary pressure on the government's China policy. Steven A. Hoffmann 
defines the release of the white papers as a crucial turning point in the conflict.
30
 
 As a result of their inherent historical role, convenient accessibility, unmatched 
comprehensiveness and detailed information from both Indian and Chinese perspectives, the 
white papers have functioned as a principal primary source for a number of histories of the 
Sino-Indian conflict. Read chronologically, the diplomatic exchanges between the two 
countries reflect the gradual development and deterioration of bilateral relations. But by 
themselves alone, they can hardly be regarded as a sufficient source for interpreting internal 
policy processes in the Indian government. Strictly speaking, the white papers only contain 
what the Government of India deemed fit to release to the public; some specific contents 
could have been omitted deliberately. Were they doctored, the white papers could 
theoretically lead to biased historical interpretations.
31
 The uncritical historian could so to say 
be duped by a careful selection of documents and therefore produce an historical narrative 
consonant with the government's desired perception of the past. Nevertheless, given that the 
white papers were accessible to the Chinese side – and judging from the public reception that 
they also contained actually sensitive information – these doubts could appear somewhat 
speculative. Read critically in parallel with other primary sources and secondary literature, the 
white papers are an indispensible source with perspectives from both the Chinese and Indian 
sides of the table – despite the theoretical possibility of government manipulation. 
 Other printed primary sources from the Government of India include a large amount 
of official statements, minutes of press conferences and speeches. Like the white papers these 
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sources convey the official views and arguments of the government. As such, they also 
provide an historical window into New Delhi's public presentation and understanding of the 
conflict. But in contrast to the white papers they were primarily designed to handle an 
increasingly agitated domestic audience, not the critical Chinese government. Hence they 
often tend to be more outspoken and less technical than the white papers. This rhetorical 
contrast is in itself telling of the duality between the internal and external dimensions of 
Indian China policy. 
  
Individual accounts 
In addition to official government sources, there is a variety of subjective accounts available – 
produced for publication and general readership. These works – primarily memoirs – largely 
represent exercises in self-defence and justification of own roles and actions. The genre must 
therefore be carefully appreciated in connection with the crushing sense of defeat after the 
war and, arguably, the subsequent desire of many decision makers to absolve themselves of 
guilt and responsibility. However, the personal accounts do provide valuable historical raw 
material in the form of first-hand accounts from central policy makers and agents – especially 
when read in parallel with other sources. The personal rendition of the central and politically 
well connected chief of general staff, lieutenant general B. M. Kaul, for example provides a 
tendentious but telling view as seen from the highest levels of command in the Indian Army; 
so does the detailed analysis of the then director of military operations, brigadier D. K. Palit.
32
 
B. N. Mullik, director of the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB) and a personal friend of Nehru, 
also wrote a crucial account, especially with regards to the role he and the bureau played in 
supplying intelligence estimates underlying the Forward Policy decision.
33
 Furthermore, a 
series of memoirs and diaries written by Indian and American diplomats with a role in the 
conflict have also been published in the aftermath of the war.
34
 Last, but not least, Jawaharlal 
Nehru was himself a prolific and eloquent man of letters, both before and during his time in 
office. His numerous historical and political writings on India, China and Asia in general 
reflect personal patterns of thought which to a large extent would shape independent India's 
foreign policy. Without actually discussing the Forward Policy decision explicitly, Nehru's 
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personal writings illustrate the larger context of his pre-1962 thinking on Sino-Indian 
relations.  As a whole these primary sources can – in a wide sense – give an indication of the 
Prime Minister's fundamental understanding of international relations.
35
 As regards the border 
dispute in particular, the personal letters to Zhou Enlai, accessible in the white papers, remain 
a particularly rich source for understanding the Prime Minister's argumentation vis-à-vis 
China. His early personal thinking on the subject is most eminently expressed in a candid 
exchange of notes with Home and Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel.
36
 Through 
archival research in New Delhi, this thesis has also been able to draw on unpublished personal 
letters from Nehru to various Indian diplomats. Important fragments of Nehru's thinking on 
China are thus available to scrutiny. 
 
Fresh sources 
The various personal accounts and open government sources have all been public for a 
relatively long time, and have thus been subject to a number of studies. But there are also 
primary sources which have been declassified fairly recently. They can still reveal important 
nuances in regard to the adoption of the Forward Policy.
37
 One central source was released in 
2002 when the Government of India declassified an official "History of the Conflict with 
China, 1962".
38
 Completed in 1992 by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence, this 
originally restricted analysis is the nearest the Government of India comes to giving an 
official and comprehensive version of the course of events before and during the 1962 war. A 
major benefit with the official history is its unrivalled access to classified primary sources, 
"including the top-secret Henderson Brooks Report".
39
 Materials that are still classified are 
not cited in the public 2002 version, but notes are allegedly available in a master copy in the 
Ministry of Defence.
40
 Although mainly concerned with events during the war itself the 
official history also throws light on the prelude to war – as seen, redacted and presented by 
the Government of India three decades after the war.  
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 A second ample and relatively unexplored primary source available since 2007 are the 
comprehensive studies of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
41
 Composed 
in three sections between March 1963 and May 1964, these intelligence analyses deal 
elaborately with the prelude to war and provide knowledgeable perspectives on the Indian 
foreign policy process. The empirical information in the intelligence analyses seems to 
indicate that the Americans had access to highly placed sources within the Indian government 
and defence establishment. Among other things they include résumés of important cabinet 
meetings. Combined with the diplomatic documents available in the collection Foreign 
Relations of the United States and the published journal of the US ambassador John Kenneth 
Galbraith (1961–1963), the CIA papers thus constitute a well informed external supplement to 
Indian primary sources.
42
  
 Thirdly, new and unpublished material has been made accessible to public scrutiny in 
Indian archives over the last decades. It is currently possible to examine the personal papers 
of a series of central Indian officials such as Nehru's sister and ambassador Vijaya Lakshmi 
Pandit or Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt.
43
 Given, in addition to new archival access, the 
comprehensiveness and fairly recent release of both the Government of India's official history 
(2002) and the CIA analysis (2007), a fresh study of the Forward Policy decision would 
appear to be due.
44
  
 
Secondary sources 
The historical literature on the Sino-Indian border conflict in general is vast.
45
 The lion's share 
of these secondary sources is of Indian origin and often has a strong patriotic undertone. 
Being a post-colonial and multiethnic state pursuing policies of nation-building, nationalist 
interpretations of history were common staple in Nehruvian India.
46
 The experience of war in 
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1962 became a nation building project.
47
 The memorable sensation of unity and purpose 
against what was portrayed as an external aggressor has been reflected in subsequent 
historical writing.   
 On the other hand there are also recent and scholarly Indian studies at hand.
48
 
Furthermore, a series of primarily Anglo-American accounts have been written. On the 
whole, the existing literature on the Sino-Indian conflict can be divided in two broad strands 
of interpretation – or what could be termed as two irreconcilable schools of thought.49  
 
The "pro-Indian" school 
The first line of argument was formulated in the aftermath of the 1962 war and during the 
high tide of the global cold war. It principally saw the conflict through a legal and historical 
prism, and expressed sympathy for democratic India as a victim of communist Chinese 
aggression. Early Western accounts include the Dutch diplomat Willem Frederik van 
Eekelen's legal analysis (1967) as well as Dorothy Woodman's well researched historical 
survey of the conflict (1969).
50
 This first broad strand of interpretation saw the Chinese 
actions in October 1962 as historically unjustifiable and illegally excessive. Different versions 
of the historical-legal approach are still current and to some extent popularly dominant in 
India.
51
  
 On the other hand, the British historian Alastair Lamb systematically reviewed and 
challenged the historical fundaments of the "pro-Indian" school through detailed studies on 
the history of Asian frontiers and borders.
52
 Lorne J. Kavic also gave a critical account of pre-
war Indian security policy in his 1967 India's Quest for Security, which included a brief 
analysis of the Forward Policy.
53
 Nevertheless, Kavic and Lamb primarily added nuances to 
the established historical interpretations. They did not fundamentally challenge the dominant 
Indian and Western perception of Nehruvian India as a victim of Chinese bellicosity.  
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The revisionist school  
Taking Lamb's inquisitive review of Sino-Indian frontier history further, the journalist and 
Oxford scholar Neville Maxwell did challenge the established historical perceptions. Indeed, 
he completely rejected the idea of Chinese aggression by launching a new and critical second 
line of argument. In his 1970 book India's China War, Maxwell basically argues that it was in 
fact self-righteous Indian intransigence that had forced China to resort to power politics.
54
 For 
Maxwell, the Forward Policy decision became the ultimate proof of India's incompetent 
handling of the border dispute. Indeed, he suggests that it was India – through its reckless 
Forward Policy – that caused the Chinese attack.55 In the period 1959–1967 he worked as a 
correspondent for the London Times, and had the privilege of access to both important people 
and documents in a fashion that lends the book an almost primary source quality. Maxwell 
states that he has "drawn on material from unpublished files and reports of the Government of 
India and the Indian Army" and adds that the actual first hand impression of events may have 
transmitted insights that will not be attainable for later historians dependent on mainly written 
sources.
56
 The intellectual power of Maxwell's work has been amply illustrated by some of 
the fierce Indian indignation over it. In the provoked words of general Kaul, who was 
severely criticised in the book, 
 
I have read this book carefully more than once and think that it should be taken with a pinch of salt 
as it is full of half-truths, distortions and factually incorrect statements (...) Also, it establishes the 
unsavoury fact that the standards of morality of some of our senior civil and military officials, who 
were unpatriotic enough to have divulged our national secrets to a foreigner, are deplorable (...) 
Does Maxwell think that India should have acquiesced  in all Chinese aggressive moves and 
surrendered her fundamental rights to defend her own territory and let a foreign power capture it 
just because the latter was more powerful than her? Does honour and patriotism mean anything to 
Maxwell?
57
 
 
Maxwell – who had virtually no access to Chinese sources – has often been accused both of 
failing to account for ulterior Chinese motives and of systematically pro-Chinese 
interpretations.
58
 Nevertheless, his revisionist study of the 1962 war was groundbreaking in 
its meticulous detail and unprecedented access to primary sources. For a long time it was 
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generally considered to be the most comprehensive and persuasive account available – at least 
for non-Indian readers.
59
 
 
Recent historiographical developments 
Reviewing the heated historical debate from a distance of two decades, the political scientist 
Steven A. Hoffmann saw the historiography of the Sino-Indian conflict as a dialectical 
process of mutually opposed schools. This historiographical dialectic called for a fresh 
synthesis: a third, less biased and better researched analysis incorporating a wider set of 
perspectives and sources than the "pro" and "contra" schools of the 1960s and 70s. Arguably, 
Hoffmann's detailed analysis (1990) of Indian decision making in the period before and 
during the war remains the most thoroughly researched and balanced account of the Forward 
Policy thus far.
60
 The following chapters will to a large extent seek to follow the line of 
synthesis proposed by him, but will also draw freely on insights from the other strands of 
interpretation. A critical, but pragmatic attitude to earlier research seems appropriate. 
Hoffmann's review of the Forward Policy is only rivalled by Maxwell in detail and 
comprehensiveness. Both accounts, together with newer contextual studies by for example 
Srinath Raghavan (2010) and Ramachandra Guha (2008), will hence be important sources of 
reference for this analysis – despite the at times diverging arguments and conclusions. 
 
The sources and the past 
Scholars like Hoffmann, Kavic and Maxwell strengthened the empirical foundation of their 
studies by conducting a number of interviews in the aftermath of the war with involved 
officers and civil servants.
61
 Maxwell experienced the prelude to war in persona as a 
journalist in New Delhi. Half a century later the available primary sources are almost 
exclusively in written form. The past would, at first glance, seem to be less accessible than in 
the 1960s. But it can also be argued that temporal – and political – distance has its benefits. 
New accounts of the Forward Policy can not only build upon the information processed by the 
pioneer scholars, but also enjoy the privilege of access to a greater variety of printed primary 
sources. Furthermore, it can be argued that modern scholars of Sino-Indian relations have the 
advantage of operating within a political climate which is comparatively less polemical than 
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in the 1960s and 1970s, at least as far as questions of personal guilt and responsibility are 
concerned. The temporal and emotional buffer may potentially facilitate a more mature 
approach to the traces and memories of this controversial past.  
 Historical sources will always be incomplete traces from a vastly more complex past. 
While recognising that the available sources do provide a substantial amount of information 
about the past specifically in concern, a prudent assertion of what they do not reveal is equally 
imperative. Because of the remaining political sensitivity attached to the Forward Policy and 
to the Sino-Indian war in general, some presumably central government documents are still 
classified. In particular, the Henderson Brooks Report – commissioned by the Indian Army 
after the war to account for the 1962 defeat – remains classified.62 In other words the 
available Indian source material is deliberately imperfect. But this imperfection does not 
impede the writing of history as such. Indeed, all historical source materials are ultimately 
imperfect. And despite lack of direct access to documents like the Henderson Brooks Report, 
it is possible to follow the creation of the Forward Policy through other high level Indian 
government sources, a number of which were either made public shortly after their creation, 
were leaked, or which have recently been declassified. The deepest thoughts and private 
reflections of key policy makers, on the other hand, may perhaps never be known. Sources of 
this nature would be more illuminating than the Government of India's published documents 
and would be ideal as a primary source.
63
 Both Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister 
Krishna Menon's private archives remain closed to most outsiders. Only few and personally 
trusted individuals have been granted access to the extensive Nehru papers by his family; this 
important primary source is thus at the very best only indirectly accessible to other 
historians.
64
 To some extent, interpretations of the policy deliberations and calculations of 
central figures like Prime Minister Nehru and his Defence Minister Krishna Menon may 
hence have a character of qualified construction rather than perfect reconstruction.  
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 Importantly, the problem of inadequate sources is not an uncommon challenge for 
international historians.
65
 It does not necessarily reduce the writing of international history to 
a branch of literature dependent on the imagination and narrative topoi.
66
 It rather implies the 
need for an approach to past reality that is conscious of its imperfect empirical foundations, 
but analytically open to the available sources as windows into the same historical reality. It is 
not a question of all or nothing. It is possible to reach historical conclusions despite imperfect 
sources – as long as these conclusions reflect the imperfections on which they are based. 
Historians cannot perfectly reconstruct the past wie es eigentlich gewesen ist, but the Rankean 
ideal of historical research can nonetheless be useful as a contrast to the equally radical idea 
of history writing as pure construction. In practice, most historians operate somewhere in 
between these theoretical extremes.
67
 Recognising the "foreignness" of the past and our lack 
of complete access to it does not mean that it cannot be understood historically. Historians 
seek to create maps, they do not strive to replicate entire historical landscapes. But a good 
map is only a simplification of a reality vastly more complex, not a constructed fiction.  
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I 
 
In the Shadow of Empires: The Historical Landscape 
 
The Forward Policy decision was the outcome of an historical process intricately woven 
within a larger context. In order to understand the origins of the policy it is therefore 
necessary to study the wider historical landscape in which it was rooted and grew. While 
taking a panoramic view of this scenery, two fundamental and increasingly incompatible 
tendencies in India's relations with China from 1947 to 1959 will be analytically emphasised: 
(i) Nehruvian visions of India-China relations and (ii) geopolitical developments on India's 
northern flank. Finally, the way in which the first element was overshadowed by the second in 
an increasingly difficult marriage will be discussed in a brief conclusion. In its essentials, it 
was as if the bright morning light of independence was haunted by shadows of times past. It is 
within this twilight of Asian co-operation and post-imperial tensions that the principal 
contextual origins of the Forward Policy decision can be sought. 
 
(i) Nehruvian China policy – visions of greatness 
India's early foreign policy was shaped by a brittle balance between material constraints and 
political ambitions. It could be interpreted as a compromise between its enfeebled point of 
departure and its future potential. Nehru’s preponderant role as the intellectual father of 
Indian foreign policy will first be rudimentally outlined along with an overview of the 
fundamental architecture of the new foreign policy. From this analytical point of departure, 
the principal characteristics of early Indian China policy will be discussed.  
 
Nehru: primus inter pares 
Jawaharlal Nehru was not only India’s first Prime Minister (PM), he was also the first 
External Affairs Minister. In fact, he held both positions continuously from independence 
until his death in 1964.
68
 But his influence on Indian foreign policy was far weightier than 
may be accounted for by the formal powers of office. At the time of independence Nehru was 
in many respects first among equals when it came to international politics. In an Indian 
National Congress oriented towards domestic politics, foreign affairs were a largely neglected 
domain.
69
 In the field of international relations, Gandhi acknowledged his disciple Nehru as 
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master, not the other way around.
70
 This preponderant position was founded upon Nehru’s 
sound knowledge of and keen interest in the world outside India.
71
 As such it was also a 
reflection of his numerous travels abroad, his élite education in Europe and his wide 
international network and experience. He was in sum one of a kind among the political 
leaders of India in 1947 and along with Gandhi he became an iconic face towards the outside 
world.
72
 Through his knowledge, experience and charismatic leadership – as well as a relative 
lack of qualified peers – he effectively became the architect of Indian foreign policy.73 The 
China policy was in particular considered to be a brainchild of Nehru.
74
 He had a personal 
interest in India-China relations going back to the 1920s and was a driving force in fostering a 
strong bilateral relationship after independence.
75
 
 But if the guiding political premises of the new foreign policy were laid by one 
individual, he was nevertheless not alone in implementing and shaping foreign policy. And 
while the influential Prime Minister can be regarded as the master architect, he was not the 
only Indian competent in foreign affairs.
76
 New institutions fostered by Nehru such as the 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Indian Foreign Service and the civilian Intelligence 
Bureau (IB) gradually became important sources of professional competence and advice. In 
particular, select ambassadors and high level bureaucrats within the MEA and the IB won the 
Prime Minister’s ear.77 Among the most important figures in the implementation of India's 
early China policy was for example the historian K. M. Panikkar who served as the first 
envoy and ambassador to China from 1948 to 1952. He personally encouraged Sino-Indian 
friendship with gusto and has later often been accused of having been exceedingly blue-eyed 
and enthusiastic towards the Maoist regime and its political intentions.
78
 In a personal letter to 
his sister and ambassador in Washington DC, Nehru considered his envoy in Beijing to be “so 
keen that it over-shoots the mark and goes much further ahead than fact warrants”, but he also 
added that Panikkar was “a man of extraordinarily acute intelligence and powers of 
observation (…) his analysis of a situation, apart from the time factor, is usually good.”79 
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Other bureaucrats Nehru trusted with regard to China policy would include figures such as the 
influential director of the Intelligence Bureau, B. N. Mullik and Foreign Secretaries like 
Subimal Dutt and M. J. Desai.
80
 Nehru was thus far from alone in running Indian diplomacy, 
but his basic policies were nonetheless rarely challenged by the foreign policy bureaucracy. 
Within the political establishment there were also relatively few who substantially 
restrained or influenced Nehru in his larger foreign policy deliberations.
81
 The most 
noteworthy exception was Nehru’s vigorous Home and Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai 
Patel, “the iron man of India”.82 His standing was such that he could afford major 
disagreements with the Prime Minister – which was several times the case.83 Patel would 
among other things distance himself markedly from Nehru’s China policy during the Chinese 
invasion of Tibet in 1950.
84
 However, he passed away a few weeks later that very same year 
and had minimal impact on the policy. After Patel’s death, Nehru was largely left alone with 
his own camp followers and was not seriously challenged until much later when the China 
crisis was already a matter of fact. In effect, Nehru personally dominated the Indian foreign 
policy process for almost two decades.
85
 In his foreign policy entourage, Krishna Menon was 
a particularly important character.
86
 Menon was widely considered to be a sparklingly 
intelligent intellectual, a close confidant of Nehru and a cultured thinker rooted in a Marxist 
world view. However, he was also described as arrogant, short-tempered and volatile.
87
 He 
moreover had a basic distrust of the military establishment.
88
 The anti-militarist attitude 
reflected on Menon’s tenure as Defence Minister from 1957 to 1962 and arguably had far-
reaching consequences for the Indian Army.
89
 To some extent, Nehru shared Menon’s 
sceptical view of the armed forces, which was an institution inherited from the Raj.
90
 Indeed, 
according to the foreign policy analyst Stephen P. Cohen, one of the distinct features of the 
Indian foreign policy process was the lack of professional military input.
91
 This strategic 
absence can in part be seen as a consequence of the fact that the Indian Army was short of 
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senior staff officers – it was still reliant on British expertise – but can also be interpreted 
within the framework of a certain anti-militarist mindset in the aftermath of Gandhi and 
independence. Military leaders were effectively excluded from the foreign policy process 
whereas civilian leaders wielded considerable influence in professional military matters. In 
short, the Nehruvian foreign policy process was not necessarily void of competent actors, but 
the Prime Minister effectively reined the process with no major opposition, either from within 
the government, or from the army or outside actors like parliament and press.
92
 
 
Designing a new foreign policy 
If Nehru was a pivotal individual agent, the new foreign policy was also shaped within the 
structural framework of a newly independent developing country. As the Indian Union 
attained independence and awoke “to life and freedom” from the ashes of Great Britain’s 
Indian Empire, it was in a context of profound social and economic underdevelopment.
93
 A 
central argument for independence had been to alleviate the Indian people of the oppressive 
poverty that had characterised colonial rule for most Indians.
94
 The fight against poverty and 
socio-economic underdevelopment became a main priority for the new Indian National 
Congress government in 1947.
95
 Indian foreign policy was designed in tandem with these 
socio-economic ambitions. India needed peace, stability and co-operation on the international 
level if it were to optimally focus its scarce resources on domestic development. Interpreted in 
this light, Indian foreign policy was to a considerable extent influenced by a Primat der 
Innenpolitik, a primacy of domestic politics in the sense of facilitating – not draining 
resources from – the country's socio-economic development.96  
 At the same time, the new foreign policy naturally also had to address the external 
challenges which the government faced. India's strategic situation was highly demanding 
indeed. As a midnight's child of 15 August 1947, independent India was born into a global 
framework of sharpening cold war and a regional setting of violent chaos following the break-
up of the Indian Empire. By birth and national identity India and Pakistan were rivals, and 
tension was immediately brewing over painful territorial questions like the fate of Junagadh, 
Hyderabad and Kashmir.
97
 Shortly after the human tragedies of partition and the massive 
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exchanges of refugees, the two countries fought their first war over Kashmir in 1948. The 
basic conflict was however never resolved and would continue to bedevil Indo-Pakistani 
relations in the coming years. During the Bengali refugee crisis in 1950, Pakistan and India 
were once again at the brink of the precipice, although war was finally avoided.
98
 As a result 
of this abiding hostility, Indian defence policy was chiefly oriented towards Pakistan until the 
war with China in 1962.
99
  
 The texture of India’s independence and the world views of its foreign policy élites 
were shaped by this challenging environment.
100
 In fact, to some contemporaries, the future of 
the composite Indian Union itself seemed uncertain.
101
 The logical consequence in terms of 
foreign and defence policy was that India must seek to cultivate a peaceful and stable 
international framework permitting room for India's immediate and long term socio-economic 
development. Because of the financial constraints and developmental priorities of the 
government, the armed forces were relegated to limited budgets and resources. Both 
politically and economically, Nehru's government had higher priorities than strengthening, or 
even upholding, the military apparatus India had inherited from its imperial masters.
102
 This 
relative negligence should, however, also be understood in context of Nehru's holistic view on 
national defence. Defence was more than weapons and men; it also encompassed economic, 
industrial and mental dimensions.
103
 Truly robust and credible defence would require an 
economically self-sufficient and a politically united India. Narrowly giving first priority to 
costly military procurements abroad would therefore constitute an inefficient approach to the 
larger challenge of building a strong Indian society capable of national defence.
104
  
However, while recognising the formidable challenges that lay before India, the Prime 
Minister also unhesitatingly envisaged India as a potential great power.
105
 India's foreign 
policy was not exclusively going to cater to the endless labyrinth of immediate interests. It 
was also meant to facilitate a gradual metamorphosis from India's present avatar as a 
developing country into that of a great power in Asia and the world – a return to India's past 
as a civilisational power house.
106
 In this respect, Nehru had a sense of the longue durée and 
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of what can be understood as “grand strategy”.107 An important vehicle for facilitating the 
transition would be a foreign policy independent of submissive cold war allegiances in favour 
of the United States or the Soviet Union. India was not to become a “pawn” in the hands of 
others. Instead, it would actively define its own independence and play a uniquely Indian role 
in world affairs. This guiding philosophy which eventually came to be known as non-
alignment was to a large extent Nehru’s inspiration, and can in many respects be seen as a 
continuation of the struggle for independence.
108
 By pursuing a "third way" New Delhi would 
preserve its recently won independence and diplomatic autonomy in the emerging conflict 
between the Western and Soviet blocs. At the same time India, as the "Light of Asia" and a 
beacon of anti-colonialism, could play a potentially significant role in the third world of 
emerging and developing states – all facing similar challenges in the nascent cold war order.  
As a fundamental pillar of Indian foreign policy, non-alignment had both pragmatic 
and idealistic dimensions. By adopting a more nuanced approach to cold war international 
relations India was poised to act as an important intermediary between the two blocs – a 
diplomatic role the country was in fact also able to play in various forms, e.g. in the aftermath 
of the Korean War or during negotiations on French Indochina in Geneva, 1954.
109
 Instead of 
passively being a pawn in the cold war, India would also be an eager spokesman for the 
emerging African and Asian nations and support these in their morally justified struggles for 
independence, development and national revival. In other terms, India could not only play an 
important and helpful role in the east-west conflict, but might equally be a global leader in a 
north-south perspective. On the other side, there were also purely pragmatic dimensions to 
non-alignment as a compass for India's new foreign policy.
110
 For a newly independent 
country that was relatively weak in strategic and economic terms, non-alignment was deemed 
to be an affordable way of buying disproportionate international influence and a clear voice in 
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the world.
111
 Furthermore, by refusing to side with only one of the superpowers, India could 
benefit from co-operation with both the United States and the Soviet Union, also in terms of 
technical expertise and foreign aid.
112
 In their competition to court New Delhi, India might be 
able to enjoy benefits from both superpowers while at the same time holding the moral high 
ground by pursuing a "third way". A non-aligned foreign policy would, in brief, ensure that 
India in its present enfeebled incarnation could punch above its weight while at the same time 
enabling a gradual and natural return to India’s historical weight class. India's early foreign 
policy was thus not only shaped by a constraining primacy of domestic politics, but was 
equally part and parcel of an ambitious vision of India's place in the world in the long run.
113
 
 
Cultivating an Asian renaissance 
The "third way" of non-alignment was a pillar of independent India's foreign policy; Sino-
Indian friendship was in many respects a pillar of that third way.
114
 Indian China policy was a 
reflection of the ambitions Nehru harboured for his country. Already in 1939, before a visit to 
his friend Chiang Kai-shek, Nehru had spoken to a colleague of how he more and more 
thought "of China and India pulling together in the future".
115
 The vision was reformulated in 
1946 when Nehru publicly announced that China would be one of the three most important 
countries in the world for India, besides the United States and the Soviet Union.
116
 As a 
resurgent Asian nation in India's relative vicinity, China would most likely have a large 
impact on India in the long run. This presumption was reinforced by his studies of world 
history.
117
 In its essentials, Nehru's vision of the relationship was anchored in two underlying 
strands of thought, deriving (a) from an inspiring set of ideas, and (b) from a notion of grand 
strategic realpolitik.   
 It has often been pointed out that Nehru’s vision of Sino-Indian friendship was shaped 
by a strong dimension of idealism.
118
 His thinking on India-China relations drew inspiration 
and guidance from the realm of ideas to the extent that it built upon three fundamental 
perceptions. These perceptions were in broad terms firstly related to a glorification of Asia's 
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past, secondly to a certain understanding of China and India as unique civilisational states 
and, thirdly, to an ideal of Asia as a larger family of nations with a common past and future.  
 Imperative among these ideas was the notion of China and India as the modern 
inheritors of magnificent cultural and historical traditions that had been interlinked by human, 
commercial and cultural bonds through millennia. The fruits of this interaction were evident 
in a variety of historical legacies.
119
 Among the most prominent examples were the spread of 
Buddhism from ancient India towards the North and the East, the impact of Indic art in East 
Asia and the remnants of the once flourishing southern route of the Silk Road. Nehru wrote of 
India being known as the "Noble Land" in China, but did not forget to add how one Chinese 
pilgrim, I-Tsing, had rhetorically asked if there were "any one, in the five parts of India, who 
does not admire China?"
120
  Such fragments of a rich and colourful past could not only instil a 
sense of common pride in historical India-China relations, but could additionally be an 
inspiring precursor to the future. From the desk of his colonial prison in Ahmadnagar Fort, 
Nehru poetically observed that 
 
now the wheel of fate has turned full circle and again India and China look towards each other and 
past memories crowd in their minds; again pilgrims of a new kind cross or fly over the mountains 
that separate them, bringing their messages of cheer and good-will and creating fresh bonds of 
friendship that will endure.
121
 
 
To Nehru, Indian independence was part of a wider Asian resurgence.
122
 Independence 
seemed to promise a renaissance, a rebirth of the old grandeur in a modern avatar. As the 
Maoists ended the chaos of civil war and stabilised China in a centralised one-party state in 
1949, the scene would appear to be set for a new chapter of comprehensive Sino-Indian 
interaction. The idealised past would be a blueprint for the future – an inspiring symbol of 
what India and China could achieve together, and a testimony to the idea of Asia as more than 
a geographical term; "the old continent is waking up after her long slumber. The eyes of the 
world are upon her, for everyone knows that Asia is going to play a great part in the 
future."
123
 Nehru's wheel of fate had turned full circle again.  
 The second element that informed Nehru's ideal vision of India-China relations was 
the belief that the two Asian giants were the modern inheritors of civilisations that were 
unique and different from the western experience. Hence, their international relations would 
                                                         
119
 See Sen, Amartya (2005) The Argumentative Indian. Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity, 
Penguin Books, London: 161–190 
120
 Nehru 1947: 157 
121
 Nehru 1947: 159–160 
122
 Guha 2008: 153 
123
 Nehru 1939: 10 
 25 
also follow a distinct pattern. There was a “new approach, which might be called broadly an 
Asian approach.”124 Nehru hoped that the time may come "when this ancient land will attain 
its rightful place in the world and make its full swing to the phenomenon of world peace and 
the welfare of mankind."
125
 Despite the fact that new China was headed by a communist 
government, Nehru was of the opinion that it would be no less “Asian” or "Chinese" than 
before and that the Maoists should be regarded as such rather than as obedient members of a 
global communist bloc.
126
 Together, China and India, with their distinct civilisational 
heritage, would offer a more humane and sophisticated Asian alternative to the cold war 
vision of international relations.
127
 To Nehru, the Asians "are nationalistic, but this 
nationalism seeks no dominion over, or interference with, others. They welcome all attempts 
at world co-operation and the establishment of an international order."
128
 Speaking to Asian 
delegates in New Delhi, March 1947, he further stated that “the whole spirit and outlook of 
Asia are peaceful, and the emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for 
world peace.”129 The view of China and India as different from the power politics of the 
western world was also implicitly incorporated in the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954, which 
in a narrow sense pertained to the renunciation of Indian privileges in Tibet. The rhetorically 
and philosophically important part of the agreement, however, lay in Panchsheel,
*
 the five 
principles which were included in the preamble and by the name of which the agreement is 
generally known. These principles were (i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, (ii) mutual non-aggression, (iii) mutual non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs, (iv) equality and mutual benefit, and (v) peaceful co-existence.
130
 Panchsheel 
would develop into a general guideline of both Indian and Chinese foreign policies, and 
would later also be adopted by the movement of non-aligned states. Its inception has widely 
come to be seen as the high tide of Sino-Indian cordiality.
131
 The period immediately 
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succeeding the 1954 agreement has generally been summarised under the popular Indian 
slogan “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai”.132 Panchsheel was perceived by Nehru and others as a 
powerful symbol of an alternative Asian approach to world affairs, deeply anchored in India’s 
intellectual history.
133
 It was one important step towards the ultimate goal for which Nehru 
expressed both fervent desire and genuine belief: world peace.
134
 China was, in brief, a 
natural partner for India in fostering a new and better Asia.
135
 
 Thirdly, the vision of Sino-Indian relations was part and parcel of a wider mental 
outlook of pan-Asianism. The idea of an Asian community was nourished by the cultural and 
historical perceptions of Nehru in which India had served as a natural linchpin between 
South-East, Central and West Asia.
136
 At the time of independence, he even thought in terms 
of some kind of future Asian federation.
137
 In his opinion, "conditions and problems differ 
greatly in the various countries of Asia, but throughout this vast area, in China and India, in 
South-East Asia, in western Asia and the Arab world run common threads of sentiment and 
invisible links which hold them together."
138
 These links were on the one hand based on past 
interaction, eloquently illustrated by the spread of Buddhism from India or the rise of Islam in 
Asia in general, but the links were also a product of the shared experience and resistance to 
colonialism. The Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 incarnated the pan-Asian 
atmosphere and laid the foundation for strengthening co-operation between the emerging 
Asian states. In Delhi's 16th century Purana Qila, Nehru presided at the conference and 
forcefully exclaimed the imminent arrival of a new epoch in Asian and world history: 
 
We stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period of history. Standing on this 
watershed which divides two epochs of human history and endeavour, we can look back on our 
long past and look forward to the future that is taking shape before our eyes … Asia is again 
finding herself.
139
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In this new Asia, India would play a role which bespoke its geographical, cultural and 
historical centrality.
140
 India would, to some extent, help Asia to find herself again by 
facilitating Asian co-operation.
141
 The idea of an Asian collective, a family of nations so to 
say, aspiring for a renaissance was reconfirmed during the Afro-Asian Conference in the 
Javanese city of Bandung in April 1955. So was Nehru's understanding of India's prominent 
place in the Asian family. The Indian Prime Minister played a leading role at the conference 
and not only stressed the global importance of the philosophy of Panchsheel, but also 
proactively sought to introduce China to the Afro-Asian community.
142
 Nehru gravely 
concluded in the final session of the conference that "we came here as agents of historic 
destiny and we have made history. (...) I hope we shall be worthy of the people's faith and our 
destiny."
143
 Pan-Asianism, India and China's special role in the world and the grandeur of the 
past thus fused into a potent sense of idealism. It was in a way India's destiny to cultivate a 
strong friendship with China. 
 On the other hand, Nehruvian visions of India-China relations also had a distinct 
realist dimension. The desire for friendly relations with the "Middle Kingdom" was not 
fuelled by idealism and historical revivalism alone. It was also the outcome of a political 
calculation in view of India’s practical long-term interests. This calculation related principally 
to India and Asia’s need for development, to India and China’s pivotal geopolitical position in 
Asia and, finally, to the importance of actively including the young People’s Republic in the 
global community. Considered together, these three elements were part of Nehru’s grand 
strategic objective of a stable and peaceful Asia in which India could prosper and realise its 
full potential. Sino-Indian friendship would furthermore help reduce the risk for a cataclysmic 
third world war. 
 The Asian countries were initially not directly linked to the emerging superpower 
conflict, but could potentially become involved in it as camp followers. Nehru repeatedly 
warned of Asia being drawn into Europe’s internal history “full of conflicts, trouble and 
hatred”.144 The continent must rather make a positive contribution on the global level, for as 
Nehru told his fellow leaders at the Asian Relations Conference, “there can be no peace 
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unless Asia plays her part.”145 The rationale for an Asian approach was also reflected in 
India’s immediate and tangible interests. Keeping Asia free from great power politicking was 
seen to be imperative for the cause of social and economic development. The two issues were 
intimately connected, for if India and other Asian countries were to engage in expensive 
“high” politics, it would probably drain their scarce resources away from development and so-
called “low” politics. To Nehru, “the problems of Asia today are essentially problems of 
supplying what may be called the primary human necessities. They are not problems which 
may be called problems of power politics.”146 At the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, the 
delegates were reminded how peace and freedom “have to be considered in both their political 
and economic aspects. The countries of Asia we must remember are very backward and the 
standards of living are appallingly low. These economic problems demand urgent solution or 
else crisis and disaster may overwhelm us.”147 Despite being considered a relatively strong 
Asian country in terms of size and potential, India was no exception.
148
 Around 80 percent of 
its citizens were rural and illiterate and the country was mired in deep social conservatism. 
Nehru reminded his diplomats that India was a poor agricultural country barely able to feed 
its own people.
149
 The Chinese people, he told a million of his countrymen at a speech in 
1954, also desired peace and development rather than conflicts and war.
150
 Seen from a 
development perspective, cultivating Asian co-operation and keeping cold war rivalries out of 
Asia was therefore more than a matter of principle or ideas – it was understood to be a core 
interest for both India and China as developing states. 
 Asian co-operation seemed dependent on Sino-Indian friendship. The relevance of 
India and China in Asia was not only an historical and cultural reflection of the civilisations 
they embodied, but was also a result of their massive size, geographical centrality, large 
population and considerable power potential. They were the pivotal actors of the continent, 
vaguely comparable to France and Germany on the European continent. The cultivation of a 
strong friendship with China was thus also based on a notion of realism in the sense that 
China was seen as the other major power in Asia. Considering that India had a northern 
frontier of more than 2000 miles in the Himalayas, the importance of friendly relations with 
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the neighbour-giant seemed all the more pregnant.
151
 In a note of 18 January 1950, Nehru 
warned his Deputy Prime Minister that if India were to develop a strained relationship or a 
rivalry of some sort with its northern twin,  
 
Pakistan [our major possible enemy] will undoubtedly try to take advantage of this, politically or 
otherwise. The position of India thus will be bad from a defence point of view. We cannot have all 
the time two possible enemies on either side of India (…) strategically we would be in an unsound 
position and the burden of this will be very great on us. As it is, we are facing enormous 
difficulties, financial, economic, etc.
152
 
 
The potential opening of a second front, with the crippling expenditures of establishing a 
credible Himalayan defence, would combine with India’s already existent strategic and 
economic challenges and provide a numbing blow to Nehru’s ambitious development 
programmes. Furthermore, in a worst case scenario India might risk getting caught in a 
strategically exhausting pincer movement between hostile Pakistan and an increasingly 
powerful China. A good relationship on the other hand, would presumably leave India’s long 
northern back free from trouble and thus permit the government to focus its attention on the 
strategic challenge of Pakistan and other problems. Cordial India-China relations were 
therefore seen to be in India’s national interest “not only in the immediate future but from a 
long term view.”153 In fact, Nehru reckoned good relations between China and India to be 
paramount for the surrounding world in general: 
 
If their relations are bad, this will have a serious effect not only on both of them but on Asia as 
whole. It would affect our future for a long time. If a position arises in which China and India are 
inveterately hostile to each other, like France and Germany, then there will be repeated wars 
bringing destruction to both. The advantage will go to other countries. It is interesting to note that 
both the UK and the USA appear to be anxious to add to the unfriendliness of India and China 
towards each other. It is also interesting to find that the USSR does not view with favour any 
friendly relations between India and China. These are long term reactions which one can fully 
understand, because India and China at peace with each other would make a vast difference to the 
whole set-up and balance of the world.
154
 
 
These prospects were of such far-reaching importance for India that Nehru thought it 
imperative to foster a cordial relationship between the two giants. “I think on the whole that 
China desires this too for obvious reasons.”155 Briefly put, there were strong negative 
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incentives not to co-operate with China and equally positive incentives to befriend China – a 
friendship which, as argued, also had strong ideological components in a resurgent Asia.  
Nonetheless, one would ignore the more subtle aspects of Nehru’s thinking on the 
People’s Republic by uniformly castigating him as a naïve optimist or as an “unabashed 
panda hugger”.156 This has repeatedly been done, especially after the breakdown of his China 
policy, and the war of 1962, and has led to a series of historical caricatures and stereotypes. 
The equation does have another side. In a secret and personal letter written in 1950 to his 
sister and ambassador in Washington DC, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, he pointed out that “I am 
sure that it is of great importance to Asia and to the world that India and China should be 
friendly. How far we shall succeed in this endeavour, I cannot say.”157 It is important to 
emphasise that Nehru did not take a friendly China for granted. But he consistently stressed 
the grand strategic importance of a friendly China for India. In analytical terms these are two 
separate positions; the logical outcome was an active effort to cultivate a friendly China. 
Through his studies of political history Nehru had reached the conclusion that China very 
much had an alter ego, that of an imperious Middle Kingdom surrounded by a periphery of 
tributary states. In periods of unity and strength, China would be vital and would have a 
“somewhat inherent tendency to expand.”158 In 1949 China emerged from the shadows of war 
and a “century of humiliation” under the banner of a strong, but unpredictable Maoist central 
government. Nehru acknowledged that the development of new China was “anybody’s guess” 
and did not rule out tendencies of nationalism and geopolitical assertiveness.
159
 In light of this 
interpretation, the alleged liberation of Tibet was no cardinal anomaly in Nehru’s analysis of 
China. Nor was China’s involvement in the Korean War or the Formosa question. The 
fundamental point for Nehru was, firstly, that the new Chinese leadership like India had 
significant challenges in terms of low social and economic development. Secondly, he 
reckoned that new China could be conditioned to modern ways of international co-operation 
and diplomacy if the surrounding world adopted a benign approach to the regime.
160
 The 
revolutionary leaders of China had risen to power in a civil war and needed time and 
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assistance to integrate in the international community. India could therefore reassume its 
ancient role as a bridge between cultures and civilisations. As an Asian nation and a liberal 
democracy it could help “interpret” new China to the critical West, while also encouraging 
the PRC’s integration in the international community.161 By stimulating China to become a 
responsible international stake-holder and a member of the Asian family of nations, India 
could help undermine any potential resurgence of expansionism. Nehru thus sought a policy 
of carrots rather than sticks, fearing that the latter would have a self-defeating effect. Indeed, 
the “tragedy of the situation” was that the US policy of isolating the newborn People’s 
Republic “is the one policy which will make China do what the US least want.”162 New Delhi 
on the other hand would proactively project China in the international society, a benign policy 
which was manifested at several occasions during the 1950s in forums as varied as 
international conferences, the Commonwealth and the UN.
163
 Among the non-socialist 
countries, India was second only to Burma in formally recognising the PRC, despite US 
protests and despite Nehru’s personal friendship with the then marginalised Chiang Kai-
shek.
164
 In Bandung 1955 Nehru saw it as India’s responsibility to present China to the Asian-
African conference and personally introduced premier Zhou Enlai to other delegates.
165
 
India’s bridge building function was even more visible vis-à-vis the United States. Despite the 
detriment to Indo-US relations, India advocated the People’s Republic’s claim to represent 
China within the UN and also took on a negotiating role in the aftermath of the Korean War. 
The anticipated positive long term effect on China and the enhancement of Sino-Indian 
relations generally outweighed the immediate cost of estranging the United States.
166
 When 
the US State Department suggested that India should take China’s place in the United Nations 
Security Council Nehru categorically refused to accept the idea. It was not that he did not 
desire India to sit in the council – in fact he argued that India was entitled to a permanent 
membership – but he refused to let this happen at the cost of China. He instructed his 
ambassador in Washington DC to indicate to the Americans that it “would be bad from every 
point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of break 
between us and China (…) We shall go on pressing for China’s admission in the UN and the 
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Security Council.”167 Nehru thus refused to let a potential short-term gain frustrate his long-
term grand strategy of pursuing Sino-Indian friendship in a new and peaceful Asia. The way 
to reach that goal lay in cultivating an internationalist China by means of inclusiveness. This 
would help enable Asia’s two major states to focus on their true challenges – internal 
development issues – while also strengthening the prospects for peace, stability and non-
alignment in Asia at large. Sino-Indian friendship was, in short, a prioritised national interest 
for India, also from a realist point of view. It was part of Nehru’s grand strategy. 
 
Visions of greatness 
In sum, it is imperative to keep in mind the general context in which the new Indian China 
policy was formulated. The Government of India was first and foremost led by a Primat der 
Innenpolitik in which the social and economic development of post-colonial India was 
emphasised. When it came to external affairs, Pakistan and the superpowers were the 
immediate challenges for New Delhi. Indian relations with China were primarily structured 
by a grand strategic view of India’s long term interests and potential. It would be a 
relationship that in many respects expressed the optimism of independence and the desire to 
cultivate a peaceful and prosperous Asia. Nehru’s early vision of Sino-Indian relations was 
based on a notion of idealism in the sense that it was a symbol and a continuation of a 
magnificent common past. The idea of India and China as unique civilisational states and the 
conception of Asia as a family of nations were also central components in the desire to forge a 
strong friendship with Beijing. But there were nevertheless shades and nuances to Nehru’s 
idealist thinking. Sino-Indian cordiality was also considered to be in India’s interests from a 
realist point of view. This was not least a function of the massive size and pivotal position of 
the two states in Asia. Friendly co-operation between the two giants was seen as important in 
order to secure a peaceful and stable Asia in which they both could focus on their pressing 
domestic challenges. Last but not least, Nehru thought it crucial to include and integrate the 
revolutionary Chinese government as far as possible in international society to discourage 
unilateralism. The motivations underlying early Indian China policy were thus complex, but 
consistently illustrated the sense of long-term importance Nehru attached to the relationship. 
Neatly defining Nehru as an idealist or a realist in his China policy may miss the point.
168
 In 
fact Nehru himself defined idealism as the “realism of tomorrow” and added that “the realist, 
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looks at the tip of his nose and sees little beyond; the result is that he is stumbling all the 
time.”169 The Prime Minister's sense of time, in short, extended beyond his own present. 
 
(ii) Tabula rasa? The Great Game revisited 
Nehruvian China policy sought to bring new life to the past glories of Sino-Indian relations by 
building a profoundly modern bilateral friendship. The one historical period the new 
relationship was not consciously supposed to reflect was the colonial era. Nevertheless, the 
refutation of the colonial legacy was in many respects artificial. The Raj had not only shaped 
the political and institutional life of independent India, but had also given it a distinct 
geographic framework and a modern western notion of statehood. In the midst of the effort to 
create a new relationship with China, India was thus bound by the heritage of its colonial past. 
So indeed was China, which in 1949 emerged from national humiliation and "unequal 
treaties" as a revisionist state intent on re-establishing Beijing’s authority in the Middle 
Kingdom.
170
 Especially two factors contributed to revive the shadows of the imperial past; 
Tibet and the Himalayan frontiers. 
 
The Tibetan question 
The idea of India and China as geographic neighbours is quite modern. Geopolitically, the 
historical relations between India and China have been shaped by the fact that they were 
separated by the highest mountain range in the world. In addition to the towering Himalayas, 
there was a vast distance between the heartlands in the plains of Northern India and Eastern 
China’s Pacific rimland. In between them lay the mountainous and sparsely populated area of 
Tibet. Before the first invasion by the People’s Republic in 1950, Tibet had a history as an 
independent country for considerable periods of time. In historical terms, it is hence more 
appropriate to speak of an Indo-Tibetan frontier rather than a Sino-Indian one. The term is not 
only geographically more accurate, but is also reinforced by the fact that Tibet had a cultural, 
ethnic, economic and political profile which distinguished the country from its giant 
neighbours. But there were also links. In cultural and linguistic terms, Tibet faced southwards 
rather than to the Chinese east. In Nehru’s view, “Tibet, culturally speaking, is an offshoot of 
India.”171  As a result of the cultural proximity, “[t]here is this feeling of kinship, if I may use 
that word, cultural kinship between the people of India and the people of Tibet.”172 Politically 
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however, Tibet was connected more to the east than to India. It nurtured important political 
links with Imperial China already in the 7th century, although it was not until the 18th century 
that Beijing imposed its rule in the country.
173
 Nevertheless, imperial rule was not direct and 
generally gave room for considerable Tibetan autonomy.
174
 It was not possible – at this point 
in time – to speak of Chinese “sovereignty” in a Westphalian sense of the term. Rather the 
relationship has been described loosely as “suzerainty” in Western vocabulary.175 Beijing’s 
influence in the country waxed and waned constantly until the balance tilted markedly in 
Lhasa’s favour after the tumultuous fall of the Qing dynasty. By 1913 and until the PRC’s 
invasion in 1950, Tibet was practically speaking an independent country which to some 
extent formulated foreign policy.
176
 This de facto independence was not least expressed at the 
Simla conference (1913–1914) when China and Tibet sent separate diplomatic representatives 
to negotiate with the colonial Government of India.
177
 Tibet’s diplomatic personality was also 
strengthened by its participation at the Asian Relations conference in New Delhi, March 
1947.
178
 On both occasions, the Tibetan presence was met with protests from various Chinese 
authorities. Nevertheless, the mere fact that Lhasa represented itself internationally and that 
Beijing had marginal or no influence in Tibet, testifies to the claim that Tibet was de facto 
independent of China in the period from the disintegration of the Qing Empire till the Maoist 
invasion of 1950–1951. 
 British India on the other hand exercised considerable influence in Tibet. As British 
influence expanded and consolidated in South Asia, the need to secure the riches of the Indian 
Empire from external threats became more pregnant. India was the “jewel in the crown” and a 
nerve centre of Britain’s global empire. During the course of the 19th century, British Indian 
strategists therefore nervously watched tsarist Russia’s expansion in Central Asia. As Russia 
progressively approached the northern frontiers of India, there was an increasingly strong 
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apprehension in the colonial government that it could be threatened from the north.
179
 At the 
closest, the Russian outposts in the Pamir region were only twenty miles away from the 
Indian frontier – a remarkable feat given that the distance had been around 2000 miles at the 
beginning of the 19th century.
180
 The Government of India responded by adopting various 
counter-strategies to the Russian thrust southwards. The consequential rivalry has been 
encapsulated in Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim as the “Great Game”, or, more poetically, as a 
“tournament of shadows” in Russian.181 From Calcutta’s perspective the gist of the Great 
Game lay in securing the geopolitical integrity of the subcontinent.
182
 In broad terms, there 
were two approaches shaping British thinking; the “forward school” and the so-called 
“backward school” – also known as the approach of “masterly inactivity”.183 Whereas the 
latter adopted a reactive approach to the defence of India – considering the existent 
borderlands of India sufficiently remote and secure to defend the heartlands – the former 
recommended a more proactive and expansive “forward” strategy. The wording “forward 
policy” is in itself a product of the Great Game, and is strongly associated with India’s activist 
Viceroy, Lord Curzon (1899–1905).184 An idea central to the forward school was the concept 
of adopting protective buffers around India. There were inner and outer circles forming a 
cordon sanitaire around the edges of the subcontinent.
185
 In the outer circle were areas 
geographically adjacent to India such as Persian Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Tibet. In order 
to secure India, it was necessary to have a certain control of these buffers. More precisely, it 
was deemed critical that Russia did not exercise influence in the outer circle. The British 
feared that Russia would exploit China’s weak presence in Tibet and then possibly project 
power on to the Indian plains from there. Inspired by a very real sense of concern, the colonial 
Government of India therefore adopted an interventionist policy in Tibet.
186
 British India did 
not control Tibet directly, but made sure that its security interests were respected and also 
acquired a series of extra-territorial privileges in the country. Thus, the leitmotif in British 
India’s Tibet policy was not to expel the decaying Qing Empire, but to contain the expansion 
of Russian power. A modicum of Chinese presence, or at the very least a formal Chinese 
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suzerainty in the area, was considered beneficial to British interests in order to keep the 
Russians out of Tibet. According to the Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, “the stronger we can make 
China (…) the more useful will she be to us as an obstacle to Russian advance.”187 China was 
therefore, in contrast to the situation in its former possessions in Vietnam, Mongolia or Korea, 
allowed to retain a nominal claim on Tibet.
188
 But when push came to shove, the Tibetans 
were de facto independent under British Indian influence.  
 The buffer policy of nurturing an independent, but impotent Lhasa under nominal 
Chinese suzerainty continued up to India’s independence. In fact, early independent India’s 
Tibet policy can largely be seen in continuity with the colonial government’s approach.189 
India did not only inherit the extra-territorial privileges of the Raj in Tibet, it also continued to 
consolidate Tibetan independence by for instance inviting separate Chinese and Tibetan 
delegations to the Asian Relations conference in Delhi 1947. Although explicit buffer policies 
were discredited by the anti-colonial ethos in the wake of independence, the British High 
Commissioner in New Delhi reported to his government that the new Indian government 
largely continued to follow the “forward” logic of supporting an autonomous Tibet.190 On the 
other hand, there were also marked ruptures. India did not fear Moscow’s influence in Tibet 
like the British in India had. Nor was China, still mired in civil war, considered to be a 
potential challenger to India in 1947. Nehru instead saw China as a crucial partner for India in 
building a peaceful and prosperous post-colonial Asia. In Nehru’s grand strategic perspective 
India’s relationship with Tibet was of minor importance compared to the centrality of Sino-
Indian friendship. 
By 1949, India was thus effectively following two separate policies of friendship; one 
towards Lhasa and another towards Beijing. The independent Government of India, it would 
seem, sought the best of both worlds. The subsequent development of Indo-Tibetan relations 
was largely the product of a dilemma. On the one hand, there was the desire for continued 
Tibetan autonomy and, implicitly, for a predictable, impotent neighbour as had been the case 
in and before 1947; on the other hand there was the urge not to alienate new China over 
comparatively minor issues. The dilemma was clearly visible in New Delhi’s handling of the 
Chinese invasion of Tibet in October 1950. India at first mildly protested against China’s 
violent course of action by sending three diplomatic notes.
191
 They sought to remind Beijing 
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of Tibet’s traditional autonomy and of the adverse consequences to the PRC’s international 
reputation and potential entry in the UN – for which India lobbied actively. The Indian 
reaction was firmly rebuffed by Beijing as an interference with China’s internal affairs and 
was followed by warnings that Tibet was no less than sovereign – not suzerain – Chinese 
territory.
192
 Nehru privately noted that “I think the Chinese have acted rather foolishly and 
done some injury to their cause. There is a strong feeling here of having been let down by 
them. Some people indeed are very angry” – but he simultaneously added that “I do not think 
all this is justified and we have to be careful not to overdo it.”193 Nehru thought there was an 
overreaction in Indian public opinion. The bottom line was that “our general policy remains 
the same.”194  
Nevertheless, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forced the 14th Dalai Lama to 
sign the “Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” in 1951, India’s 
geopolitical position had in fact been fundamentally altered. The buffer New Delhi had 
effectively inherited from the colonial government was irrevocably gone. It was the first time 
since 1793 that China had a major military presence in India’s immediate vicinity.195 
Vallabhbhai Patel recognised the change and its potential consequences in a personal letter to 
the Prime Minister: 
 
Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas 
have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly 
Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. (…) China is no longer divided. It is 
united and strong. (…) Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism are different from the 
expansionism or imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which 
makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, 
national or historical claims.  (…) a new threat has developed from the north and north-east.196 
 
Patel also suggested a series of practical countermeasures and called for a general 
reconfiguration of India’s China policy, and even non-alignment. In a reply formally 
addressed to the chief ministers Nehru acknowledged the geopolitical novelty of the situation, 
but apart from that dismissed Patel’s analysis and policy recommendations: 
 
we should be clear in our minds as to what we are aiming at, not only in the immediate future but 
from a long-term view. (…) In all probability China, that is present-day China, is going to be our 
close neighbour for a long time to come. We are going to have a tremendously long common 
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frontier. (…) Therefore it is important to pursue a policy which will be in keeping with this long-
term view.
197
 
 
Nehru considered it impossible for either India or any other country to stop China in Tibet. It 
was a mere fact that had to be accepted. His basic analysis was more or less the opposite of 
Patel’s; the best way to secure India’s interests in the new situation was not in confronting 
China, but in befriending it further. The original policy of co-operation with China was only 
strengthened by the fact that they were now becoming geographical neighbours. Therein lay 
New Delhi’s greatest and most cost-effective source of influence – to the benefit of both India 
and Tibet.
198
 Where Patel argued for a foreign policy reflecting what he considered to be 
India’s immediate needs, Nehru advocated a policy adjusted to India’s long-term grand 
strategic ambitions. He stressed the importance of interpreting and reacting to singular events 
in view of India’s long-term policy interests; Patel emphasised that India’s long-term policy 
interests must gradually be redefined in correlation with such singular events. The sense of 
time perspective and the manner of thinking in terms of ends and means were thus rather 
different between Nehru and Patel. So was the understanding of geography. Patel’s Himalayas 
were no “impenetrable barrier” any more, whereas in Nehru’s mind it was “inconceivable that 
[China] should divert its forces and its strength across the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and 
undertake a wild adventure across the Himalayas.”199 The Himalayas were still a natural 
barrier of defence, it would seem. In addition, a Chinese attack on India in the foreseeable 
future was “exceedingly unlikely” as it would “undoubtedly lead to world war”.200 Briefly 
put, China would not and could not threaten India militarily from Tibet, and Tibetan 
autonomy could be secured more efficiently by influencing a friendly China than by 
antagonising it. Confrontation was the least beneficial outcome for all parts, especially in a 
long-term perspective. 
 Nehru’s line of thinking prevailed. Patel passed away shortly after having formulated 
his warning and left the Prime Minister surrounded by political clients who did not 
substantially challenge his foreign policy deliberations.
201
 The decision to cultivate Sino-
Indian friendship despite the loss of the Tibetan buffer was brought ahead in the following 
years. A crescendo was reached in the form of the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954, by which 
India formally surrendered the extra-territorial rights it had inherited from the Indian Empire. 
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The agreement formalised the Indian policy of accepting China’s interests in Tibet and – most 
crucially – effectively acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over what was termed the “Tibet 
region of China”.202 It is debatable precisely how Nehru and the Government of India 
understood this term. The word “autonomy” was not mentioned in the treaty, but according to 
Nehru himself he was ensured, and firmly believed, that Tibetan autonomy would be 
respected by Beijing and that Tibet was no regular province of China.
203
 Beijing, it seemed, 
would let the inhospitable mountain country alone once it was formally under Chinese sway. 
To Nehru, a de facto autonomous “Tibet region of China” would meet both Lhasa’s concerns 
and Indian security apprehensions by reducing the need for strong Chinese presence in Tibet – 
and hence in India’s vicinity.204 This however was not stated explicitly in the treaty. India 
therefore principally secured what could be understood as a psychological buffer, replacing 
Lord Curzon’s geopolitical buffer in Tibet. This mental buffer was consolidated by the 
formulation of Panchsheel and by the friendly enthusiasm the agreement generated between 
New Delhi and Beijing; it was the beginning of the Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai period. The 1954 
agreement, according to Nehru's thinking, removed “the last vestiges of suspicion” in India-
China relations and opened the prospect for further strengthening the Sino-Indian 
partnership.
205
 The strategic need for agreement and co-operation between India and China 
was underlined when Pakistan in 1954 formally aligned with the United States and in that 
way, in Nehru’s eyes, brought the cold war directly to South Asia. Post-imperial quarrels in 
Tibet could not come in the way of Beijing and New Delhi’s partnership for an alternative 
world order. 
 The 1954 agreement thus seemed to promise China’s friendship to India, but it did not 
guarantee such friendship in the same way that India had effectively guaranteed recognition 
of the "Tibet region of China". Good bilateral relations were not legally binding, but were 
fundamentally political in nature. In hindsight, there has been a tendency to criticise Nehru for 
giving away too much – India's extra-territorial rights and its special relationship to Lhasa – 
for too little in return, i.e. temporary Chinese friendliness.
206
 On the other side, it is 
questionable whether Nehru had much choice in a situation where the geopolitical balance of 
power had already been altered in 1950. Interpreted from this perspective, the treaty of 1954 
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only gave legal recognition to a fait accompli from 1950.
207
 Moreover, Nehru's expectations 
of Tibetan autonomy were in large measure confirmed by Beijing in the period up to and after 
1954. Until internal unrest escalated seriously at the end of the 1950s – and especially with 
the revolt of 1959 – Tibet had a substantial degree of autonomy.208 When the Dalai Lama 
visited India in 1956 for the 2500th anniversary of the Buddha's birth, there were suggestions 
from other Tibetan leaders that he should stay on and work for Tibetan independence in co-
operation with the Government of India. But Nehru declined and advised him to return and 
work constructively with Beijing, as an autonomous region within the PRC in line with the 17 
point agreement of 1951.
209
 Nehru least of all wanted conflict in Tibet and was realist in the 
sense that he deemed it unfeasible for Tibet to break away from Beijing; a pragmatic political 
course was the only solution for Tibet, and by far the best alternative for India as a 
neighbouring country.  
India's Tibetan policy of consolidating a psychological buffer of friendship was 
gradually challenged from the outbreak of the Tibetan Khampa rebellion onwards. By 1958 it 
was becoming known in India that the idea of an autonomous Tibet was not consonant with 
the harsh realities on the ground.
210
 When China reacted to internal upheavals by severely 
tightening its military, political and economic grip, Nehru seemed to be left with broken 
promises and hopes of autonomy, but little more. By 1959, the last remnants of de facto 
Tibetan independence were crumbling while Chinese troops filled Curzon’s strategic buffer 
zone. Beijing reacted strongly to all perceived Indian interference in Tibetan affairs, this 
being considered as internal affairs at least since 1950, and in Chinese eyes, formally 
recognised as such by India in 1954.
211
 The Chinese invasion in 1950 had altered the 
geopolitical scene and 1954 had politically confirmed the altered balance of power by giving 
recognition of China’s interests in Tibet. The loss of Curzon’s geopolitical buffer in 1950 and 
the gradual weakening of Nehru’s psychological buffer by the end of the 1950s would 
indirectly present a major stumbling block to the Government of India’s grand strategic vision 
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of India-China co-operation. The problem would acquire a more direct nature in combination 
with another issue, the undefined territorial limits between Tibet and India. 
 
From frontiers to borders 
The Indo-Tibetan frontier ran along the world’s most massive chain of mountains, the 
Himalayas. In pre-colonial times these mountains had functioned as a natural barrier between 
India and Tibet. There was no precise border line as defined in a modern legal sense. Rather, 
the inhospitable mountain area constituted what can be understood as a natural frontier 
separating India from its northern neighbours by sheer physical force.
212
 It was a more or less 
overlapping area, a marchland in which the contiguous pre-colonial states had neither strong 
interest nor technological capacity to dominate efficiently. Tibet, or China via Tibet, rarely 
posed a security threat to Indian states, nor vice versa. The rock solid stability of the 
Himalayan frontiers was not seriously challenged until the advent of British colonial rule. The 
Europeans brought path breaking technology, new geopolitical strategies as well as foreign 
concepts of space and territoriality to India. They introduced ideas of more precise territorial 
delimitation than had been common in pre-colonial states.
213
 Like Tibet, the Himalayan 
frontiers became part and parcel of the geopolitical strategies of the Raj in Asia. India’s 
colonial frontiers were, in short, shaped by the Great Game.
214
 Securing an “un-Russian” 
Tibet was not sufficient for forward school strategists; in periods of Russian strength, it was 
also deemed important to expand the British Indian frontiers in such fashion as to facilitate 
and enhance the marginal defence of India. In other words, there was a tendency to enlarge 
the frontiers in periods of strategic uncertainty and reduce them, and the potential cost of 
maintenance, in periods of stability.  
 Stretching over 2000 miles, the entire Himalayan frontier was in reality composed of 
several frontiers; there were necessarily different areas with unique geopolitical 
characteristics. The entire frontier could roughly be divided in three parts: a western sector 
covering the frontier of Ladakh towards Xinjiang and western Tibet, a middle sector running 
largely north of the United Provinces (UP), and an eastern sector covering the area north of 
Assam and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). 
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Map 1. The three sectors of the frontier. Source: Lamb 1968: 118  
 
The middle and eastern sectors of the frontier were largely stable. By the Simla accord of 
1914 the colonial Government of India had in fact agreed with Tibetan authorities on a 
common border in the eastern sector, known as the McMahon line. Although the Chinese 
representative refused to sign the border agreement and only ambiguously initialled it, 
independent India thus inherited what it considered to be a legal and recognised border in the 
north-east. In British India, the eastern frontier – or de jure border after 1914 – was largely 
seen as stable and even “forgotten”.215  
 
Map 2. The eastern sector and the McMahon line. Source: Hoffmann 1990: 17 
 
The same could not be said of the western end of the Himalayas, at the trijunction of Ladakh, 
Tibet and East Turkestan (later called Xinjiang under Chinese rule). During the heyday of the 
Raj in the late 19th century, it was the portion of the frontier in Ladakh that attracted most 
attention. The principal cause for this was the geographical proximity to Russian forward 
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territories. Great Game strategists left significant imprints in this area of the frontier, but 
never succeeded in establishing a formal border line similar to the McMahon line in the east. 
The challenge initially arose after the British gained control of Jammu, Ladakh and Kashmir 
by the treaty of Lahore in 1846.
216
 The Maharaja of Kashmir who ruled these territories had 
no defined borders with Tibet or East Turkestan. But the Maharaja did have a history of 
exerting limited authority as far to the north as Shahidulla, north of Karakoram Pass, where an 
outpost had been established.
217
 
 
                            Map 3. Boundaries in the western sector. Source: Hoffmann 1990:  11 
 
The British government on several occasions sought to define a formal border with Chinese 
central authorities, but for various reasons the efforts ran into the sand – lastly in 1899.218 
Partly, this may have been because the Qing government was already under hard pressure in 
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the Han Chinese core areas and hence could not prioritise border negotiations in the imperial 
periphery of Xinjiang; partly they did not have much influence in Tibet; and partly the reason 
could be that London did not want to press the issue too hard with China. Indeed, Calcutta’s 
proactive frontier policies – i.e. the British Indian perspective – were often not in harmony 
with the political desires of Whitehall, which had to consider British interests in India as one 
component in a larger global perspective.
219
 For London, Britain’s global interests had 
precedence to the local interests of its colonies; enhancing the Indian frontiers at the cost of 
Anglo-Chinese relations was therefore not necessarily an attractive policy.  
 In any case, the imperial authorities in Beijing did not respond actively to the British 
initiatives. And the lack of a clear boundary constituted no major problem for British India 
given that neither China nor Tibet posed credible security threats. The lack of a de jure border 
was no obstacle to British rule as long as the Government of India was able to establish a 
frontier that served its geopolitical expediencies vis-à-vis the perceived Russian menace. This 
geopolitical logic was expressed by the unilateral adoption of border lines that developed and 
changed apace with the colonial bureaucracy’s threat perceptions. Among the many unilateral 
attempts to draw a British Indian boundary in the western sector, it is possible to distinguish 
between two main types: one expansive and one modest version.
220
 The expansive variety 
was typified by the Ardagh-Johnson line (1865) – which defined the territory up to the 
desolate Kuen Lun Mountains as Indian. The modest version was represented by the 
Macartney-MacDonald line (1899) and the Trelawney Saunders line (1873) which both 
roughly defined the Karakoram Mountains as the limits of Indian territory. The main 
territorial difference between the Kuen Lun and the Karakoram lines was the in-between 
plateau of Aksai Chin, a high altitude desert of around 14 000 square miles with no habitation 
or noteworthy natural resources.
221
 
 When the ambitious Survey of India explorer W. H. Johnson first drew a line along 
the Kuen Lun Mountains in 1865, it was in the context of Russian advances, unrest in 
Turkestan and on the basis of expansive territorial claims made by the Maharaja of 
Kashmir.
222
 The Trelawney Saunders line of 1873 and the Macartney-MacDonald line of 
1899, on the other hand, could be seen as expressions of Whitehall’s desire for a less 
expansive – and less expensive – frontier. The more modest proposal of a frontier along the 
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Karakoram mountain range was in fact also suggested as a point of departure for formal 
border talks with the Chinese authorities in 1899 – but Beijing did not respond to the 
invitation.
223
 In any case, the “forward” Viceroy Lord Curzon soon also rejected it and – 
urged on by recommendations from the director of military intelligence, John Ardagh – he 
returned to the Kuen Lun line proposed by Johnson and reconfirmed by Ardagh himself.
224
 
Although subsequent Viceroys differed in their perceptions of the frontier, the Ardagh-
Johnson line seems to have been revitalised as late as the Second World War when the British 
Indian government feared Soviet influence in Xinjiang.
225
 The available sources do not 
however positively confirm such speculations.
226
  
Most importantly, early independent India – lacking a formal border arrangement in 
the western sector – chose to officially settle for a slightly modified Ardagh-Johnson 
interpretation.
227
 It could be argued that the "forward" Ardagh-Johnson line was preferred as a 
substitute to the lost buffer of Tibet – much in line with British geopolitical calcultation.228 
On the other hand, India's formal cartographical claim to Aksai Chin came as late as 1953, 
when Sino-Indian relations were cordial; furthermore the claim was not followed up by 
control on the ground. The perceived pre-colonial activity of Indian states in the area seems to 
have been a key factor in the equation, although it was in fact controversial whether or not the 
Indian claim to Aksai Chin actually had sound historical foundations.
229
 Perceptions of 
identity and history seem to have been the underlying factor for adopting the expansive border 
line, although strategic considerations in the wake of 1950 may have functioned as a 
contributory cause.
230
 Whereas the Raj had principally been guided by geopolitical calculation 
in its frontier policies, early independent India thus seemed to be primarily driven by 
historical perceptions and identity. Due to a lack of primary sources from the Government of 
India on this matter, the discussion must to some extent be characterised as qualified 
speculation. For all practical purposes, however, both the Raj and the Union of India ended at 
the Karakoram Mountains.
231
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All in all, the question of the frontiers was a minor issue to the new Indian 
government. There were far more serious challenges to grapple with in the wake of partition. 
The question was not revitalised until the Chinese invasion of Tibet – at which point 
Vallabhbhai Patel expressed profound concern to the Prime Minister: 
 
we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as 
we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. (…) The Chinese interpretation of 
suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown 
all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting 
pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and 
acting during the last half a century. (…) The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on 
our side of a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential 
trouble between China and ourselves.
232
 
 
Nehru did recognise the observation that India faced new challenges after Beijing had 
reasserted its authority north of the Himalayas. But as in the case of Tibet, he argued that 
India's interests on the frontiers would be better served by ameliorating Sino-Indian relations 
than by provoking the Chinese. Nehru, in contrast to Patel, was of the opinion that China was 
not inclined to seriously threaten the Indian frontiers. His reasoning was partly based on a 
realist argument that China could not afford a "wild adventure" across the towering 
Himalayas against a friendly nation like India while simultaneously facing grave threats in its 
eastern heartlands from Formosa and Korea.
233
 But the argument would increasingly also be 
based on a notion that India's frontiers were stable because they were – from the Indian 
perspective – based on formal agreement (McMahon line of 1914) or historical precedence 
(Kuen Lun line in Ladakh) as well as natural geographical features like watershed.
234
 Nehru's 
legal and historical interpretation was further boosted during the course of the 1950s under the 
influence of the director of the MEA historical division, Sarvepalli Gopal.
235
 Partly, Nehru 
may have assumed that India's case was so clear that the Chinese had no good reason to 
question it. But mainly, he considered the frontiers to be an utterly marginal issue on the 
bright new horizon of the Asian family of nations – both for India and for China. 
 Indian maps reflected both the minor importance accorded to the frontiers as well as 
the gradually developing legal and historical interpretation of the Nehru government. In the 
official map of 1950, Aksai Chin had ambiguously been marked as undefined.
236
 The Survey 
of India did not cartographically depict the modified Ardagh-Johnson line as India's border 
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until revisions of the official maps began in 1953.
237
 During the negotiations in 1954 the 
cartographic claim was at best only implicitly expressed. In hindsight, a principal critique has 
been that India ought to have demanded Chinese guarantees for the Government of India’s 
interpretation of the entire frontier.
238
 This might have been a reasonable quid pro quo in 
return for the Government of India's acknowledgement of the "Tibet region of China". In fact 
it was also suggested in the MEA that Nehru should raise the topic of frontiers and borders 
with the Chinese – something which he declined to do, supported by ambassador K. M. 
Panikkar.
239
 The motivation behind this later much lamented decision may not so much have 
been Nehru's desire for China's friendship as the firm belief that there was really nothing to 
discuss in terms of India's borders – and that the Chinese would pay heed to this.240 Silence 
was interpreted as mutual acceptance. Upon reports that certain Chinese maps showed Indian 
claimed territory as Chinese, he did however – urged on by MEA officials – discuss the topic 
with Zhou Enlai privately during a visit to Beijing in 1954.
241
 The answers he received were 
reassuring enough: the PRC had not yet had sufficient time to update old maps and there was 
no reason to worry.
242
 In short, the border issue was no cause of major concern for the 
Government of India either before or after the Chinese invasion of Tibet. The Panchsheel 
agreement of 1954 and the Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai period succeeding it seemed to include an 
implicit "gentleman's agreement" on the Indian frontiers and claim lines.
243
 India’s frontiers 
appeared to remain unchallenged under the new buffer of friendship. In other words India 
claimed a “forward” frontier with Curzonian connotations, but simultaneously appeared to 
reject the power politics of the Great Game. 
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 India, in short, claimed territory it was not in physical possession of. The Chinese 
PLA on the other hand did actually rely on the Aksai Chin plateau for a transit route to Tibet 
already during the invasion of 1950–1. The Intelligence Bureau allegedly notified Indian 
authorities of the Chinese activity in the area during the early 1950s, but no further action was 
taken.
244
 Judging by the lack of exercise of sovereignty in the area, it would seem that Aksai 
Chin and the Kuen Lun line had no practical importance to Nehru's government. In contrast, 
the McMahon line was perceived as definite and legal in New Delhi right from independence. 
It has been suggested that in the early 1950s Nehru was in fact open to negotiate on Aksai 
Chin on the basis of pragmatic considerations and that it was not seen as non-negotiable 
Indian territory like areas south of the McMahon line.
245
 On the other hand, Nehru's emphasis 
on history and identity could imply that he may not have been willing to negotiate on Aksai 
Chin, despite the fact that India did not – or could not – prioritise effective domination of the 
desolate mountain region. Early Indian perceptions of the Kuen Lun alignment nevertheless 
seem to have been more nuanced than what became politically correct to argue after the 
public outbreak of the dispute.  
 
Tibet and the frontiers – a tournament of past shadows 
The fairly relaxed atmosphere in Sino-Indian relations would begin to change from early 1958 
onwards. Partly, the Khampa rebellion and the dismantling of traditional Tibetan autonomy 
were becoming known in India. Tibet was swarming with rebel and Chinese military activity. 
Closer to home the Government of India's territorial claims were simultaneously becoming 
openly challenged by Beijing. Since 1954 there had been minor territorial discrepancies at 
Bara Hoti in the otherwise little contested middle sector. Indian patrols repeatedly met 
Chinese troops on what was considered to be Indian territory by New Delhi, but nevertheless 
tried to avoid confrontations. In line with Zhou Enlai's reassurances that PRC maps had not 
yet been brought up to date, Nehru kept the issue of Bara Hoti discreetly away from 
parliament and the public eye.
246
 The Bara Hoti affair could thus be held at a low key 
bureaucratic level and was seen more in terms of a "petty issue" than of a serious territorial 
dispute.
247
  
 It was in the western sector that a potential territorial conflict between India and China 
first became evident to New Delhi. In September 1957 an official Chinese publication 
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announced that a motor road running from Xinjiang straight through Aksai Chin to Tibet was 
nearly completed.
248
 The Indian government  was informed about the road by its embassy in 
Beijing.
249
 When Indian military patrols were sent out to Aksai Chin on a reconnaissance 
mission in the following summer of 1958, they not only confirmed the information but one 
patrol was actually taken captive by Chinese troops.
250
 In parallel, bureaucratic level 
negotiations with Beijing on Bara Hoti in March and April 1958 turned out to be considerably 
tougher than the Indian side had expected.
251
 Combined with unsettling military activity in 
Tibet, the year 1958 and the developing events on the ground thus seemed to point in a 
different direction than the laudatory political rhetoric of the two governments. There was no 
doubt any more that the question of borders had to be explicitly discussed at the highest level 
so that the whole issue could be sorted out.  
 When Nehru finally sat down in December 1958 and wrote a frank letter to Zhou on 
the subject of borders, the vision of an Asian renaissance built upon Sino-Indian friendship 
remained India's leading star.
252
 But at the same time, the geopolitical developments in Tibet 
and on the frontiers meant that India-China relations more and more constituted an uneasy 
marriage. It consisted of two separate and increasingly incompatible tendencies that seemed 
to pull in opposite directions, yet still without breaking Nehru's much celebrated diplomatic 
edifice. On the one hand, there was Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai, on the other there was a Chinese 
motor road in the middle of Aksai Chin and a brewing revolt in Tibet; Curzon's geopolitical 
buffer was gone by 1951, and Nehru's alternative psychological buffer now seemed to be 
under pressure. But there was still room for an uneasy marriage within the broad church of 
Indian China policy in 1958. The cracks were barely visible to Nehru himself. Officially, 
Indians and Chinese were still brothers. China continued to be a pivotal long-term priority for 
Nehruvian India. 
 Did Nehru pursue a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis China? In hindsight, the 
Government of India has been accused of sacrificing not only Tibet, but also the integrity of 
India's frontiers on the altar of friendship with China. John W. Garver considers early 
Nehruvian China policy in the unflattering light of appeasement.
253
 The contrast between the 
time when Tibet was invited as an independent nation to the Asian Relations conference in 
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March 1947 to the point where India in 1954 formally acknowledged Tibet as a part of China 
could seem to point in that direction. So does the fact that Nehru refused to sponsor Tibet’s 
appeal to the UN in order to avoid “bitter speaking and accusation”.254 In contrast to 
Vallabhbhai Patel, the Prime Minister considered Sino-Indian friendship even more important 
after the invasion of Tibet and argued against antagonising China: “the real protection we 
should seek is some kind of understanding with China.”255 On the other hand, however, it is 
important to consider what credible options Nehru had at that time. Militarily or multilaterally 
there was not much India or any other country could have done to help Lhasa in 1950; the 
1954 agreement can thus merely be seen to have acknowledged a Chinese fait accompli.
256
 
The fact that Sino-Indian relations were accorded a higher priority than supporting the 
virtually lost cause of Tibetan independence does not necessarily justify the term 
appeasement. "Appeasement" in the sense of Chamberlain's policy in Munich 1938 cannot 
reasonably be applied as a term to Nehruvian Tibet policy.
257
 Nehru did not tactically buy 
time or barter in front of an expansionist power, but rather sought to lay the foundations for a 
grand strategic partnership he honestly believed in.
258
 When push came to shove, Nehru 
thought the best help India could realistically offer Tibet was to avoid antagonising Beijing.
259
 
A peaceful and de facto autonomous “Tibet region of China” would also favour Indian 
security apprehensions on the frontiers. As Sumit Ganguly has hinted at, early Nehruvian 
China policy could thus be understood as pragmatic rather than as appeasing.
260
 There may 
not be any clear distinction given that appeasement policies can also have clearly pragmatic 
aspects and vice versa. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that interpretations of the 
period are inevitably coloured by the present knowledge of subsequent historical 
development. Seen through the martial prism of 1962, it is facile to criticise the Government 
of India's early policies on China, Tibet and the borders. It must be a central historiographical 
ambition to employ this posterior insight with care and humbleness.
261
 Nehru deemed war 
between India and China to be “inconceivable”.262 The development from 1947 to 1958 must 
to the extent possible be understood on its own premises and in terms of its own context. 
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(iii) Asian light, Himalayan shadows 
In sum, Indian China policy in the period 1947–1958 reflected both the challenges facing an 
underdeveloped post-colonial state, as well as the ambitions and dreams its leaders harboured 
for the long run. The architect of India’s foreign policy, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 
considered Sino-Indian friendship as crucial not only for the future of India as a developing 
country, but also strategically for peace and stability in Asia: “I think the future of Asia and to 
some extent the world depends upon this.”263 Indian China policy was an expression of 
diplomatic grand strategy and came to embody a vision and a time aspect that was not only 
meant to cater to India's immediate day to day interests. It was designed to provide a fertile 
foundation for a comprehensive bilateral relationship of potential world importance.
264
 Indian 
China policy encapsulated Nehru's visions of an Asian renaissance with India and China as 
the central actors in a prosperous, peaceful and non-aligned Asia. In short, it was a 
cornerstone of his foreign policy. In parallel, India-China relations were nevertheless 
increasingly challenged by momentous geopolitical developments in the wake of the Chinese 
revolution of 1949. Indian China policy soon had to confront factors like the Chinese invasion 
of Tibet in 1950 as well as the nebulous state of India's long frontiers with what had by 1954 
become the "Tibet region of China".
265
 The relationship that seemed to be a perfect match in 
1947 had by 1958 developed into an uneasy marriage – still dominated by Nehru’s proactive 
policy of friendship, but simultaneously challenged by geopolitical developments on the 
ground. 
While there were obvious breaks with the past at the diplomatic and rhetorical level, 
the geopolitical dimension of early India-China relations revealed significant continuity with 
the colonial past. There was no tabula rasa, despite the euphoria of independence. The 
territorial parameters within which the new relationship was shaped were inherited from the 
Raj. In practical terms India came to defend 19th century colonial frontiers in the Himalayas, 
while China re-conquered its erstwhile imperial possession after a century of humiliation. 
Independent India inherited the fruits of the Great Game, but refused to continue playing it by 
the rules of Curzonian realpolitik. The political light of independence met the long 
geopolitical shadows of the past. In this twilight, the Prime Minister consistently downplayed 
individual negative developments in favour of long-term prospects and dismissed Patel's 
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clarion call. Sino-Indian friendship was too important to be derailed by “petty issues”. It is 
within this inherently unstable combination of pan-Asian optimism and post-Great Game 
geopolitics that the contextual origins and the root causes of the 1961 Forward Policy 
decision can be found.  
Despite new and disconcerting questions, Tibet and the frontiers still appeared to be 
separate details on the horizon of India-China relations. The psychological buffer was 
stronger than the impact of these individual geopolitical challenges. Within one year, 
however, the two factors would intertwine and forcefully break the superficial harmony of the 
Sino-Indian relationship. The first blow came with Zhou Enlai's reply letter of 23 January 
1959. It made clear to Nehru that Beijing did not recognise any "gentleman's agreement" in 
1954 and that the PRC and India in effect had a disagreement on the borders.
266
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II 
 
The Rise of the Border Dispute 
 
In late January 1959 the contours of a border dispute in Aksai Chin were casting shadows 
over Nehru's grand strategic vision of Sino-Indian partnership. But the emerging dispute was 
still subject to confidential analysis in New Delhi's corridors of power. During the course of 
the following two years, what had originally been portrayed in terms of "petty issues" 
metamorphosed into a painfully public territorial dispute between the two nations. The 
proximate causes of the Forward Policy decision can be identified within this time span. By 
late 1961 the Government of India had reached an impasse in which a new approach towards 
China seemed to be required. 
  In order to clarify the proximate causes of the Forward Policy decision, the Tibetan 
rebellion of 1959 and the subsequent external pressure that affected the Government of India 
will be discussed first. Secondly, the internal pressure on the government and the domestic 
dynamics of the conflict from the Tibetan rebellion and onwards will be examined. The initial 
response to this internal and external pressure in the form of diplomacy in 1960 will be 
discussed in a third section. Finally, the gradual hardening of Indian perceptions and the 
outcome of the diplomatic process will be analysed, followed by a concluding summary of the 
chapter.  
 
(i) External pressure 
The most cordial period of Sino-Indian friendship, from Panchsheel in 1954 to the discovery 
of the road in 1958, coincided with a relatively stable situation on the Tibetan side of the 
frontier. The Khampa rebellion had been simmering since the mid-1950s and escalated in 
1958, but largely took place in eastern Tibet far from the Indian frontiers. By spring 1959, 
however, a general rebellion was spreading throughout Tibet.
267
 Autonomy dwindled as the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched comprehensive counter-insurgency operations. A 
climax was reached in March 1959 when Lhasa came out in open revolt against Chinese rule. 
The PLA reacted severely to what was officially considered as a rebellion of "big serf-
owners".
268
 In these circumstances the Dalai Lama decided to escape from anticipated 
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captivity and on 31 March 1959 crossed the McMahon line over to Tawang to seek refuge in 
India, followed by thousands of his countrymen.
269
  
 To the great displeasure of the PRC his request was granted by the Government of 
India – on humanitarian grounds. Worse still, the Dalai Lama received an enthusiastic 
reception in Indian media and also had meetings with Nehru and Indian officials.
270
 From a 
Chinese perspective, this was a major set-back in the bilateral relationship and may have been 
one of the vital turning points in the already growing distance between New Delhi and 
Beijing.
271
 From Beijing's point of view, Indian policy seemed duplicitous; on the one hand 
publicly professing friendship with new China, on the other hand discreetly supporting its 
enemies in Tibet.
272
 Available Chinese sources seem to point in the direction that from 1959 
onwards, Chairman Mao and other central Chinese decision makers interpreted Indian policy 
moves in the light of an increasingly sensitive Tibet prism.
273
 The border conflict, and 
especially India's claim on Aksai Chin – with the strategically important road linking Xinjiang 
to isolated parts of Tibet – seems to have fitted well into a narrative of Indian designs on 
Tibet. Why else would India claim an area which even Prime Minister Nehru had admitted 
was of little practical use for India and where they had not even been in a position of actual 
occupation? Beijing suspected India of collaborating with the CIA and the western world in 
undermining Tibet's integration into the PRC.
274
 More to the point, Chairman Mao feared that 
the "Indian expansionists" wanted to "seize Tibet" from China and, in line with pre-1947 
imperial strategies, turn it into a buffer state or a colony.
275
  
 The new threat perceptions were first given mild expression in China's government 
controlled press from April 1959 through a series of critical articles on Indian policy and, by 
May, through elaborate personal attacks on "Nehru's philosophy".
276
 All public utterances or 
activities in India that were critical of Chinese Tibet policy came to be understood as 
interferences in China's internal affairs and hence as an assault on the Panchsheel agreement 
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of 1954. The Chinese ambassador on 16 May regretted the "large quantities of words and 
deeds slandering China and interfering in China's internal affairs" and in a slightly nebulous, 
but surprisingly candid tone warned that India could not afford to have "two fronts".
277
  
 From the perspective of the Government of India, the overall picture looked very 
different indeed. To Nehru, there were no other principled options available than granting the 
Tibetan leader humanitarian asylum – despite conscious awareness of the detrimental impact 
this could have on India-China relations.
278
 Neither was there much a democratic government 
could do to hinder expressions of pro-Tibetan sympathies by the Indian public – sympathies 
that were in turn vigorously reflected by the opposition in parliament. The nuances in Nehru's 
handling of the Dalai Lama and the Tibet question were rooted in India's liberal democratic 
system of government and may have been difficult to grasp for the revolutionary Chinese 
government.
279
 In his meeting with the Dalai Lama on 24 April, Nehru recognised that the 
Chinese "suspect everything we say" and explained that "at the moment, our relations with 
China are bad". He stressed the need to "recover the lost ground" and "retain good relations 
with China". War was no option, and "cursing the Chinese was no alternative." The Dalai 
Lama in turn acknowledged the Indian government's concerns and "agreed that India should 
be in the middle and try to help Tibet through China [and that] the attempt should be to 
develop good relations between India and China so as to find a solution to Tibet".
280
 In the 
midst of increasingly severe public reactions to China, Nehru was thus focussed on mending 
Sino-Indian relations. A return to constructive dialogue would be the key to influence Beijing 
in a more advantageous direction for India and Tibet alike.  
 There may all in all have been a lack of understanding in India for the delicate Chinese 
sensitivities over Tibet – especially so in parliament, press and public opinion. But on the 
other hand, there was equally a lack of Chinese understanding for the vocal nature of India's 
heterogeneous democratic society. Foreign Secretary Dutt, under Nehru's instructions, 
responded to the Chinese ambassador's complaints of 16 May by explicitly pointing out that 
"it is evident that this freedom of expression, free press and civil liberties in India are not fully 
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appreciated by the Government of China, and that hence misunderstandings arise."
281
 It was 
in many ways a conflict of two fundamentally different political cultures that was brought 
afore by the Tibetan revolt and the entry of the Dalai Lama to India in March 1959.
282
 
 
Militarisation of the Tibetan frontier 
If India's sympathetic public reception of the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees 
was a major source of irritation and concern for Beijing, the increased Chinese military 
activity in the frontier areas would in turn become the principal challenge for India. Nehru 
held his knowledge of the increasingly strained situation discreetly away from a by then 
inquisitive parliament, and publicly stressed the need for a balanced and calm approach to 
China.
283
 Simultaneously, Indian patrolling along the eastern frontier was increased.
284
 
Intelligence reports noted the large presence of Chinese troops on India's northern frontiers 
and underlined the fact that their strength by far outweighed India's own capabilities there.
285
 
Now that Sino-Indian relations were straining and Tibetan autonomy was waning, Tibet was 
no more a buffer to speak of either in geopolitical or in psychological terms. By summer 1959 
the Sino-Indian friendship had cooled down considerably. Nevertheless, armed conflict 
between the two Asian powers seemed both improbable and highly undesirable in New Delhi. 
In a letter to his sister, at that time High Commissioner to London, Nehru wrote of how "the 
Chinese are always and, more especially now, given to arrogance and throwing their weight 
around", but also stressed that "our approach is different [from people used to the cold war]" 
and that "it does little good to shout loudly and denounce and condemn."
286
 The Chinese 
military activities were interpreted in the context of the Tibetan revolt, not from the 
perspective of a potentially violent border dispute. The cause of the current turbulence seemed 
above all to stem from Tibet and the Dalai Lama rather than from the new uncertainties on the 
frontier in Aksai Chin. From an Indian perspective, Tibet and Aksai Chin still seem to have 
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been treated as two technically separate issues, in contrast to the evolving Chinese 
interpretation of seeing them as two aspects of one and the same problem. 
 The Chinese militarisation of the Tibetan frontier in the wake of the rebellion and the 
increased level of patrolling on both sides logically resulted in more frequent and direct 
contact than previously. As there was no demarcated border, this contact resulted in a number 
of local tensions and allegations of border incursions. Clashes became "almost inevitable".
287
 
Two particular occasions stick out because of their relative severity and because of their 
political ramifications in India; firstly the skirmish at Longju in late August, but especially the 
clash at Kongka Pass on 21 October 1959. At Longju, which was situated in the eastern 
sector, Indian and Chinese border patrols clashed for the first time on 25 August 1959 leaving 
one Assam Rifles man dead and one seriously wounded.
288
 The following day, India was 
militarily forced to pull out of Longju. According to Beijing, India was to blame for the 
episode – not least because the Indian picket at Longju was itself north of the "so-called 
McMahon line" and that Indian presence was thus unwarranted even by the in Chinese eyes 
unequal 1914 Simla accord.
289
 India, on the other hand, rejected the Chinese allegations with 
the argument that Longju was south of the watershed and thus, by interpretation, part and 
parcel of the 1914 border. Furthermore, according to the Government of India, the twelve 
man picket of the paramilitary Assam Rifles had been assaulted by a Chinese force of 200 to 
300 troops, and could thus be characterised as "deliberate aggression".
290
 The tension between 
the two countries was more visibly manifest than ever before. 
 In tactical terms Longju had merely been a skirmish, but it nevertheless made Indian 
government officials painfully aware of the unequal levels of military clout on the frontier. 
The formal responsibility for securing the border was therefore delegated from the 
paramilitary unit of the Assam Rifles to the Indian Army.
291
 But in reality, little practical 
change ensued.
292
 Nehru's established tenet of seeking long-term security through cordial 
relations to China was only reconfirmed. In his own words, to the Dalai Lama, the challenge 
was to follow "a middle but difficult course" retaining good relations without "surrender to 
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China's strength".
293
 From a point of view of realpolitik, Foreign Secretary Dutt told the 
American deputy chief of mission on 5 September that "we have to be friends with the 
powerful country with whom we have a border of 2680 miles."
294
 As one single instance of 
external pressure on India, Longju therefore did not fundamentally shake the Indian grand 
strategic approach to China. No major initiatives were taken apart from an intensified 
exchange of notes and Indian diplomatic efforts to engage the Soviet Union in restraining 
Chinese aggressiveness.
295
  
 Among the external factors that did seem to open a veritable Pandora's box in terms of 
Indian China policy were (a) the letter Nehru received from Zhou on 8 September and (b) a 
new and far more serious clash at Kongka Pass in Ladakh on 21 October 1959. Zhou's 
September letter clearly and explicitly stated that China considered the entire Sino-Indian 
frontier as both undelimited and undemarcated.
296
 It thus seemed to throw the whole 2600 
mile frontier into the melting pot of negotiation, including the McMahon line which Nehru 
had vigorously defended since 1950 and which he had considered recognised and approved 
by Zhou Enlai on several occasions in the period 1954–1957.297 Nehru described the tone and 
contents of the letter as a "great shock" and answered it on 26 September by defending India's 
interpretation of the frontier in unprecedented detail.
298
 To the Indians, the entire border was 
not under any circumstance open to negotiation. Nevertheless, there were implicit nuances: 
the McMahon line seemed to be given far greater importance than the apparently still rather 
vague Indian claim on Aksai Chin, which Nehru, barely a week after Longju, described in 
parliament as "a barren uninhabited region without a vestige of grass".
299
 It is not 
inconceivable that Nehru could have been inclined to discuss the status of Aksai Chin at this 
early point of the dispute. The Chinese disavowal of the entire frontier however offered no 
acceptable basis for negotiations.  
 The Chinese letter of 8 September 1959 made an impact of surprise on Nehru 
personally and seemed to mark the end of his and Zhou's personal bonhomie.
300
 The lingering 
notion of a serious disagreement brewing between India and China was further compounded 
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in October. On the 21, a second major clash took place between Indian and Chinese personnel 
at Kongka Pass, south of Aksai Chin in Ladakh. Again the parties accused one another of 
aggression. But there was no denying that only one Chinese had been killed whereas ten 
Indian police officers patrolling near the pass were left dead, apparently under heavy fire – the 
remaining ten being captured and "treated badly while in custody".
301
 These facts could point 
in the direction of a Chinese attack.
302
 On the other hand it also revealed the fact that the 
Indian border police, under the direction of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), patrolled more 
actively forward in Ladakh than previously.
303
 In any circumstance, according to India's 
official history of the war, "the mask from the Chinese face was now off".
304
 IB director 
Mullik, in hindsight described Kongka Pass as the first major precursor to what he terms the 
Chinese "betrayal" in 1962.
305
 From Nehru's point of view too it seemed to be the final straw 
that broke the camel's back – at least in terms of genuine Sino-Indian friendship.306 Chinese 
policies towards India appeared increasingly capricious and aggressive, quite different from 
what he would have expected only a few months earlier.
307
  
 Nevertheless, escalation to armed conflict was still by no means a likely scenario in 
the eyes of the Prime Minister. Kongka Pass, in combination with Longju and the 8 
September letter, did provoke changes in Nehru's view of China, but his China policy was not 
fundamentally altered. As in NEFA after Longju, the army was promptly charged with the 
main responsibility in Ladakh, marking a superficial shift of power from the local border 
police and the IB towards the professional army. The unprepared 4th Division was eventually 
dispatched from the scorching plains of Punjab to the towering heights of the Himalayas in 
NEFA.
308
 Nevertheless, these were superficial measures. At an emergency cabinet meeting in 
late October 1959, Nehru, according to American intelligence, 
 
indicated that border fighting did not constitute a threat to India. The strategic Chinese threat, he 
maintained, lies in the rapidly increasing industrial power base of China as well as the building of 
military bases in Tibet. The only Indian answer, he continued, is the most rapid possible 
development of the Indian economy to provide a national power base capable of resisting a 
possible eventual Chinese Communist military move. Nehru seemed to believe that the Chinese 
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could not sustain any major drive across the "great land barrier" and that the Chinese threat was 
only a long term one.
309
 
 
The main points of this recently declassified rendition seem credible. The autumn of 1959 
may have put an end to Nehru's fervent desire for Sino-Indian friendship, but it did not alter 
the grand strategic outlook of cultivating an international framework conducive to domestic 
development. Defence was still seen in a holistic, long term perspective – despite clashes with 
China in Ladakh and NEFA. While recognising a potential Chinese military threat to India in 
the long term, it was still considered improbable by the Prime Minister in the short term. If 
the potential Chinese threat had not been seen in such long term perspective, far stronger 
preparatory measures could reasonably have been expected to be taken within a relatively 
short time.
310
 Only minor adjustments were in fact made, something which was partly also 
reflected in the roughly unaltered defence budgets of the country in the period 1959–1961.311 
The mighty Himalayas were still perceived as a natural barrier against potential Chinese 
adventurism, just like Nehru had outlined to Patel back in 1950.
312
 
 Nonetheless: by autumn 1959 the awareness of a potentially threatening China was 
undoubtedly stronger than before, also in Nehru's mind. There was a strong feeling of having 
been let down by the Chinese, and in parts of the government there was outright hostility 
towards China after August-October.
313
 In the opinion of the IB director, the Chinese were in 
effect pursuing a "forward policy" by steadily expanding their occupation of Indian claimed 
territory, especially in Ladakh.
314
 Seen together the external Chinese pressure on the 
Government of India, as epitomised not only at Longju and Kongka Pass, but also verbally in 
Zhou's 8 September letter, thus provoked a negative reaction within important parts of the 
Indian government. Perhaps most importantly, it would also ignite the anger of an 
increasingly agitated public opinion. 
 
(ii) Internal pressure 
Since the outbreak of the Tibetan rebellion – and more particularly since the entry of the Dalai 
Lama in India in March 1959 – the outwardly much celebrated Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai was 
increasingly questioned by public opinion. Indian China policy was gradually moving out 
from the excluding conference rooms of South Block and Teen Murthi Bhavan to the raucous 
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sphere of the general public. Indian media coverage on Tibet was strongly biased with 
sympathy to the Tibetans, not least as the defenders of a unique Buddhist culture with roots in 
India. The national newspapers poured out articles demanding stronger Indian pressure on 
Beijing to respect Tibetan autonomy. The pro-Tibetan feelings were soon reflected in a 
parliament that not only genuinely shared the concerns expressed in the press, but whose 
opposition members were equally quick to grasp an opportunity to criticise the massively 
dominant Nehru government.
315
 Jayaprakash Narayan, a fêted politician and independence 
activist, advocated the cause of Tibetan independence; the right-wing Jana Sangh party went 
further and loudly argued that India should abandon non-alignment and ally with the United 
States in order to "liberate" Tibet.
316
 Nehru plainly rejected such demands and emphasised 
that India had recognised Tibet as part of the People's Republic in 1954 and that this was still 
to be India's policy. But as a concession to public feelings he also – adding to Beijing's 
increasing suspicion – underlined India's intimate feelings of "deep sympathy" towards Tibet 
as the cultural "offshoot" of India; Nehru stressed that Tibet was no regular province of 
China, but an autonomous region within the People's Republic.
317
  
 First and foremost, however, the Prime Minister gently tried to steer parliament and 
the public away from emotional overreactions. For the sake of the "peace of Asia and the 
world" he urged Indians and Chinese alike to avoid the infelicitous language of the cold war 
and underlined that "it would be a tragedy if the two great countries of Asia (...) which have 
been peaceful neighbours for ages past, should develop feelings of hostility against each 
other."
318
 In fact, Nehru increasingly addressed two audiences simultaneously, the Indian 
people as well as the Chinese government. Both were paying close attention to his numerous 
public statements. While he was hardly able to significantly placate the sensitive Chinese, the 
Prime Minister was – importantly – still able to rein in or at least largely avoid the displeasure 
of Indian public opinion, which was quickly turning a cold shoulder to China and its brutal 
counter-insurgency tactics in Tibet. Nehru was in effect increasingly riding two horses at once 
and, for the time being, managed not to fall in between.  
 A vital precondition for this precarious balance had been the widespread use of 
confidentiality in border matters. Indeed, Nehru had deliberately withheld information from 
parliament on the development of the frontiers.
319
 Neither the road in Aksai Chin, nor Zhou's 
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January letter were publicly known. The main motive for this secrecy may be assumed to 
have sprung out of a raison d'état to ensure maximal diplomatic manoeuvrability vis-à-vis 
China. This was not least useful in the case of Aksai Chin where Nehru himself seemed 
doubtful of a foolproof Indian claim.
320
 As tensions grew on the newly militarised frontiers, 
reports of border incidents and Chinese incursions were still kept confidential to avoid public 
hysteria and in order to facilitate potential negotiations.
321
 The turning point came with the 
skirmish at Longju in late August. With mounting pressure in the press and parliament, a 
fairly large incident like Longju made a strategy of continued confidentiality politically 
untenable. It would be difficult to hide from the public eye and would hence require 
explanations. Speaking in an agitated parliament on 28 August and on 4 September 1959, 
Nehru broke the silence and gave detailed statements on the general state of affairs of the 
Sino-Indian frontier – including the road in Aksai Chin. But he simultaneously stressed that it 
was not becoming of a major country like India to take action in anger, and that, in the larger 
interest of the nation, friendship with China must still be the objective.
322
 The revelations 
nevertheless produced an intense reaction. While vigorously refusing angry calls made even 
by senior Congress members to "bomb the Chinese out of NEFA" or take Aksai Chin by 
force, Nehru did – most importantly – agree to a request from the Jana Sangh's Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee on 28 August to put all further cards on the public table.
323
 The subsequent decision 
to issue government white papers presumably containing all diplomatic documents and letters 
exchanged between India and China since 1954 was the decisive break with the confidential 
and discreet handling of the border question. 
 Along with Nehru's frank addresses to parliament after Longju, the white paper 
decision was an important turning point in the dynamics of the border conflict.
324
 From the 
issue of the first white paper on 7 September 1959, Indian China policy became increasingly 
influenced by domestic politics. More to the point, it severely curtailed the Prime Minister's 
room to act freely vis-à-vis China because he now constantly had to assess the domestic 
reception of all moves.
325
 Vice versa, the government's policy moves were in logical 
consequence increasingly calibrated to fit with the demands and expectations of the general 
public. The first white paper set the standard and was regularly followed by new ones, thus 
turning the development of Sino-Indian relations into a highly public process. A consequence 
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of this was that Nehru had a hard time riding the two horses of his China policy. The political 
power of commentators, journalists and opposition members increased at the cost of the 
government's executive discretion. In diplomatic communications with the Chinese, the 
government would have to consider the domestic implications of any message sent, whereas 
in communicating with the Indian public, the government would also have to consider 
Chinese reactions. Hence it became easy to disappoint both audiences simultaneously and 
impossible to satisfy both. By stressing the grand strategic demand for a peaceful relationship 
with China, Nehru risked estranging the frustrated electorate calling for retaliation. By 
conceding to bellicose rhetoric, he risked not only to break his own principles but also to turn 
a powerful and revolutionary China into the truly threatening neighbour he now feared it 
might become. The diminished room for nuances in public discourse made Nehru's 
sophisticated grand strategic approach more difficult to advocate. 
 Why did Nehru not stick to his guns and retain a protective lid of confidentiality? 
There is no evidence available that Nehru released white papers deliberately in order to 
pressure China under the cover of public opinion. Rather, the cognitive dissonance between 
the Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai-topos and actual happenings on the ground had become too 
pronounced to carry on with confidentiality as before Longju. Parliament was angered by the 
skirmish and felt deceived by the government's increasingly obvious secrecy. The release of 
more information, in short, appeared to be a political necessity. Nehru's respect for 
parliamentary democracy may have added a dimension of principle to the decision. 
Additionally, from a tactical point of view, the white papers would ostensibly demonstrate to 
the people that the government had in fact responded actively to the Chinese challenges.
326
  
 Contrary to what Nehru and his advisers might have expected, the effect of the 7 
September white paper, combined with the revelations in parliament, was one of havoc in the 
press and severe criticism against the government's "soft" China policy.
327
 Even within his 
own party the Prime Minister had to contend with open criticism.
328
 Rather than convincing 
the general public of an active Indian approach, the new information added fuel to the fire of 
discontent. In a public relations perspective the timing of the Kongka Pass clash a couple of 
weeks later was therefore extraordinarily damaging for the image of China in India. 
Furthermore, it seriously discredited the Prime Minister's calls for a modest and measured 
Indian approach to the border question. Already provoked by Longju and the white paper 
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revelations, the major incident at Kongka Pass seemed to constitute a point of no return in 
public opinion. Sino-Indian brotherhood was practically speaking dead as anger was roused to 
the "boiling point".
329
 In the belief that India would be capable of it, there were open calls for 
a military response against China in major national newspapers like the Indian Express and 
the Hindustan Times.
330
  
 Nehru now faced the delicate task of responding to China in a proportionate manner 
while at the same time calming the martial attitudes and "brave talk" of journalists and 
parliamentarians in New Delhi.
331
 In his language he turned markedly firmer, but still both 
publicly and privately stressed the need to avoid a large scale conflict. In parliament the Prime 
Minister boldly pronounced that "if war is thrust upon us, we shall fight, and fight with all our 
strength" and reassured the house that "at no time since independence have our Defence 
Forces been in better condition, in finer fettle".
332
 But he immediately toned down the 
statement by making clear that he would try to prevent war by all possible means.
333
 The 
sharpened tone in Nehru's discourse on China was not merely an instrumental concession to 
public opinion and future white papers, but also reflected Nehru's personal disappointment 
with the new course of Sino-Indian relations. But political pressure and personal 
disappointment did not mean that recourse to military pressure or armed conflict was an 
option. Again, no major policy moves were taken to follow up on the rhetorical sabre-rattling. 
The Chinese challenge was if anything first and foremost a long-term challenge that could 
only be countered by the development of the Indian economy and heavy industry.
334
 
 The initial impact of the domestic pressure on the government was thus manifested in 
sharper words rather than in actual policy initiatives. The pressure of public opinion would 
not, however, go away and for the democratically elected Congress government it was a force 
to reckon with. The border dispute was progressively ridden with the passions of popular 
nationalism. When Nehru after Kongka Pass emphatically stated that "you cannot barter your 
self-respect or honour", he very much reflected the emotions of a post-colonial nation in 
search for identity and unity.
335
 But when he soberly assessed Aksai Chin to be a barren 
wasteland of minor practical importance to India, he did not reflect those same emotions.
336
 
From being an unknown naked desert in the high Himalayas, Aksai Chin rapidly acquired a 
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notion of holy soil and sacred motherland in the public sphere.
337
 The plateau became a 
symbol of the nation's pride and self-respect. This metamorphosis contributed to restrict the 
government's diplomatic scope of action. Nehru still appeared ambiguous with regards to the 
Indian claim to Aksai Chin, but that ambiguity was increasingly overshadowed by the vocal 
nationalism on India's domestic scene.
338
 At a private meeting in late 1959 Nehru is reported 
to have recognised the symbolic power of Aksai Chin and told his two interlocutors that "if I 
give them that I shall no longer be Prime Minister of India – I will not do it."339 Perhaps for 
the first time, Nehru's de facto foreign affairs monopoly was about to be broken. He was no 
longer free to define Indian China policy independent of public opinion, parliament and 
cabinet colleagues.
340
  
 
(iii) The diplomatic response 
The combination of external Chinese pressure and strong internal opposition contributed to 
undermine Nehru's flexibility on Aksai Chin. But it did not affect his preference for a 
peaceful and negotiated settlement of the dispute. According to the CIA, Zhou and Mao 
apparently shared this desire for a negotiated solution; at the time they considered increased 
tension with India as unfavourable to their international image and larger foreign policy 
interests.
341
 The question, however, was on which preconditions negotiations were to take 
place. The parties only seemed able to agree on the principle of talking and on avoiding 
further clashes. Behind the formal phrases and calls for negotiations expressed in the 
diplomatic notes, the atmosphere for meaningful negotiations was slowly evaporating. 
 The core of Zhou's argument in the 8 September letter was that, pending formal 
negotiations on the delimitation, i.e. the cartographic location, and demarcation, i.e. the 
physical location of the border, the status quo must be maintained. That was to say: the 
current and actual position of the parties in the frontier areas must be respected to avoid new 
clashes and unilateral action.
342
 "Greatly surprised and distressed", Nehru vehemently 
                                                         
337
 See Misra 2007: 309 
338
 Before the clash at Kongka Pass, Nehru repeatedly stated in parliament that Aksai Chin was an uninhabited 
mountain region in which "it is not quite clear what the position is", thus very different from the McMahon line; 
see for example Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, August 28, 1959, in: Nehru 1961. Nehru may thus have been 
preparing Indian opinion for potential negotiations with China regarding the ownership of the region; United 
States. CIA March 1963: 34 
339
 Reported by one of the three present at the meeting to Neville Maxwell 1970/1997: 161 
340
 Brown 2004: 320; see Kapur 2009: 69; Hoffmann 1990: 255 
341
 United States. CIA August 1963: i 
342
 Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India, 8 September 1959, in: White Paper II. 
The idea was first formulated in the letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India, 23 
January 1959, in: White Paper I 
 66 
repudiated the allegation that no part of the frontier had been delimited.
343
 The Indian 
argument was that most parts of the frontier, and prominently the McMahon line, had indeed 
been delimited. It was agreed that it had not been properly demarcated, but that was a 
comparatively minor affair which could be settled amicably without throwing large areas of 
Indian territory into the melting pot of negotiation. Secondly, Nehru strongly disagreed with 
the Chinese notion of "status quo" as the actual present state and requested the Chinese 
premier to first "withdraw their personnel from a number of posts which you have opened in 
recent months".
344
 In the Indian reading "status quo" was an unclear notion in itself. An 
acknowledgement of Zhou's interpretation of status quo, it was feared, would be tantamount 
to legitimising the fait accompli established by recent Chinese occupation, especially in 
Ladakh.
345
 By status quo, India in effect referred to status quo ante and deemed that "no 
discussions can be fruitful unless the posts on the Indian side of the traditional frontier now 
held by the Chinese forces are first evacuated by them and further threats and intimidations 
immediately cease."
346
 In plain speaking, India would not negotiate unless China first pulled 
out of the areas which India considered Indian and which had been occupied by China over 
the preceding months – thus leaving a certain room for ambiguity on whether Aksai Chin 
itself had to be evacuated along with the newer Chinese posts elsewhere in Ladakh.
347
 The 
formulation of this precondition for discussions was significant, not least because it 
crystallised into a more or less permanent Indian stance that would be recapitulated up to the 
outbreak of war in 1962.
348
 
 The correspondence between the two prime ministers continued throughout 1959 and 
early 1960, but brought little new to the fore. The argumentation was repetitive and the clash 
at Kongka Pass contributed to limit Nehru's political scope of action and his early pragmatism 
on Aksai Chin. Both parties tried to avoid further border clashes by restricting patrol activity, 
but on the subject of negotiations the prospects looked rather meagre.
349
 Zhou's suggestion of 
a 20 km buffer zone on each side of the line of actual control was rejected on the same 
grounds that his earlier suggestion of merely retaining the status quo had also been 
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rejected.
350
 India answered in kind by calling for a Chinese withdrawal to the international 
border as interpreted by India, and would in exchange pull back to the claim line stated in 
Chinese maps of 1956.
351
 The Indian suggestion would in fact entail a major Chinese retreat, 
including from the Aksai Chin road, while India would only have to pull back from a few 
marginal areas. It was hence rejected in a letter from Zhou to Nehru in which the idea was 
described as "absolutely unconvincing".
352
 From the Chinese point of view, it was a telling 
fact that India had not been in actual occupation of the land it claimed to be Indian. From 
India's point of view, the Chinese intrusion could not ipso facto be considered legal just 
because India had not registered it to begin with.
353
  
 Nehru expressed "great shock" while Zhou wrote of "extreme regret" in the 
correspondence.
354
 The diplomatic effort in the wake of Longju and Kongka Pass seemed to 
have run out of steam. Nehru saw no realistic chance of reaching an agreement "where there 
is such complete disagreement about the facts."
355
 After having read China's first detailed 
defence of its border interpretation dated 26 December 1959, Nehru wrote to Zhou that he did 
not see "for the moment (...) any common ground between our respective viewpoints."
356
  
 
The decision to meet 
With Nehru's negative assessment fresh in mind, the following paragraph may well have been 
surprising reading for the Chinese premier: 
 
Nevertheless I think we should make every effort to explore avenues which might lead to a 
peaceful settlement. Although any negotiations on the basis you have suggested are not possible, 
still I think it might be helpful for us to meet. (...) You will be our honoured guest when you come 
here.
357
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Nehru was in effect offering to see Zhou in New Delhi within a few months time – without 
preconditions. Although it was made painstakingly clear that the meeting could not be 
considered as "negotiations", the new signals from India seemed no less than a major 
deviation from the policy expounded since September 1959. Zhou was "very glad" to 
accept.
358
  
 Why did Nehru give up demanding Chinese concessions as a precondition to meet? 
The answer is contingent upon how the Indian proposal of "talks" is interpreted. At least three 
motives can be considered in the decision: a tactical, a conciliatory and an international. From 
the Chinese point of view the suggestion of unconditional talks seems to have been 
interpreted more in terms of negotiations than of a mere "meeting". The Indians were quite 
surprised when they found out that Zhou planned to bring a large delegation with him to 
Delhi in April 1960 – for no less than six days.359 Beijing thus seems to have had fairly large 
expectations for the visit. The Chinese may have thought that Nehru publicly said "talks" as a 
sop to public opinion, but in reality meant negotiations. The Indian inclination to portray the 
meeting as something lesser than negotiations could indeed reasonably be seen to follow from 
the popular pressure and ire ignited by the turbulence since March 1959.
360
 On the other hand, 
while it is undoubtedly true that the idea of explicitly renouncing earlier preconditions in 
order to negotiate would have been frowned upon in parliament and the press, this approach 
ran the risk of underestimating Nehru's growing personal suspicion with Chinese motives. 
Indeed, it may have been Nehru's primary goal to talk with Zhou to understand him and the 
Chinese position better, rather than to actually negotiate.
361
 Nehru's suggestion to meet may 
have been more of a tactical initiative in an otherwise frozen situation than a sign of 
substantial thaw in the Indian position.
362
 Given that Zhou in fact encountered little Indian 
flexibility, the tactical motive seems to be confirmed at least as a partial motivation for 
Nehru's 5 February initiative.
363
 
 If Nehru had not necessarily meant "negotiations" by inviting Zhou on 5 February, he 
did nevertheless express a genuine desire for peaceful settlement. The peaceful resolution of 
the border dispute was inherently more important than the borders per se: it was the key to re-
establish Sino-Indian relations on an even keel and to proceed on the long way towards the 
Asia Nehru had envisioned. India's official history portrays Nehru's decision to drop 
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preconditions in light of the desire for peace and friendship with China – even at a time when 
India, according to the government historians, had been wronged by Chinese forward 
movements on the frontier.
364
 Writing to a member of parliament before the meeting, the 
Prime Minister stressed that talking to adversaries had run like a thread through his career 
both before and after independence and that Zhou would be no exception.
365
 Talks did not 
guarantee improvement, but neither was there much to loose. Nehru was deeply convinced 
that India had the better over-all argument and may have considered it possible to exert some 
moral and intellectual pressure on Zhou by demonstrating the logic of the Indian position. It 
may also have been a motive to make Zhou personally feel how passionately the border 
question was seen in India.
366
 At the very least, a meeting might give the Chinese a better 
understanding of India's position.
367
 
 Finally, Nehru's decision to meet Zhou can be understood in an international 
perspective. Independent of the underlying motives for inviting Zhou to New Delhi, a visible 
effort to solve the dispute by peaceful means would be appreciated in an international 
community which was beginning to pay attention after the clashes of 1959.
368
 More 
particularly the Soviet Union, which had friendly relations with both India and China, saw the 
border dispute as destructive.
369
 Speaking to an international correspondent, Khrushchev 
discredited the story as "sad and stupid", particularly since Aksai Chin was an unpopulated 
wasteland.
370
 The concerned Soviet attitude was repeated on numerous occasions to Indian 
officials and to the leading politicians of both India and China. During Nehru's talks with 
Khrushchev on 12 February 1960, the Soviet leader emphasised that 
 
we would not  like our relations with either of our two friends to cool off (...) Our warmest wishes 
are that this conflict may come to an end as soon as possible and in a manner which will be to the 
satisfaction of all concerned. This conflict is a sop to the aggressive forces (...)
371
 
 
Nehru assured him that India strove for a peaceful and friendly solution. He underlined that 
"for the moment there is no basis for negotiations", but – to Khrushchev’s pleasure – added 
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that a personal meeting would be "generally helpful".
372
 Soviet pressure on Indian diplomats 
also seems to have precipitated the meeting. Indeed, the decision to meet Zhou was taken in 
mid-January after Nehru's conference with his ambassadors to Beijing and Moscow.
373
 They 
both pressed for negotiations with China, albeit for different reasons. While the ambassador to 
Beijing, Parthasarathy, emphasised the need to minimise short-term challenges in order to be 
able to focus on development and meet the long-term challenges from China, the ambassador 
to Moscow stressed the Soviet perspective and signals from the Kremlin that "India should 
not make it too hard for the Chinese to come to an agreement."
374
 Nehru was sensitive to 
Soviet signals as he was most probably informed of the emerging cracks between Beijing and 
Moscow.
375
 Conceivably, the Soviet Union could become a discreet, but most influential 
supporter of India in the border dispute. Nehru was however also sensitive to the diplomatic 
pressure that the Chinese were deliberately putting on India by means of their hastily 
concluded border agreements with Burma on 28 January and, two months later, with Nepal on 
11 March 1960.
376
 India must not be made to appear recalcitrant, and must hence talk with the 
Chinese.  
 Home Minister Pant objected to the meeting, but the Prime Minister stressed that the 
act of seeing each other did not imply policy alterations.
377
 With rumours in the press that 
Nehru and Krishna Menon in fact wanted to cede Aksai Chin in return for Chinese acceptance 
of the McMahon line, it was highly necessary for Nehru to communicate a message of 
firmness to the Indian public, too.
378
 While flexibility and reasonableness was the intended 
message to the international community, firmness and consistency was promised to the Indian 
audience. 
 
Meetings in New Delhi, 19–25 April 1960 
Although the government had taken great care to emphasise the limited scope and nature of 
the meetings, Nehru's 5 February letter with the invitation to meet without preconditions was 
furiously criticised in the newspapers. The parallel to Munich 1938 was frequently drawn.
379
 
On 16 February, the Times of India wrote of "nourishing dangerous illusions", while 
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Hindustan Standard referred to the decision as an insult to the parliament and the country.
380
 
The tone did not improve as Zhou arrived in India on 19 April. He was officially received 
with pomp and circumstance, but the public reception was far from what it had been when he 
visited in the brotherly mid-50s. In fact, he was greeted with demonstrators carrying black 
flags, scornful media coverage and an oppositional "no surrender week" to run in parallel with 
the meetings.
381
 The strained atmosphere was also manifested in the talks. In brief, they were 
an almost utter failure.
382
 The Chinese premier was given a series of repetitive "lectures" not 
only by Nehru personally, but even by his "old friend" Krishna Menon, by other ministers and 
by vice-president Radhakrishnan – all generally reflecting the Indian feeling of having been 
betrayed by a trusted friend.
383
 Zhou was not able to make any new impression on the Indian 
policy makers. Nor were the Indians able to secure a Chinese withdrawal from Ladakh. 
 The most striking feature of the talks was the Chinese effort to secure a settlement 
based on the lines of actual control. It was suggested that China could formally recognise the 
McMahon line – as indeed they had recognised the McMahon line's extension in Burma in 
January – in return for India's recognition de jure of China's de facto control in north-eastern 
Ladakh.
384
  India disagreed with the interlinkage of the two issues and maintained that there 
could be no "horse-trading" of that kind.
385
 Indian diplomats were told by the Foreign 
Secretary a few days later that the government had "disagreed with the Chinese on every 
single point."
386
 The Indian position was that the delimitation of the McMahon line was 
impeccable and that consequently there was nothing to discuss apart from minor adjustments 
on the ground. In Ladakh, on the other hand, there may have been room for discussion with 
China, but not for unilateral Chinese occupation – and for the Indians there was definitely not 
room for interlinking territorial claims to Aksai Chin with the blatantly illegal and 
unreasonable Chinese claims in NEFA. There was, in short, an emerging mental perception of 
China as a kind of thief promising not to steal again if only the first theft could be forgiven.
387
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 One of the few face-saving outcomes of the meetings was the fact that the planned six 
day schedule had been observed and followed in correct forms.
388
 Apart from the superficial 
aspect, the only substantial agreement was that the two governments would keep a dialogue 
going on the border issue through a joint commission of officials. The joint commission 
would be constituted by civil servants from both countries and would in the course of three 
sessions from June to December 1960 present a joint report to the governments with detailed 
historical-legal analyses of their respective border claims.
389
 However, the Indians were not 
certain "whether Chinese will implement this agreement sincerely" and did not place much 
faith in it.
390
 The single most significant outcome of the April meetings in New Delhi was the 
strong notion that any "prospect of reasonable settlement is [not] even remotely in sight."
391
 
 
(iv) Indian perceptions and positions harden 
As Zhou left India, the diplomatic atmosphere had reached a low point.
392
 The Indian public 
reception was even critical of the diplomatic effort itself; in the words of the leader of the 
oppositional Swatantra party, Nehru was simply wasting valuable time while the Chinese 
were progressively "soiling our motherland with their cancerous fingers".
393
 The agreement to 
have a joint border commission only aggravated this criticism in a public that expected some 
kind of practical action to be taken. There was no prospect of quick progress. Both parties 
retained their former positions of a settlement based respectively on status quo and status quo 
ante. India had in fact arrived at a diplomatic impasse. Nevertheless it was not necessarily the 
failure of the talks in itself that had led to the impasse. Rather, the meetings openly 
manifested the wide gap between the Indian and Chinese positions. It is highly unlikely that 
the April talks had any chance of success to begin with.
394
 Nehru had certainly not expressed 
any substantial hope for the talks and, according to foreign secretary Dutt, "did not expect 
anything tangible to come out of a meeting with Chou" apart from a better understanding of 
the Chinese position and, "at best", a basis for further talks.
395
 India's way into the impasse of 
1960 seems rather to have gone via a long drawn process of hardening perceptions of Aksai 
                                                         
388
 This could not be taken for granted. After receiving a Chinese note dated 3 April which reiterated the same 
argument as in Zhou's letters, Nehru considered breaking off talks after only two days. United States. CIA 
August 1963: 44–45 
389
 Hoffmann 1990: 88 
390
 Immediate top-secret message from Foreign Secretary to heads of missions 27.04.1960, in: P. N. Haksar 
papers, 1 & 2 instalments, subject file 25 (1960), NMML 
391
 Immediate top-secret message from Foreign Secretary to heads of missions 27.04.1960, in: P. N. Haksar 
papers, 1 & 2 instalments, subject file 25 (1960), NMML 
392
 United States. CIA August 1963: 50 
393
 Ranga quoted in Maxwell 1970/1997: 169; Misra 2007: 309 
394
 Hoffmann 1990: 88 
395
 United States. CIA August 1963: 38 
 73 
Chin, and secondly, via a growing sense of suspicion with regard to the reliability of the 
Chinese. Together these perceptions crystallised into a relatively inflexible Indian attitude and 
diplomatic position prior to the talks in April. When the Indian perceptions and positions 
collided with those of the Chinese during the talks, the result was a frigid diplomatic impasse 
and no substantial change. 
 
The metamorphoses of Aksai Chin 
Aksai Chin was one of the main ingredients of the diplomatic blunder. The desolate plains 
were subject to two important mental metamorphoses prior to the talks. As already discussed, 
the unknown mountain plateau quickly turned into a symbol of national pride in public 
opinion after August 1959. This first metamorphosis added popular pressure to the 
government's handling of the Aksai Chin question. But additionally, and in analytical terms 
separate from the popular transformation of Aksai Chin into a symbol, Nehru's personal 
perception of the area was also subject to change. After Longju, while the dispute was still 
ostensibly within the government's political control, Nehru repeatedly described Aksai Chin 
as a barren wasteland in public. Although indirectly, he effectively questioned India's claim to 
the territory.
396
 In contrast to the McMahon line which was described as non-negotiable, 
Nehru seems in fact to have been preparing parliament for a potential cession of the un-
administered areas of Ladakh – in other words for a formal recognition of the Chinese fait 
accompli.
397
 The idea seems to have had intellectual backing not only from defence minister 
Krishna Menon, but also from the chief of army staff, general Thimayya; he regarded the 
areas outside the Karakoram range as "militarily indefensible" – even if the Chinese had not 
been in actual occupation.
398
 
 In any case, no explicit suggestion of a cession was ever made, either to parliament or 
to the Chinese. Moreover, after the 1962 war, even the existence of considerations to that 
effect was promptly discharged as fictitious.
399
 The idea of negotiating on Aksai Chin is 
certainly not mentioned in India's official history of the border conflict.
400
 Nevertheless, both 
American diplomats, vice-president Radhakrishnan and high ranking bureaucrats like foreign 
secretary Subimal Dutt suspected Nehru of harbouring the idea at the time.
401
 Indeed, so did 
the Chinese who during the talks in 1960 had expected more Indian flexibility on Aksai Chin 
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than actually turned out to be the case.
402
 In fact, Nehru was himself reported by the British 
journalist Kingsley Martin to have said in early April 1960 that "in certain circumstances I 
would not have minded giving away a little bit of Ladakh, but I do not want the Chinese to 
take me for a sucker. Chou En-lai has lied to me so often that I do not feel like trusting him 
any more."
403
 Whether or not Nehru was seriously considering to cede Aksai Chin to China, it 
is thus clearly the case that his view of Aksai Chin in August 1959 was far more ambiguous 
than during the meetings with Zhou in April 1960. 
 What happened in between? Nehru's statements on Ladakh and Aksai Chin grew 
markedly wearier of public furore after the major clash at Kongka Pass in October 1959.
404
 
Partly, the angry mood in the press and parliament forced Nehru to mind his step. 
Furthermore, significant actors within the government were now also working for a tougher 
line. President Prasad, for example, pressed Nehru to sharpen the tone in a note of 4 
November to the Chinese on the grounds that it "lacked firmness".
405
 Nehru personally grew 
more suspicious of the Chinese, but he did not necessarily abandon his nuanced view of Aksai 
Chin – despite a façade of rhetorical firmness. A cousin of the Prime Minister, the high 
ranking diplomat and former ambassador to Beijing (1955–1958) R. K. Nehru, later claimed 
that up to 1960 "we ourselves were not sure that the territory belonged to us and we were 
thinking in terms of giving up our claims as part of a satisfactory settlement."
406
 It was not 
until February 1960 that the Prime Minister told his cabinet colleagues that he was convinced 
of India's legal and historical claim to Aksai Chin.
407
 To a large extent this was the outcome 
of the director of the MEA historical division, Sarvepalli Gopal, who returned from archival 
research in Britain in late 1959. Gopal, who was himself convinced that India had a sound 
argument, found Nehru in a "malleable mood".
408
 His mental flexibility and will to 
compromise with China had been undercut by the tumultuous autumn of 1959.
409
  Together, 
Gopal and the historically minded Prime Minister went through India's case in detail in 
February 1960. From that time, the political notion of having been wronged by China in 
autumn 1959 was paired with a sense of historical and legal justification for India's case. In 
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combination this pointed in the direction of diplomatic firmness on Ladakh, vigorously 
encouraged by public opinion and internal pressure in the government.  
 Nevertheless, if Zhou in April 1960 had offered the Indian government leeway on 
Aksai Chin in the form of some kind of shadow acceptance of Indian sovereignty, there might 
potentially still have been room for a compromise solution. This must, however, remain 
speculations so long as there are no sources indicating that the suggestion was in fact raised 
with Zhou during the talks. Contrafactually speaking, it is highly improbable that Nehru 
would have survived the wrath of Indian public opinion and the political establishment had he 
formally ceded Aksai Chin to China.
410
 But it is equally uncertain if Zhou would have 
accepted Indian "shadow" sovereignty in Ladakh if the suggestion had in fact been raised.
411
 
In sum, the talks of April 1960 did not alter India's position or policy in any significant 
fashion. Instead, it openly demonstrated the by now rigid Indian demands for status quo ante 
and left the disillusioned Chinese with an unfulfilled and equally hardened demand for a 
settlement based on status quo. 
 
A trust betrayed? 
The joint commission may partly have been intended as a sort of face-saving compensation 
for the diplomatic deadlock. If anything, however, it actually contributed to widen the 
perceptual crevasse between the two parties. The Indian team saw its suspicions confirmed 
when the Chinese presented a new and more detailed map of their border claims. In fact, the 
new claim line had swung further into Indian claimed territory compared to China's 1956 
claim line and incorporated 2000 additional square miles to the 50 000 square miles already 
claimed by Zhou on 8 September 1959.
412
 As Zhou had told Nehru that the 1956 line was 
authoritative and as the Chinese team insisted that there was no difference between the two 
lines, Indian apprehensions increased.
413
 Apart from what India claimed had been a fresh 
instance of cartographic aggression, the end result of the commission was a massive report 
published by the Government of India in February 1961.
414
 In fact it consisted of two separate 
reports repeating the gist of the established positions in unprecedented rigour and detail. 
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India's case was generally perceived as better documented and argued than the Chinese 
equivalent.
415
 The Chinese chose not to publish the report. Nehru on the other hand felt self-
assured enough to publicly describe India's case as almost "foolproof", thus hammering the 
last nail in the coffin of China's desired status quo solution.
416
  
 No real attempt was made to follow up on the report of the officials with new 
diplomatic initiatives. En route from Mongolia, the senior diplomat R. K. Nehru did however 
visit Beijing in July 1961 to probe the atmosphere. As none of the parties were prepared to 
abandon their diplomatic trenches, the probe ended in false smiles and no yields.
417
 It rather 
cemented the mutual perception of monotonous rigidity. The diplomats had indeed reached a 
deadlock from which it seemed difficult to imagine any proximate exit.  
 
Conclusion 
India's road to the near total diplomatic stalemate in July 1961 was dotted with numerous 
external and internal obstacles. In short, the year 1959 turned out to be the annus horribilis of 
the Prime Minister's highly prioritised Sino-Indian friendship.
418
 In hindsight the newly 
discovered Chinese road in Aksai Chin and Chou's letter of 23 January 1959, with its 
rejection of any implicit recognition of India's colonial era frontiers, seem to mark a turning 
point in the border question. Nevertheless, it was not until after a major revolt in Lhasa broke 
out that a dispute was triggered. The Tibetan crisis and the border dispute escalated in 
tandem. The external pressure from China in the form of more frequent and larger incidents 
on the frontier combined with Zhou's explicit 8 September letter. Seen together these 
developments greatly distressed the Prime Minister and the government and seriously 
undermined Indian trust in the reliability of the Chinese.  
 Most importantly perhaps, the abrupt announcement of the dispute to the public after 
August 1959 unleashed an unexpectedly strong reaction in parliament, press and public 
opinion in general. Nehru's dominance in foreign affairs was effectively undermined in an 
historically unprecedented fashion. In parallel with the public metamorphosis of Aksai Chin 
into an emotional national symbol, Nehru in the wake of the major clash at Kongka Pass 
gradually abandoned his initial pragmatism on the mountain plateau. By February 1960, he 
perceived India's legal-historical case in Chinese occupied Ladakh to be "foolproof". 
Combined with Nehru's sense of a betrayed trust, the newly evolved position on Aksai Chin 
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made his mental attitude and India's diplomatic positions in the controversial April talks of 
1960 almost as rigid as the activists in the "no surrender week" may have wished for. In many 
ways, the outcome of the talks was given before they had even commenced. India declined 
China's discreet suggestions of a swap, while China continued to refuse India's demand for a 
formal recognition of the McMahon line combined with a withdrawal from Aksai Chin. 
  Over the period from autumn 1959 to summer 1961, Nehru had thus lost his faith in a 
genuine friendship with China. By 1961 he was in many ways a disappointed man. But he 
still remained firmly wedded to the analysis that China only represented a potential long-term 
challenge to India. China was not perceived as an immediate military threat by the Indian 
cabinet, despite the failure of diplomacy.  
 On the other hand, India's relationship to China continued to be hostage to an 
increasingly tense atmosphere, both within government circles and in the public sphere. The 
new Chinese claim line of 1960 added to the malcontent. There was a rising pressure for some 
kind of action to be taken as talking had quite obviously led nowhere. In short, India was in 
need of a new approach to China and the frozen border dispute. 
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III 
 
The Forward Policy Decision 
 
The glaring failure of the 1960 talks cemented the mutual feeling of having reached a 
diplomatic deadlock. As Zhou finally left for Beijing, China remained in actual occupation of 
12,000 square miles of Indian claimed land in Ladakh. Since September 1959 Beijing 
furthermore laid verbal claim to over 50,000 square miles, including territories south of the 
established McMahon line in NEFA.
419
 The sense of "cartographic aggression" escalated with 
new claims on the Chinese map presented in 1960.
420
 The domestic pressure on Nehru grew 
stronger as it became apparent that talking had been insufficient to "liberate" Aksai Chin. 
China would clearly not comply voluntarily with India's historical and legal approach to the 
border question. Neither would India kow-tow to the Chinese fait accompli in Ladakh or 
succumb to further realpolitik from Beijing. During the course of 1961 all these elements 
combined to form a growing demand that India should answer in kind and pursue its own 
brand of realpolitik vis-à-vis China. War was no option in the eyes of the government. But 
neither was passive observance of creeping Chinese expansion. Time seemed ripe for a "third 
solution". By late 1961 the contours of a fresh initiative emerged. It would neither be fish nor 
fowl, combining the diplomatic pressure with a new and proactive military component. By 
1962, small detachments of Indian troops systematically established symbolic "forward posts" 
deeply within disputed areas, most especially in Ladakh. This is what came to be known as 
the Forward Policy. 
 A definite decision on the subject was made by the Prime Minister in a cabinet 
meeting on 2 November 1961.
421
 But within what context and organisational frameworks was 
the Forward Policy conceptualised? What were the analytical premises of the Forward Policy 
decision and what were Nehru's intentions with it? In order to analyse the Forward Policy 
decision in a "narrow" sense, the precedents of the policy from 1950 onwards – arguably 
forward policy in a "broad" sense – will be outlined first. Secondly, the internal and external 
context in which the Government of India was operating in late 1961 will be discussed. 
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Thirdly, an analysis of the Forward Policy decision proper on 2 November will be given, 
followed by a summary outline of its subsequent implementation in the field.  
 
(i) Policy precedents 
Established interpretations of the Forward Policy can roughly be placed in two categories. On 
the one side, there is the majority approach that broadly perceives Nehru's 2 November 
decision and its implications as something qualitatively new in Indian China policy.
422
 On the 
other side there are also interpretations that primarily describe the Forward Policy in terms of 
a logical and partly even inevitable continuum of a process already set in motion.
423
 
Interestingly, both Neville Maxwell's critical revisionist account and the Government of 
India's official history can be placed within the second category. In most other respects these 
two analyses can be said to be fundamentally opposed. They reach opposite conclusions and 
interpret the continuum in two widely different manners.   
 Maxwell argues that the Forward Policy was merely the physical manifestation of a 
rigid and unilateral mindset that had been prevalent in New Delhi since the eruption of the 
border dispute in the first place. India's policy was in fact obdurate long before November 
1961 and the Forward Policy was hence more of a crescendo than a break with past policy. 
"Collision course" was already set in the early 1950s.
424
 Maxwell ultimately blames India for 
provoking the 1962 war which he succinctly describes as "India's China war".
425
 On a rare 
note of agreement, India's official history argues that "there was nothing new in this [2 
November] directive (...) What happened now was that the directive coming directly from the 
Prime Minister speeded up the implementation process."
426
 In fact, the policy – which 
according to the Indian government can only mistakenly be called "forward" – emerged in 
logical extension of the Army's take-over in Ladakh after October 1959.
427
 In stark contrast to 
Maxwell's version, the driving force is not considered to be unilateral Indian policy making, 
but Chinese aggression in Ladakh. In other words, the "Forward" Policy is seen as a natural 
continuation of the Army's defence of Indian territory. It was China that had initiated the 
dispute by secretly occupying Aksai Chin; India merely reacted in defence.
428
 Although the 
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analyses of Maxwell and the Government of India thus concur in seeing the Forward Policy 
decision as a continuation of an already existing policy their arguments are entirely different. 
Maxwell, in brief, argues that India was aggressive to begin with whereas the Government of 
India stresses that India reacted defensively right from the start. Hence they also describe the 
policy in itself differently – either as aggressive or as defensive. 
 
Forward policy in a "broad" sense 
Unlike Maxwell and the official history, the majority of analyses portray the Forward Policy 
decision more in terms of a turning point than as a mere continuation of Indian policy. The 
analysis of the 2 November decision as something qualitatively new in Indian China policy 
does not however mean that it came out of the blue. It partly built on policy roots from the 
1950s. It is therefore relevant to ask to what extent there had been taken specific measures 
before 2 November 1961 that pointed in the direction of a forward policy. Does it make sense 
to speak of an early forward policy in a "broad" sense as opposed to the Forward Policy in a 
"narrow" sense sanctioned by the Prime Minister in November 1961? Two specific cases will 
be considered in this regard: firstly India's defence reactions to the demise of the Tibetan 
buffer and, secondly, the Intelligence Bureau's (IB) response to the 1958 discovery of the 
Chinese road in Aksai Chin.  
 The militarisation of the Tibetan border was primarily but not only driven by China.
429
 
The Government of India had indeed taken a number of initiatives to improve its control over 
the frontier areas since the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950. Although the Prime Minister 
rejected Vallabhbhai Patel's stern warnings that India faced a Chinese military threat in the 
Himalayan region, he did not entirely exclude the possibility of negative repercussions in the 
frontier areas.
430
 In November 1950 the Prime Minister admitted that  
 
While there is, in any opinion, practically no chance of a major attack on India by China, there are 
certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our borders and possibly of entering and taking 
possession of disputed territory, if there is no obstruction to this happening. We must therefore 
take all necessary precautions to prevent this. But, again, we must differentiate between these 
precautions and those that might be necessary to meet a real attack (...) If we really feared an 
attack and had to make full provision for it, this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial 
and otherwise, and it would weaken our general defence position (...) the fact remains that our 
major possible enemy is Pakistan.
431
 
 
Nehru thus took a different view on the potential Chinese threat from that expounded by 
Patel, but was not neglecting potential challenges in the isolated frontier areas. The North 
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Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) was a particular source of concern given that the local 
inhabitants had weak historical ties to New Delhi and a long common history with Tibet.
432
 
Measures would therefore be taken, but – importantly – commensurate to the minor issue that 
the potential Chinese challenge constituted in the total picture of Nehru's grand strategy. 
Among the first steps was to establish the so-called Himmatsinhji-committee which was 
charged with recommending "measures that should be taken to improve administration, 
defence, communication, etc. of all the frontier areas".
433
 In September 1951 the committee 
submitted a report which called for a comprehensive set of measures such as widespread 
construction of infrastructure in the isolated frontier areas as well as establishment of new 
border checkposts to show the Indian tricolour. By the end of 1952, 30 such checkposts had 
been established, manned either by police or paramilitary Assam Rifles in the middle and 
eastern sectors and by IB directed personnel in the western Ladakh sector.
434
 Crucially, 
among the seven checkposts established by the IB in Ladakh, none were placed further north-
east than the Karakoram mountains.
435
 In effect, there was therefore no permanent Indian 
presence in north-eastern Ladakh and on the Aksai Chin plateau, presumably "because these 
areas were inaccessible and uninhabited."
436
  
 Before the tumultuous autumn of 1959, Aksai Chin was still perceived as desolate, 
both physically and politically. Indeed, both the Himmatsinhji-committee as well as the 
implementation of the committee's recommendations seem to have focussed on NEFA rather 
than on Ladakh. In revealing contrast to Ladakh, where the cartographic Kuen Lun alignment 
was not followed up by permanent occupation, India made sure to take de facto control over 
most territories south of the McMahon line in NEFA. A telling example is the case of the 
Tibetan monastery town of Tawang in northern NEFA where British administration had been 
practically non-existent despite of it being south of the formal McMahon line. In February 
1951 one Indian official and "several hundred porters" entered, hoisted the flag and thus 
established actual occupation to reinforce India's theoretical claims from 1914.
437
 New Delhi 
thus made sure to be in effective control of the territory south of the McMahon line before the 
potential arrival of the PLA.  
 Indian claims to north-eastern Ladakh on the other hand remained largely theoretical. 
Similarly, most of the Himmatsinhji-committee's comprehensive recommendations were not 
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implemented. Looking back in 1987 one officer commented that there was an "absence of a 
sense of urgency".
438
 As Sino-Indian relations deteriorated in 1959, few of the foreseen roads 
had in fact been built. The Border Roads Organisation was only set up in 1960, nine years 
after the committee had submitted its report.
439
 When push came to shove China had not been 
seen as a probable threat to India; India's scarce resources had been prioritised elsewhere.
440
  
 Interestingly, Nehru had issued a directive after his talks with Zhou in 1954 in which 
paragraph eight declared that it was important for India to be in effective control of the "entire 
frontier", and that "more especially we should have check-posts in such places as might be 
considered disputed areas."
441
 In Maxwell's interpretation this excerpt demonstrated Nehru's 
inclination towards unilateral forward policy logics long before November 1961. Srinath 
Raghavan on the other hand disputes this reading and argues that, in the context of the other 
paragraphs of the comprehensive directive, Nehru's intentions were in fact far more modest 
than Maxwell's partial interpretation would suggest.
442
 The modest interpretation of this 1954 
directive is certainly supported by the fact that no significant changes ensued in Ladakh in the 
wake of it; India did not start to expand its zone of actual control into north-eastern Ladakh, 
despite the cartographic claims to the area. Hence no early forward policy can be said to have 
existed there in the wake of the 1954 directive. 
 It is important to keep in mind that the Government of India's early focus on 
consolidating frontier defence after the disappearance of the Tibetan buffer was far more 
impressive on paper than in reality. As argued in chapter one, the real effort was rather put on 
the construction of a psychological buffer of friendship with China.
443
 In the period preceding 
1958 there was to Nehru's knowledge no Chinese presence in the Indian claimed frontier 
areas.
444
 In other words, if the frontier policy India implemented after 1950 were at all an 
early version of forward policy, then it was substantially different from the policy which 
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developed after November 1961. The pre and post-1961 frontier policies admittedly shared 
the primary objective of de facto control of disputed areas – like Tawang in NEFA. But unlike 
the predecessors, the policy after November 1961 was geographically expansive in north-
eastern Ladakh. And it was far more confrontational in the sense of partly intruding into 
Chinese controlled territory, not only distant "blank spots". It was not purely preventive, as it 
had been in Tawang 1951, but had a more coercive dimension. Hence, it does strictly 
speaking not make sense to equal the moderate checkpost-policy of the early 1950s with the 
more proactive "forward post"-policy that would formally emerge after the 2 November 
decision. The main link between the two policies was the perception that India should 
establish actual control in territories disputed by China in order to reinforce India's claims. 
The practical fashion in which this was to be done differed. Before November 1961 the Prime 
Minister seems – based on the available sources – to have had no intention of physically 
coercing the Chinese out of territories claimed cartographically by India and least of all from 
Aksai Chin. 
 Nevertheless, it was in fact in Ladakh that a precursor to the Forward Policy decision 
became most evident. The neglect of north-eastern Ladakh remained more or less constant 
until September 1958 when two Indian patrols physically confirmed the existence of the 
Xinjiang-Tibet motor road in the middle of Aksai Chin. One of the parties was even captured 
by Chinese border guards.
445
 India had not established checkposts along the Kuen Lun 
alignment even though it had in fact been formally claimed on Indian maps since at least 
1954. Hence early Chinese activities in Aksai Chin were not registered by New Delhi. The 
realisation of this fact and the fear that the same story might repeat itself triggered a new local 
tactic in Ladakh. The driver of the process was not Nehru or the cabinet directly however, but 
the Intelligence Bureau – which was in charge of the checkposts in Ladakh.446  
 In December 1958 the director of the bureau, B. N. Mullik, submitted a number of 
proposals to the government in which it was argued that "our patrols should go right up to the 
frontier so that no portion could be surreptitiously occupied by the Chinese on the ground that 
it was not under effective Indian occupation."
447
 According to Mullik, the idea was first and 
foremost to prevent the Chinese from extending and further developing their road network in 
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Aksai Chin, which he believed they were doing.
448
 It hence appeared to be preventive at first 
glance. However, the location of at least two of the five suggested new checkposts would be 
very near to established Chinese positions and the southern part of their road in Aksai Chin.
449
 
In effect, it would entail an unprecedented proximity that could possibly provoke clashes. The 
proposals were discussed on 8 January 1959 at a meeting in the foreign secretary's room with 
high ranking civil servants and officers present.
450
 During the discussions, it was agreed with 
the IB that India should take control of territories in which Indian presence had not yet been 
established on the implicit conditions that (a) the Chinese did not claim the area yet or (b), in 
the case of Singlung, the Chinese claimed the area cartographically but were not yet near the 
area physically.
451
 The establishment of a post at Singlung would offer a "safe" form of 
pressure, signalling that India did not respect Chinese cartographic claims but without risking 
armed confrontation.  
 When it came to the suggestion of establishing posts in direct vicinity of Chinese 
controlled areas just to the south of the road, on the other hand, there was marked resistance 
from the Army.
452
 In the localities of Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol such action was 
"bound to invite a clash with the Chinese who with their established motor communications in 
the area could easily overpower our post."
453
 Foreign secretary Dutt agreed with the Army's 
reserved approach because the checkposts "would be of no use to stop Chinese infiltration" 
and "might even provoke the Chinese into making further intrusions."
454
 The proposal of 
establishing posts near the southern part of the Aksai Chin road was hence not approved.
455
  
 Most importantly, the Prime Minister did not approve of it either. A few days after the 
meeting on 8 January, foreign secretary Dutt had a word with Nehru who agreed not to open 
posts near the road.
456
 According to Mullik's memoirs, even the suggestion of establishing a 
"safe" checkpost in Chinese claimed but unoccupied Singlung was rejected at the January 
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meeting and subsequently by the PM himself in conversations with the foreign secretary.
457
 
According to the minutes however, the proposal of establishing a checkpost in Singlung was 
indeed approved by the meeting as "a definite advantage".
458
 In any case, Mullik soon 
protested the decisions of the January meeting in a note to the Prime Minister on 16 February 
1959.
459
 After receiving this note Nehru, according to Mullik, "passed orders that while we 
should not open posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol, because they would be too 
near the Aksai Chin road and might create tensions, the other posts recommended by me 
should be opened."
460
 The IB director adds that out of these, only two posts could actually be 
opened by October 1959 because "before the others could be opened the Chinese came in and 
occupied the area."
461
 The implicit logic, in other words, seems to be that if only more 
checkposts had been established more swiftly, the Chinese would not have come and 
occupied the land.  
 Among the two posts that were in fact opened in October 1959, one was located at Hot 
Springs in Kongka Pass. It turned out to be much closer to Chinese posts than Nehru seems to 
have anticipated. While India accused China of aggression in the ensuing clash on 21 
October, Beijing blamed India of having trespassed into Chinese territory first.
462
 The 
approach advocated by Mullik since late 1958 had effectively abandoned prevention in the 
form of "safe" checkposts far away from Chinese positions for a more activist strategy of 
establishing Indian presence near or next to Chinese personnel in disputed areas.
463
 It was still 
conceived as "preventive" in the sense of halting Chinese occupation of land claimed by 
India, but it was far riskier than the previous approach of combining prevention with 
considerable physical distance. In brief, the IB set a new standard of Indian frontier policy in 
Ladakh from late 1958. The clash at Kongka Pass in October 1959 did not deter Mullik from 
advocating advanced checkposts, but rather confirmed his earlier suspicions that the Chinese 
were stealthily expanding their control. The source of the conflict was not new Indian 
checkposts, but Chinese aggression. The establishment of additional checkposts therefore 
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seemed to be called for. In logical extension: India should have taken a co-ordinated forward 
policy decision much earlier than November 1961.
464
 
 Mullik and the IB were stopped before the situation escalated further. After the major 
clash at Kongka Pass, the Army criticised the recent expansion of checkposts and patrolling 
and accused the civilian Intelligence Bureau of "expansionism and causing provocations on 
the border."
465
 In Mullik's opinion, this was "ridiculous, because this incident had occurred 
more than thirty miles within Indian territory". To the IB director's regret, Nehru on 24 
October subsequently charged the Army with the main responsibility of the frontier in Ladakh 
and thus stripped the IB of its formal direction of affairs there.
466
 Nehru's frontier policy was 
still carefully circumscribed rather than proactive and confrontational. New clashes were to be 
avoided.
467
  
 Had the Intelligence Bureau adopted its own forward policy? The idea of unilaterally 
occupying disputed territories by symbolic posts had as a matter of fact been formulated years 
ahead of the Prime Minister's November 1961 decision. The IB was its primary beacon. In 
fact, the bureau had not merely formulated the idea but had partly also executed it – until the 
initiative was cancelled by Army HQ after the clash at Kongka Pass. In Mullik's opinion a 
proactive checkpost policy seemed to be the only realistic option for India if additional 
territory in Ladakh was to be saved from gradual Chinese encroachment.
468
 As such, it was 
indeed forward policy in a "broad" sense. But, crucially, it was not yet the Government of 
India's official policy. Furthermore it was highly limited in scale. It was first and foremost an 
evolving tactic which had been nipped in the bud by cautious Army officers like the chief of 
army staff, general Thimayya.
469
 But the intellectual seeds of the Forward Policy decision had 
undisputedly been sown – in what would turn out to be fertile soil. 
 
(ii) Contextual factors 
What were the salient features of the contemporary landscape in which the cabinet decision of 
2 November 1961 was made? A tentative map must reflect the general situation of the Indian 
government in both its domestic and international dimensions. Domestically, the period after 
the failed talks of April 1960 was characterised not only by continued pressure on the Nehru 
government's seemingly "soft" China policy, but also saw major shifts within the higher 
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echelons of the Indian Army. Externally, the government's evolving perceptions of China and 
the international situation in general helped stimulate new trends in Indian China policy.  The 
domestic dimension in the period up to November 1961 will be discussed first, followed by 
an analysis of the international calculations of New Delhi within the same span of time. 
 
The domestic context 
The political climate in India was flavoured by the fruitless talks of April 1960 and the 
subsequent failure of the Sino-Indian border commission. The frustrated atmosphere was 
reflected in three seminal developments within the Government of India; Defence Minister 
Krishna Menon's hardening attitude to the dispute, the advent of new top brass at Army 
Headquarters and the increasing receptivity of the Prime Minister to pressure and input from 
more activist elements within the cabinet and the bureaucracy. The synergetic effect of these 
developments furnished the fundamental preconditions for a new course in New Delhi's China 
policy. 
 Nehru's personal friend and controversial Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, had 
become a focal point of criticism since the day the border dispute became public in 1959.
470
 
Surprised by the new information, even members of the Congress party were demanding his 
resignation for having failed to guard India's borders.
471
 To a large extent, the public criticism 
of the government targeted Menon instead of Nehru directly. With his vocal leftist leanings, 
Menon was considered by many to be pro-communist and hence unreliable when it came to 
dealing with the PRC.
472
 At the time of the April talks in 1960, there were jokes circulating in 
New Delhi that the reason for Menon's absence from the Indian team was that he preferred to 
serve in Zhou Enlai's delegation.
473
 Menon, who had headed the ministry of defence since 
1957, was nevertheless one of Nehru's closest associates in the cabinet and was held in high 
personal esteem by the Prime Minister for his cultural refinement and intellectual vigour.
474
 
To a large extent he was dependent on Nehru's personal patronage and had less political 
capital as an individual.
475
 The failure of the joint commission and the expanded Chinese 
claim line of 1960 did not calm the acid public criticism of Menon's performance. On 11 
April 1961 the respected opposition leader J. B. Kripalani of the Socialist Party delivered a 
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fierce and eloquent attack on Menon in parliament and drew parallels to Chamberlain's 
appeasement of Nazi Germany. It was described as "perhaps the greatest speech that has been 
made on the floor of that House since Independence."
476
 For Menon and Nehru, the onslaught 
was worrying not only as an indicator of strong public malcontent with government policy, 
but – more tactically – as a negative barometer for the upcoming Lok Sabha elections of 
February 1962. Even Menon's seat in the Lok Sabha seemed to be in danger as the popular 
Kripalani vowed to challenge him in Menon's home constituency of North Bombay.
477
 Nehru, 
however, did not abandon his protégé and made Menon's cause his own.
478
 To the extent that 
public criticism stimulated change, it was first and foremost in Menon's handling of popular 
signal issues – like what US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith termed the "Portuguese 
pimple" of Goa.
479
 It hardly seems coincidental that India's invasion of the Portuguese enclave 
was triggered in December 1961, only two months before the scheduled general elections of 
February 1962.
480
 The decision to liberate Goa from Salazar Portugal's unrepentant colonial 
rule had long been awaited and was massively popular with the Maratha constituencies in 
which Menon campaigned in January. He finally carried off his district by a large margin.
481
  
 The other key signal issue, in which virtually the whole nation seemed to have 
invested an emotional stake of honour, was of course the deadlocked border dispute. Goa did 
not pacify public malcontent with the government's China policy – if anything it rather added 
fuel to the fire of public demands for firm action.
482
 Unlike Goa, there was however to be no 
invasion of Aksai Chin. Since independence, Menon had been of the opinion that Pakistan 
was India's real threat – not China.483 This was not least reflected in the fact that the bulk of 
the Indian Army was garrisoned on the borders with Pakistan, not on the disputed Sino-Indian 
frontier. In fact, Menon's approach to the border dispute did not harden until after the failed 
talks of April 1960. As late as March 1960 his attitude on Aksai Chin seemed to be flexible 
and open to negotiation.
484
  
 In June 1960, on the other hand, he suggested to Nehru that India should start 
patrolling forward in the disputed frontier areas.
485
 Again, in January or February 1961 at a 
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cabinet meeting, Menon launched the idea of systematically establishing military posts deep 
into the disputed territories.
486
 When Home Minister Pant asked for an elaboration, Menon is 
reported to have taken his walking stick and pointed out that the posts should be placed in a 
"zig-zag" pattern in between Chinese posts.
487
 Menon had thus definitely abandoned his 
initial flexibility on Aksai Chin and was in fact suggesting a forward policy. What had 
stimulated the new toughened stance? Partly, the failed talks may in themselves have 
contributed to the change. According to CIA analyses, Menon's changing attitude can also be 
interpreted through an ideological lens; the growing distance between the USSR and the PRC 
in April 1960 caused his aversion towards the Chinese – i.e. as a reflection of the evolving 
Soviet world view.
488
 More to the point perhaps, Menon's hardened attitude can, with a 
certain parallel to the case of Goa, be seen in connection with the intense public pressure on 
him and the uncertain political prospects that would face him unless the situation was visibly 
improved on the ground. Like Goa, the border issue was a symbolic question in need of a 
symbolic and easily communicable answer. In short, the hard pressed Defence Minister was 
in search of an approach that could efficiently hinder Chinese expansion and control of Indian 
claimed territories while also demonstrating to the angered Indian electorate that the 
government was up to the challenge of preserving the territorial integrity of the nation. 
Menon's political perspective found a felicitous match in IB strategic analyses. Moreover, he 
soon found willing supporters within the Army Headquarters.  
 In addition to being the black sheep for India's failure to guard its claimed frontiers, 
Krishna Menon ran into deep conflicts with senior officers. He especially developed a tense 
relationship with the respected chief of army staff, general Thimayya.
489
 When Menon 
personally intervened in questions of professional promotion in the critical month of August 
1959, Thimayya threatened to resign.
490
 After a painful public stand-off between the two men, 
Nehru finally coined a compromise that kept up appearances. But in reality Menon largely got 
his will through. By April 1961 when Thimayya retired, Army HQ was taken over by a new 
generation of handpicked senior officers. They were more pliable to political demands than 
Thimayya had been.
491
 Most influential among the new officers was the new chief of general 
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staff, major general B. M. Kaul.
492
 He was an ambitious and quick-witted officer with 
personal connections to Menon and the Prime Minister himself.
493
 He was not least attractive 
due to his ability to see defence in a similarly holistic perspective as Nehru and Menon 
themselves did.
494
 Thimayya on the other hand had resented Kaul's promotion on the 
professional grounds that he lacked practical combat experience.
495
 In fact, the new 
generation at Army HQ was derogatorily known as courtier "Kaul-boys" among many 
officers.
496
 The promotion policy directed by the civilian Krishna Menon thus tarnished the 
morale and unity of the Army at a critical juncture.
497
 Furthermore, it lead to a significantly 
more politicised Army HQ with top brass that was willing to satisfy political patrons at high 
military costs.
498
 Whereas Thimayya had openly resisted the early forward policy designs of 
the civilian IB in Ladakh in 1959, Kaul and the new chief of army staff, Thapar, were willing 
to play ball with civilians in a more flexible and dynamic fashion.
499
  
 Maxwell, in short, describes Kaul as a "yes-man" who was given the job precisely 
because of his servile inclination to say and do just what politicians with minor knowledge of 
military affairs would like to hear. According to Maxwell, Kaul's promotion can therefore be 
seen as an instance of blatant favouritism and political meddling with professional military 
affairs.
500
 Srinath Raghavan on the other hand stresses a structural dimension to understand 
Kaul's rapid promotion; the independent Indian Army was still developing and lacked 
sufficiently experienced senior officers in 1961.
501
 The precocious advent of Kaul may thus 
primarily be seen as an expression of the fundamental growth problems that affected the post-
colonial Indian Army. Kaul's case was not unique, but rather a sign of system failure. 
Independent of such interpretations, however, the result of this particular promotion was that 
Army HQ's function as a moderator in policy deliberations was severely curtailed. In 
combination with Menon's increasing penchant for a coercive strategy, the advent of the 
politically compatible Kaul provided a keyhole for the opening of a new chapter in Indian 
China policy. The man with the key, however, was the Prime Minister. 
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 R. K. Nehru's probe to Beijing in July 1961 failed thoroughly.
502
 His cousin, the Prime 
Minister, privately commented that China was in no mood to settle the dispute peacefully, and 
that in consequence he would have to adopt a "very stiff" attitude.
503
 By that time, Nehru was 
already thoroughly convinced that India's demands were legally and historically justified. 
India had however clearly not been able to persuade the Chinese by the reason of argument 
alone. From prospects of genuine friendship, damage control seemed to be the new keyword. 
A definite policy impasse had been reached. The Asian future which Nehru had 
wholeheartedly lauded with Zhou in 1954 in retrospect mournfully resembled a castle in the 
air. But equally so did the opposition's chimerical calls for immediate armed expulsion. The 
result of such adventurism would according to Nehru be a full scale Asian war which would 
"be one of the major disasters of the world".
504
 A violent course of action could hence be no 
policy option for either India or China. Mao's China was perhaps no longer the bhai Nehru 
had envisioned, but as a great Asian power and a powerful neighbour it nonetheless remained 
a crucial factor in his grand strategic world view. Stability was central to any solution. The 
immediate challenge for the Prime Minister after the failed April 1960 talks was to avoid new 
clashes like at Kongka Pass and, secondly, to prepare the economy structurally for increased 
Sino-Indian rivalry on a much larger and varied macro-scale in the long term.
505
 When it 
came to popular demands of restoring India's claimed status quo ante, Nehru and Army HQ 
were wary. Cautiousness also characterised the handling of pressure from within the 
government. On the administrative level, Army HQ under general Thimayya hindered various 
efforts from May 1960 and onwards to reinvigorate IB-style forward patrolling in Ladakh – 
emanating largely from civilian bureaucrats in Menon's Ministry of Defence.
506
 On the 
cabinet level, Nehru reportedly rejected Krishna Menon's direct call for a policy of forward 
patrolling in June 1960.
507
 Menon's bold "zigzag"  suggestion in January-February 1961 was 
also left hanging in the air, presumably because of Thimayya's sceptical attitude and the 
logistical problems cited by the Army in desolate and isolated Ladakh.
508
  
 A few months later, however, the Prime Minister's attitude had changed substantially. 
In November 1961 the Forward Policy decision was formally passed at the highest level of 
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government without any apparent hindrance. What can account for this sudden turnabout? 
Firstly, of course, the public pressure in parliament and press affected the democratically 
elected Prime Minister like it had, although more directly, affected Krishna Menon. More 
importantly, perhaps, Menon's hardening attitude contributed to internal pressure on Nehru 
within cabinet itself. The operational obstacle that Army HQ had constituted under Thimayya 
had furthermore been removed since mid-1961; from then on Kaul and officers who were 
significantly more forthcoming to Menon and Mullik ruled the roost.
509
 Partly as a 
consequence of this new and malleable framework, there was a power shift towards the 
Intelligence Bureau. The precarious lack of confidence in Chinese intentions was 
accompanied by the IB's ability to authoritatively suggest a firm course of action. In the 
confusion of the deadlock that had developed by July 1961, the ability to present seemingly 
clear policy alternatives gave the bureau considerable influence at the highest level of 
government. 
 In part, then, the Intelligence Bureau gained influence because of the widening gap of 
confidence between the Prime Minister and Beijing. The lack of confidence in Chinese 
intentions was not new in itself, but what had made it especially pressing was the recent 
Chinese claim line of 1960 combined with a series of border intrusions since 3 June 1960. 
Unknown to the public, there seems to have been made certain informal understandings on 
border patrolling between the two Prime Ministers during the April 1960 talks.
510
 Speaking to 
an American diplomat, a senior MEA official noted that there had been a personal 
understanding between Nehru and Zhou that no patrols would be sent beyond the point of 
"actual control."
511
 Nehru's rejection of Menon's requests for forward patrolling can be seen 
against this backdrop. So can the sense of distrust when 25 Chinese soldiers penetrated seven 
kilometres south of the McMahon line on 3 June 1960.
512
 If there was an agreement, it had 
certainly been broken. India disputed China's explanation of 30 July that 25 individuals had 
crossed the line by mistake "because of inclement weather when out to fell bamboos".
513
 Both 
the incident and the incredulous cover story added weight to the argument that the Chinese 
were not going to stop expanding in Indian claimed territory. It seemed to confirm the 
warnings of the Intelligence Bureau and thus strengthened Mullik's key role as a provider of 
analytical premises in the policy making process. The IB argued that China's real intention 
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was to fill out the blanks and realise the new claim line of 1960.
514
 If the Chinese were 
allowed to do so, the argument implied, they would in turn extend their claim line further. 
China's word could in short not be trusted. 
 New information on Chinese activities in Ladakh further reinforced the IB's theory of 
deliberate Chinese expansion. It had been known to New Delhi since at least 1959 that the 
Chinese were systematically developing a network of motor roads in and along the disputed 
areas.
515
 As the harsh Ladakhi winter gave way to spring in May 1961, an energetic Chinese 
construction of roads seemed to take place in the direction of the 1960 claim line.
516
 When 
this thrust was added to the discovery of a Chinese checkpost in the Chip Chap valley in 
September 1961, Mullik's alarm bells rang.
517
 The Chinese post was barely four miles away 
from the Indian strongpoint at Daulet Beg Oldi
518
 and was moreover connected to Chinese 
infrastructure in the hinterland with what appeared to be a motor road.
519
 Army HQ under the 
new chief of army staff, P. N. Thapar, was nevertheless uncertain whether the post could be 
seen as a fresh instance of aggression – and hence as a push to realise the 1960 claim line – 
given that the post could theoretically be much older than the recent Indian discovery of it.
520
 
Mullik disputed this theoretical reservation and found a ready ally in Defence Minister 
Menon. Menon subsequently criticised Kaul and Thapar for what he deemed to be passivity 
from the Army in the border dispute.
521
 To Mullik and Menon, sufficient cards were on the 
table to draw a conclusion. It was now time to act decisively to forestall further Chinese 
incursions. Another civilian official, Foreign Secretary M. J. Desai, went so far as to suggest 
that "one of the most effective methods of stemming the Chinese policy of gradually creeping 
westwards across our borders in Ladakh would be to give them an occasional knock (...) 
aimed at conflicting casualties and/or taking prisoners".
522
 As the suggestion was found to be 
contradictory to the existing guidelines from the Prime Minister to avoid escalation, and as it 
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furthermore was deemed to be lacking in military realism, it was decided to request an IB 
appraisal of the situation before taking any new initiatives.
523
 
 The Intelligence Bureau moderated Desai's suggestions, but agreed on the need to take 
practical action. In a lengthy note of 26 September 1961 the bureau argued that the Chinese 
were systematically expanding their area of actual control in order to realise the new claim 
line of 1960.
524
  Clearly, any unofficial understanding between Zhou and Nehru had been 
violated. China only seemed bent on securing another fait accompli. Most importantly, the IB 
followed up on the negative assessment by confidently outlining a countermeasure. 
According to the note, the only areas the Chinese had avoided were the ones with an Indian 
presence – also when only symbolic: "where even a dozen men of ours are present, the 
Chinese have kept away".
525
 In other words, the logic behind the checkpost policy advocated 
by Mullik already in 1959 had seemed to work. If India were to hinder further Chinese 
expansion, the number of "forward" posts and patrols would have to be increased and 
deployed on a systematic scale. The Intelligence Bureau hence recommended the Army to 
start filling the comparatively large vacuums that still existed in Ladakh as soon as possible 
with token markers of Indian sovereignty "as, otherwise, the Chinese are bound to move into 
these areas within a few months."
526
 The minor vacuums on the McMahon line should 
likewise be secured by a proactive Indian forestalment of Chinese expansion.
527
 The note 
gave the impression that the Chinese threats which would expectedly follow such bold Indian 
initiatives, were largely to be taken with a pinch of salt.
528
   
 The path breaking importance of this IB note can partly be derived from the support it 
received from Krishna Menon. Worried about the dire political consequences of further land 
loss and a public outcry, Menon was receptive to the IB's seemingly well argued approach.
529
 
When Army HQ in response to the IB note sought to point out significant military and 
logistical problems in the suggested policy in their own note of 21 October 1961, Thapar and 
Kaul were reprimanded by the Defence Minister. He reportedly claimed that "the Army 
appeared to be doing nothing" to protect India's borders.
530
 This would undoubtedly have 
made an impression on Menon's protégé, general Kaul, who was eager to prove his mettle as a 
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soldier.
531
 The director of military operations, D. K. Palit, later in 1971 described the note as 
"the turning point in our border policy" and lamented that a civilian intelligence agency had in 
effect been laying down premises for tactical military policy.
532
 It was nevertheless the IB 
director's growing influence with Nehru in person that seemed to be the most consequential 
turning point in this regard. According to Mullik, 
 
the situation was getting very serious. There were areas in our territory which we had not yet 
physically occupied because they were difficult of access and were generally uninhabited. Unless 
immediate steps were taken to occupy them by summer 1962, we might find that the Chinese had 
already moved into them. I stressed these dangers to Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, as well 
as to the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, and then I took up the matter with the Prime Minister 
himself. I had three long meetings with him, in which, with the help of maps, I explained to him 
the extent of Chinese penetration into our territories since October, 1959, and the areas where gaps 
existed into which the Chinese might intrude at any moment (...)
533
 
 
During these meetings, Mullik convinced the Prime Minister that a forward policy was the 
best approach towards a devious China. Public opinion was crying for revenge, the politically 
unstable Menon was calling for a visibly tougher policy and – all at the same time – China 
seemed to keep "nibbling" on the territory that Nehru by now sincerely considered to be 
legitimately Indian. After a fourth meeting on early 2 November 1961, Nehru requested 
Mullik to come back in the evening to take part in a meeting at his residence, Teen Murthi 
Bhavan.
534
 That meeting would turn out to be an important turning point in the history of 
Sino-Indian relations.
535
 
 The lack of common ground for negotiations was in short exacerbated by the evolving 
threat perceptions of China. The civilian Intelligence Bureau was the main source of 
information on China to the government during this period.
536
 The basic argument of IB 
intelligence reports was that China was indeed intent on continued expansion in Indian 
claimed territory, despite any assurances that may have been given in private by Zhou to 
Nehru.
537
 China had not been satisfied with the 1956 line and now systematically sought to 
realise the new and widened claim line of 1960. India had no guarantee that Beijing would 
stop there; by giving them an inch, it was feared that they would take a mile.
538
 Influenced by 
the flow of rather unambiguous IB reports, key Indian decision makers increasingly feared 
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that China continued to expand in Indian territory. Additionally, China had since early 1960 
proactively strengthened its relationship with India's Himalayan buffer states, notably 
Nepal.
539
 In Mullik's opinion, China tried to "isolate" India from its neighbours.
540
 Worse still, 
Beijing suggested border talks with Pakistan in December 1960.
541
 In India's view, Pakistan 
and China had no legal common border despite the fact that parts of northern Kashmir 
bordering to Xinjiang were controlled by Pakistan. Indian suspicions of Chinese malevolence 
seemed to be reconfirmed.
542
 It would be strategically and politically risky to passively 
observe the diplomatic deadlock when China apparently kept on playing its own "Great 
Game" behind a thin verbal veil of good faith. White papers were still going to be published 
and public opinion closely monitored every single step the government took. Meaningful 
conversations with Beijing had ceased. On the ground, however, there still seemed to be room 
to improve India's situation. 
 
The international context 
The context that stimulated the decisions taken during that seminal November evening in 
1961 was however not purely domestic. While the domestic context in the period from the 
failed talks of April 1960 to the meeting in November 1961 furnished what may be 
considered as the fundamental preconditions for the adoption of the Forward Policy, the 
international analyses of the government added water to the mill by indicating that India's 
international situation gave adequate room for such a policy.
543
 The external context thus 
contributed to a hardening of Indian China policy, without actually causing the changes. 
These contributory factors primarily stemmed from (i) Indian analyses of Beijing's general 
strategic situation as well as (ii) New Delhi's calculation that not only the United States, but 
also the influential Soviet Union were relatively favourably inclined to India vis-à-vis the 
PRC and that Beijing would have to take account of this. 
 While the Indian government saw China's actions as increasingly threatening, it also 
reflected on China's grand strategic situation. In the eyes of Indian analysts, the overall 
situation would have appeared relatively unfavourable to Beijing at the time.
544
 Due to the 
insufficient availability of government primary sources, it is not possible to pinpoint the 
Government of India's analyses of China's situation in the period. But it is out of question that 
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Nehru, with his sophisticated sense of political analysis, would ignore the international 
dimensions of the equation. Certain aspects of potential Chinese weakness must have struck 
Indian China analysts. China's precarious internal situation was one such aspect. In 1961 the 
PRC was in the midst of the Great Leap Forward, a Maoist reform with highly damaging 
effects on the internal fabric of the Chinese state.
545
 Like India, China was basically an 
underdeveloped country with limited resources to spend on what Nehru in 1950 had written 
off as a "wild adventure across the Himalayas".
546
 Internal Chinese challenges would in short 
overshadow the peripheral border problems with India. China's international situation pulled 
in the same direction.
547
 With its most dangerous enemies immediately to the east of the Han 
Chinese heartlands – Guomindang Taiwan and the US satellites of South Korea, Japan and 
the Philippines – there was no strategic room for costly adventurism in the extreme west of 
China's outskirts. In the case of Taiwan, there was the prevalent fear of an outright invasion of 
South China.
548
 And to the north, relations with the Soviet Union were taking a new and 
complicated turn. The Indian government was informed of the growing Sino-Soviet split since 
at least 1960; the differences were expected to persist, "though every effort will doubtless be 
made by both sides to prevent them from coming into the green so blatantly as they did in 
1960."
549
 Nehru attached great importance to the shifting tide, which he considered to be a 
natural consequence of traditionally diverging Soviet-Russian and Chinese national 
interests.
550
 With its principal ally, the Soviet Union, taking a provokingly balanced approach 
to the border dispute with India, China would have to mind its steps. It would hence seem 
logical for Beijing to act defensively vis-à-vis a fundamentally non-threatening India, even if 
India adopted a more assertive stance in the border dispute. To Nehru's thinking, there may 
additionally still have been a faint belief that China would not risk to utterly ruin its relations 
with a large and potentially powerful neighbour that all in all had been friendly to the young 
People's Republic since its early days. In sum, China's situation seemed to be such that 
Beijing would not be willing to gamble on war with India – a war which according to Nehru 
was bound to end in a devastating and gargantuan conflict with global consequences.
551
 In 
other words, India might adopt a more assertive approach to China in the border areas without 
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running high risks of provoking a war. China's perceived weakness seemed to open a room 
for a more proactive Indian policy. 
 Such a policy would nevertheless have to be minor in scale and cost. Developing 
India, too, had other and more fundamental problems to mind. Pakistan was still by far 
considered to be the greater threat in New Delhi – not least by Krishna Menon who even after 
1962 staunchly maintained that "our main enemy was Pakistan", not China.
552
 Other issues 
were also pressing the Indian government. Southeast of the McMahon line, in the jungles of 
Nagaland, there was an armed revolt against the central government. Sectarianism, 
development issues and internal instability also made India vulnerable to external pressure.
553
  
But seen in isolation with regard to the border dispute with China, India's general strategic 
situation was not necessarily unfavourable. The political sympathy of the United States and 
the western world against communist China was almost taken for granted, and seemed to have 
been confirmed during President Eisenhower's visit to India in the critical year of 1959.
554
 
The issue at stake was rather non-aligned India's reluctance to bind itself strategically to the 
western superpower. It was in testing times that non-alignment would prove itself valid.
555
 
The most significant international advantage of India rather appeared to be the increasing 
Soviet ambiguity towards China.
556
 By not openly supporting China the Soviet Union was in 
fact tacitly sympathising with India, it was deemed.
557
 Khrushchev had remarked to the Indian 
ambassador in Moscow that "so far as the Indo-Soviet friendship was concerned there was not 
a single cloud on the sky."
558
  
 It has later been confirmed that Khrushchev criticised Mao for China's approach 
towards India, especially with regards to the clashes in the autumn 1959, but it is not known 
whether Nehru or the Indian government had positive knowledge of this criticism.
559
 During 
Nehru's conversations with Khrushchev in February 1960, the Soviet leader primarily stressed 
his wish for India and China, "our two friends", to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.
560
 
Nehru nevertheless described it to ex-Viceroy Mountbatten in May 1960 as "clearly" a sign of 
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support for India and "a slap in the face for China".
561
 As far as the disputed border was 
concerned, the Government of India assessed the emerging rift between Beijing and the 
Kremlin to be in India's strategic favour.
562
 In the analysis of the Australian High 
Commissioner to India, Nehru viewed the Soviet Union as his "best assurance" against 
China.
563
 In short, India's friendship with the Soviet Union seemed to offer New Delhi 
significant leverage with China in the peripheral border dispute. The international context 
hence appeared benign for a revision of Indian China policy.
564
 Mullik's arguments for a 
"firm" approach was buttressed by Nehru's interpretation of superpower politics and China's 
isolation. Both China's internal and external situation seemed to offer no credible room for a 
violent response, should India adopt a firmer policy. As such, the international analyses of the 
Indian government were a contributory factor to the decisions taken in the evening of 2 
November 1961. 
 
(iii) The Prime Minister's decision  
As agreed during the morning rendezvous with Nehru on 2 November 1961, Mullik returned 
to the neoclassical residence of Teen Murthi Bhavan in the cool evening. The Prime Minister 
had called for a "high powered" meeting of leading decision makers and bureaucrats to 
discuss the way ahead for Indian China policy.
565
 While the peacocks sang in the elegant 
colonial gardens, "decisions were taken at this meeting that eventually led us past the point of 
no return."
566
 There are no official minutes available, but the final directives from the meeting 
were later leaked to the then London Times journalist Neville Maxwell. The authenticity of 
the leaked directives have been confirmed by official government sources and by individuals 
who were themselves present at the meeting.
567
 Furthermore there are various personal first 
hand accounts at hand, all from the differing but supplementary angles of IB director Mullik, 
chief of general staff Kaul and  the director of military operations, Palit. Primarily by means 
of these sources, an account of the meeting will be given along with a discussion of the 
fundamental premises underpinning the decision and the likely immediate intentions behind 
it. It was in the shadows of that "high powered" evening of 2 November 1961 that the door 
was opened for the Forward Policy in the "narrow" sense of the word.
568
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 Present in the room were the Prime Minister, Krishna Menon, Mullik and Hooja (the 
deputy director of the IB), general Kaul, general Thapar and brigadier Palit of Army HQ, 
foreign secretary Desai and various other senior officials.
569
 The meeting itself unfolded as a 
reflection of the seminal IB note of 26 September 1961. Krishna Menon reproduced the same 
vein of arguments: China was systematically advancing westwards and had recently 
established a new post a few kilometres east of the Indian post at Daulet Beg Oldi; the IB 
added that similar advances were likely to continue till the 1960 claim line was established 
and possibly even further than that – unless an Indian presence were expediently 
established.
570
 Again, Mullik argued that "even a dozen soldiers" would be enough to deter 
Chinese expansion in a given area.
571
  In line with the 26 September note, he also told the 
assembly that the worst case scenario for India would be patrol clashes rather than war. Palit 
regrettingly noted in 1991 that "by that time, I think most of us had been conditioned to 
accept this speculative prognosis".
572
 Mullik's argument seems to have been accepted by the 
assembly, for the next phase of the meeting was concentrated on a discussion of concrete 
initiatives in order to put the IB recommendations into effect. While discussing potential 
geographical locations for forward moves, there only seems to have been reservations from 
army officers like Thapar and Palit.
573
  
 These reservations were basically congruent with the ones Army HQ had raised in 
response to the IB note of late September (i.e. operational and logistical problems 
complicating forward moves in Ladakh) and for which Thapar and Kaul had subsequently 
been scolded by Krishna Menon in person. According to Palit's account, Thapar nevertheless 
restated his hesitation to venture further forward unless he could support the new posts 
tactically and logistically. Kaul, according to Palit, refrained from raising reservations on 
tactical inadequacies.
574
 In his own account, Kaul does not clearly specify his own opinion on 
the matter but merely notes that Nehru "was told" about the military difficulties in the 
meeting.
575
 Given Kaul's close connections to Menon and Nehru and the recent reprimand by 
Menon following Army HQ's reservations to the IB note of 26 September, Palit's account 
seems credible. What in any case appears quite certain is that some of the professional 
military problems confronting the suggested policy were indeed raised in one manner or 
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another and, most crucially, that these reservations were ignored or at least toned down by 
influential civilian decision makers.  
 
Fundamental premises 
Mullik seems to have played a key role in the downgrading of the military reservations. The 
core of his argument had been that the border dispute with China was more of a political than 
a tactical military challenge. Overt steadfastness was the most vital factor in countering 
China's unhindered advance. The Intelligence Bureau had repeatedly stressed that even a 
small Indian presence of a "dozen men" would forestall Chinese incursions – a view which 
was endorsed by officials from the MEA.
576
 A violent Chinese response would not be 
triggered by India occupying what was rightfully Indian territory. The fundamental premise of 
the IB argument was thus not only that the disputed land was unquestionably Indian territory 
waiting to be occupied, but – most importantly – that a forward policy would not trigger a 
large scale military reaction from China.
577
 Despite the well known disparity in military 
capacity, China's internal and external difficulties, the complex political triangle of India-
China-superpower relations and the difficult and isolated mountain geography of Ladakh 
would presumably combine to temper a violent Chinese reaction against Indian forward 
moves.
578
 Only minor patrol clashes were to be expected, not war.
579
 This crucial assumption 
found resonance in the grand strategic approach of Nehru who also considered China's 
internal and international situation to be too fragile to allow for a "wild adventure" over the 
towering Himalayas against India.
580
 The international dimension of the question also seemed 
to go in India's favour, especially in view of the emerging Sino-Soviet rift and the good 
relations between Moscow and New Delhi. In Nehru's opinion, other priorities and problems 
would quite simply prevent China from taking rash action against its giant Panchsheel 
neighbour; War with India would entail unacceptable consequences for strategically 
vulnerable and economically developing China.
581
 China would not risk a potential world war 
for the sake of uninhibited wasteland in Ladakh.
582
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 In his own memoirs, Mullik does not really delve into the considerations underpinning 
his crucial assumption that China would not react in a vigorous military fashion. Instead, he 
rather stresses that India had no real alternative to adopting the Forward Policy:
583
  
 
The only alternative was to hand over quietly all the territories which China had claimed and be 
satisfied with the crumbs that China might leave with India to show her magnanimity in dealing 
with a Panchsheel ally. But this would only have whetted the Chinese appetite and provided a 
temporary pause before the next phase of Chinese advance would begin.
584
 
 
In his opinion the Forward Policy ought therefore rather to have been called the "No more 
surrender policy".
585
 Although it might be challenging to execute, professional military 
hesitation was to Mullik "a strange logic (...) as no country gives up the frontier without a 
fight."
586
 The "real trouble" was on the contrary Army HQ's lax and hesitating attitude, 
especially under general Thimayya.
587
 Military weakness vis-à-vis China was no excuse for 
not implementing a firm course: "the consideration whether a country is weaker or stronger 
than the enemy can come only in a war of aggression but not when one has to choose between 
defending one's motherland and surrender."
588
 According to Mullik's 1971 memoirs, there 
was quite simply no alternative to the Forward Policy under the given circumstances of 
November 1961. His only regret was that it had not been implemented earlier – or, in his own 
words – "had not been stopped in October, 1959".589   
 In personal conversations with brigadier Palit, on the other hand, Mullik explained the 
assumption of Chinese moderation with arguments strikingly similar to Nehru's thinking: the 
Chinese were too occupied with "their own grave problems" to react forcibly. Palit found the 
argument persuasive and admits that "we had become inured to the presupposition of Chinese 
non-belligerence."
590
 Most importantly, Nehru had also become convinced that the Forward 
Policy was the most credible course to settle for. According to Mullik's résumé of the 2 
November meeting: 
 
after a general discussion, Pandit Nehru decided that Indian forces should remain in effective 
occupation of the whole frontier from NEFA to Ladakh and they should cover all gaps by setting 
up posts or by means of effective patrolling. No longer should the Chinese be allowed to encroach 
surreptitiously into territories not occupied by Indian troops or police. He, however, ordered that 
the troops should not fire except in self-defence. There was no protest because the task which 
Pandit Nehru now set before the Army and the Police was nothing new.
591
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The Government of India's official history of the 1962 war gives a strikingly similar account 
of the decisions taken at the meeting.
592
 While there may not have been "protests", there 
certainly seems to have been reservations from the side of Thapar and Palit.
593
 In fact, 
brigadier Palit later described the idea of unanimity as an "aberration in Mullik's memory".
594
 
During the meeting Palit, according to himself, argued that the army could not go "anywhere 
forward of Leh and Chushul airfields because of lack of roads, mules and even porters."
595
 
Nehru allegedly listened to the reservation, but "somewhat impatiently remarked that he did 
not envisage a battle with the Chinese."
596
 The officers did not take their case further.
597
 The 
Prime Minister obviously agreed with the Intelligence Bureau in the basic analytical premise 
that China would not respond violently to Indian forward moves.
 
According to Palit's résumé 
he then 
 
gave his directions in a rambling manner not untypical of him. These were to the effect that we 
must go forward into our claimed territories and establish a presence. Where we were already in 
occupation, as in NEFA, we must 'plug the holes' through which the Chinese might attempt to 
infiltrate.
598
 
 
The military reservations on logistics and tactical support for the new posts were thus largely 
put aside. Similarly, general Kaul understood the upshot of the discussions  
 
to be that (since China was unlikely to wage war with India,) there was no reason why we should 
not play a game of chess and a battle of wits with them, so far as the question of establishing posts 
is concerned. If they advance in one place, we should advance in another. In other words, keep up 
with them, as far as possible, and maintain a few of our symbolic posts–where we could–in what 
we were convinced was our territory. This defensive step on our part at best might irritate the 
Chinese but no more. This was how, I think, this new policy on our borders was evolved (which 
was referred to by some as the 'forward policy').
599
 
 
Both the accounts of Kaul and Palit resonate with the policy recommendations of the 
Intelligence Bureau: move forward into disputed territories, even with minor troop 
detachments, but without risking war with China. So do the formal directives that emerged 
from the discussions. They were signed by secretary general R. K. Nehru of the MEA, who 
according to Palit's recollection was not present at the meeting himself.
600
 Nevertheless, the 
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written directive written at the MEA was to be formally passed and signed, also by Army HQ 
under the auspices of general Kaul:
601
  
 
(a) So far as Ladakh is concerned, we are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present 
positions towards the international border. This will be done with a view to establishing our posts 
which should prevent the Chinese from advancing any further and also dominating from any posts 
which they may have already established in our territory. This must be done without getting 
involved in a clash with the Chinese, unless this becomes necessary in self-defence. 
 
(b) As regards U.P. [Uttar Pradesh, i.e. the middle sector] and other northern areas there are not 
the same difficulties as in Ladakh. We should, therefore, as far as practicable, go forward and be in 
effective occupation of the whole frontier. Where there are any gaps they must be covered either 
by patrolling or by posts. 
 
(c) In view of the numerous operational and administrative difficulties, efforts should be made to 
position major concentrations of forces along our borders in places conveniently situated behind 
the forward posts from where they could be maintained logistically and from where they can 
restore a border situation at short notice.
602
 
 
According to Palit, this written directive reflected at once both a sharper tone in paragraph (a) 
and a significant, but cosmetic reservation in paragraph (c) compared to the oral decisions of 
the Prime Minister at the meeting.
603
 The added sharpness was primarily visible in the term 
"dominate" – i.e. "observe and cover" to exert military pressure on established Chinese 
posts.
604
 Rather than to solely occupy the vacant spaces within the Indian claim line, in the 
sense of deterring Chinese occupation, there was thus also a coercive element to the written 
directive. Not only should Chinese occupation be prevented, to some extent it was also to be 
proactively resisted by means of Indian domination over existing Chinese forward posts. To 
the extent that the wording "dominate" did not reflect the oral directives of Nehru, it would be 
logical to presume that it had roots within the MEA – where the written directives were 
authored. After all, it was foreign secretary Desai of the MEA who in September 1961 had 
suggested that India should start inflicting an offensive "occasional knock" on the Chinese.
605
 
The Forward Policy decision of Nehru – even as reflected in the written directives – in other 
words called for a markedly less aggressive policy than what Desai in the MEA had suggested 
only a few months earlier.  
 On the other side, the written directive also clearly reflected an important precaution 
in paragraph (c). The wording of the paragraph would imply that the Forward Policy as 
conceptualised on 2 November was not meant to be a policy of "symbolic posts", as Kaul 
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described it, but a policy based on considerable military backing.
606
 This precaution was 
important for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, Mullik in 1971 claimed that when 
speaking of a policy based on "symbolic posts" or "penny packets", Kaul's memory had 
"played a trick (...) due to a great deal of suffering both physical and mental."
607
 Rather than 
symbolic measures, Mullik emphasises that Nehru had in fact wanted the disputed territories 
to be "effectively occupied" – as implied in paragraph (c).608 In hindsight it would in other 
words seem as if Nehru did not get the product he had called for, namely a militarily sound 
policy that would supply the politically desirable forward movement with the necessary 
tactical depth in the possible, but unlikely, case of trouble. On the other hand, the then 
director of military operations, Palit, effectively discards this critique as shallow: for one 
thing it was Mullik and the IB who had argued in 1961 that a "dozen men" would be enough 
to deter China.
609
 Indeed, Mullik had personally talked to Palit of forward posts in terms of 
mere administrative presence.
610
 Secondly, Nehru and the IB were in concurrence as to the 
unlikely possibility of a Chinese attack, despite Indian forward moves in the disputed areas.
611
 
In the worst case, "they would play the same game at us – push forward new posts while 
avoiding open clashes."
612
 Hence large and costly military resources demanded elsewhere 
need not be requisitioned for the policy implementation. Finally, the civilian leaders had 
repeatedly been warned by professional officers that in the case large military resources were 
in fact needed, it would be hard to muster anyway due to the very considerable logistical and 
tactical obstacles – especially in the still roadless and desolate north east Ladakh.613  
 Most importantly, however, Palit argues that the precautionary paragraph (c) was not 
even a part of Nehru's oral directive. To him, "sub-para (c) was clearly a bureaucratic 
afterthought; the Prime Minister had not mentioned it (...) It was a brazen ploy at alibi-making 
by the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry, in effect turning our own guns against us (...) 
seeking, presumably, to hedge their bets."
614
 In Palit's opinion, if paragraph (c) were at all to 
be part of the new policy, then it would automatically have to take precedence to paragraph 
(a); by implication, the politically desired forward movement could only be implemented after 
a costly and time consuming build-up of infrastructural, operational and logistical 
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capabilities.
615
 General Thapar in principle seems to have agreed to this logic. In 1971 he 
wrote that if paragraph (c) were to be taken seriously, it would have taken years to implement, 
a time during which the Chinese could have continued to expand unopposed in Ladakh.
616
 In 
a letter to Defence Minister Menon Thapar did warn of potential Chinese military 
repercussions in Ladakh and also restated the problematic geographical and logistical aspects 
of the policy.
617
 Nevertheless, in the very same letter, Thapar loyally declared his will to 
implement the policy as described in the directive's main paragraph (a) should he still be 
asked to do so, despite not being able to fulfil paragraph (c).
618
 Kaul was also willing to 
implement the directive's paragraph (a) and accorded his approval without apparent 
hesitation, despite the unrealistic demands of paragraph (c); instead of reneging on political 
directives from Nehru and Menon, "he was convinced that the forward policy must be 
implemented as soon after the winter as possible."
619
 In spite of serious logistical and 
operational inadequacies, Thapar, Palit and especially Kaul thus embraced the IB premise that 
China would not respond violently to the Forward Policy – politically endorsed by Menon 
and Nehru himself.
620
 The premise appeared to render the professional military apprehensions 
of Thapar and Palit less pressing. Seen from this perspective, it thus seems improbable that 
Nehru, Menon and other civilian decision makers were hoodwinked by the Army in the sense 
of ending up with an entirely different product than what they had ordered for. The 2 
November meeting did not envisage the Forward Policy to be a traditional military operation. 
In the opinion of the retired general Thimayya – who had vigorously resisted IB policy in 
Ladakh from 1959 till he left office in 1961 – "China's present strength (...) exceeds our 
resources a hundredfold with the full support of the USSR, and we could never hope to match 
China in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the diplomats and the politicians to ensure 
our security."
621
 With the clear precedence of the offensive paragraph (a) to the logistical and 
operational precaution in paragraph (c), the Forward Policy decision acutely underlined 
Thimayya's observation. Diplomacy, rather than forward posts, was India's fundamental 
insurance against Chinese force. 
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Principal intentions  
But if the assumptions of "foolproof" Indian territorial claims and Chinese moderation under 
pressure were the basic analytical premises underlying the 2 November directives, what 
where the guiding intentions underlying Nehru's decision? What did he want to achieve with 
the new policy? Despite the lack of primary sources to decisively illuminate the Prime 
Minister's personal thoughts and feelings on the subject, it is possible to distinguish between 
at least three broad sets of motives informing the policy decision taken on 2 November. 
Firstly, the decision could be seen as a response to the perceived Chinese expansion 
westwards. Since the discovery of the presumably new Chinese forward post in the Chip 
Chap valley in September, the Intelligence Bureau had expressly recommended, in written 
form (e.g. note of 26 September 1961) and in the course of four "long meetings" with the 
Prime Minister in person, that India should counter Chinese expansion by swift and 
determined occupation of disputed areas that had not yet fallen to Chinese control.
622
 The 
same argument can also be found in India's official history: the 2 November decision was 
taken "in the midst of reports about intensifying aggressive Chinese activities (...) to encroach 
surreptitiously into our territories not occupied by Indian troops or police."
623
 As "the Chinese 
were steadily pushing forward their posts, occupying more and more of the empty area", India 
too had to push forward "in an effort to show that the remaining area was not empty".
624
 In 
these accounts, Nehru's decision was therefore a necessary and immediate response to 
external Chinese pressure in the form of yet another "surreptitious encroachment". Indeed, 
according to Mullik the Forward Policy decision was the only actual option available to the 
Prime Minister.
625
  
  Secondly, Nehru's decision can be seen in context of the strong domestic pressure on 
a government which was quickly approaching India's third general elections in February 
1962.
626
 It was necessary to demonstrate signally to the public that the government handled 
the dispute with China with resolve and sincerity. This was especially true in regards to 
Nehru's friend and colleague Krishna Menon who was severely criticised for not beating back 
the Chinese incursions. According to general Kaul's memoirs, a fundamental force behind the 
2 November decision was "the constant and unrealistic criticism from the Opposition benches 
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in the Parliament against the way in which he was handling the border situation."
627
 Indeed, 
Nehru was squeezed between strong public pressure and knowledge of "the handicaps from 
which our Armed Forces were suffering."
628
 Kaul concludes that he was therefore "anxious to 
devise some via media and take action short of war to appease the people."
629
 The new 
discovery of a Chinese post in the Chip Chap valley and the subsequent clear-cut policy 
recommendations of the IB may thus have functioned more as a trigger than as a cause – this 
principally being appeasement of the inflamed public opinion. In the words of another officer, 
brigadier Dalvi, the Forward Policy was "merely a sop to an agitated public."
630
 Mullik's 
memoirs, on the other hand, vehemently contradict such interpretations.
631
 According to the 
IB director, Nehru did not try to "devise some via media" or appease the people quite simply 
for the reason that "he did what the Prime Minister of any country could do, that is to task the 
Army to secure the frontier."
632
 Whereas Kaul partly paints a picture of Nehru framing the 
policy "principally for the benefit of the Parliament and the public", Mullik exclusively 
stresses the external Chinese dimension in a choice between "defending one's motherland and 
surrender".
633
 
 Despite Mullik's criticism of Kaul's account, the intention of stemming a perceived 
Chinese expansion westwards and, on the other hand, the intention of stemming the rising tide 
of public malcontent were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Nehru would have had both the 
external and the internal dimensions of the problem in mind when he deliberated what 
decision to take at the 2 November meeting.
634
 The fact that the recently discovered Chip 
Chap valley post and unanimous IB recommendations may have triggered the call for the 
meeting does not render the domestic dimension unimportant – neither for Nehru as a 
democrat, nor for the politically vulnerable Krishna Menon. Thirdly, and most importantly 
perhaps, Nehru saw the new policy decision in a grand perspective. True to his preference for 
a negotiated solution, the Forward Policy decision would merely act as a supplement to the 
stalled diplomacy of words. If China was not willing to agree that both countries should pull 
out of the disputed areas in Ladakh, including Aksai Chin, because it would merely be a 
symbolic gesture for India and a large loss for China, then India should improve its standing 
by controlling more land. India, in other words, could ameliorate its bargaining power vis-à-
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vis China at the negotiating table by applying a relatively soft and financially affordable 
military pressure to secure an immediate fait accompli. As Krishna Menon later recalled, "our 
policy in regard to China was one of building posts, showing the flag, and so on, largely 
depending upon our hope that good sense would prevail. We expected negotiation and 
diplomacy to play their part."
635
 In other words, the solution Nehru and the government 
settled for on 2 November was based on an immediate intention of strengthening India's 
major interest in a negotiated solution.
636
 
 
In summary, Nehru's principal intentions behind the 2 November decision would seem to be 
(i) to halt continued Chinese forward moves, (ii) to demonstrate to the public opinion that the 
government was up to the Chinese challenge and (iii) to improve India's bargaining power in 
view of future negotiations with China. The fundamental assumptions underlying the 
directives given by him at the 2 November meeting were (a) India's "foolproof" claim to the 
areas in dispute and (b) the crucial calculation that China would not and could not respond 
violently to an Indian forward policy. Together these underlying push and pull-factors made 
that November evening at Teen Murthi Bhavan into nothing less than a turning point in the 
history of Sino-Indian relations.
637
 
 
(iv) A game of chess and a battle of wits 
A discussion of the long drawn and complex implementation of the Forward Policy decision 
would exceed the limits of this analysis. Causes and origins must analytically be distinguished 
from the post-hoc perspective of effects and consequences. In order to place the political 
decision of 2 November 1961 in a wider historical perspective, however, a summary overview 
of the implementation of the Forward Policy may be in place. 
 The inherent incompatibility between the boldness of paragraph (a) and the 
cautiousness of paragraph (c) would soon be reflected in the process by which the 
government's written directives were turned into military orders. That is: paragraph (c) was 
not present in the military orders which were eventually passed on to the regional commands 
from Army HQ on 5 December.
 638
 At that time, the bitterly cold Himalayan winter still held 
the disputed areas in its sway. But as spring gradually crept up to the windy mountain peaks 
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of Ladakh in 1962, the Forward Policy began to take shape on the ground.
639
 It was not a 
policy of precaution, but rather one that was completely dependent on the validity of the two 
assumptions on which it rested. Its implementation would continue until September 1962, 
when the brief summer of the Forward Policy effectively came to an end with a severe crisis 
in NEFA; in the later words of an officer present in the area, "our day dreams were coming to 
an end."
640
 It finally turned out that a "dozen men" was not sufficient to deter China. On 20 
October, China launched a full-scale attack on India in both Ladakh and NEFA.
641
  
 Nehru's government was re-elected in February 1962 and the implementation of the 
new and officially declared hard line was initiated in Ladakh in spring 1962. A total of 36 
new Indian forward posts were established there by September.
642
 In NEFA, where the 
challenge was very different given that India was largely in effective occupation of its claim, 
35 new posts were put up by September to "plug the holes" of the McMahon Line.
643
 China 
retaliated in Ladakh by establishing 47 new posts of its own according to Indian sources.
644
 In 
the words of one officer involved in the process, "we thought it would be a sort of game. They 
would stick up a post and we would set up a post. We did not think it would come to much 
more"
645
 General Kaul, who became the undisputed military driver for the policy once it had 
been formally adopted, thought of the policy in terms of a game of chess.
646
 Brigadier Palit 
agreed at the time, but later noted that the term was only fitting to the extent that India fought 
with pawns whereas China deployed knights and castles.
647
 In spite of that, a number of the 
posts were placed around and even behind established Chinese positions.
648
 Speaking to a 
cabinet sub-committee in December 1961, Krishna Menon stated that "the new posts would 
be positioned to cut off the supply lines of targeted Chinese posts; they were to cause the 
'starving out' of the Chinese who would thereafter be replaced by Indian troops in the posts. 
These points would serve as advanced bases for Indian patrols assigned to probe close to the 
road."
649
  
 The plan was first put to the test in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh. Lightly armed 
Indian soldiers had flanked the recently discovered Chinese post which had played a part in 
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triggering the 2 November decision in the first place.
650
 Beijing saw the new Indian move as 
provocative and loudly denounced it in a threatening note of 30 April.
651
 India, however, 
refused to budge. On 6 May, China supplemented its diplomatic pressure with around 100 
troops "in assault formation" approaching one of the small Indian forward posts in the Chip 
Chap valley.
652
  General Kaul and Army HQ nevertheless stuck to their guns and fundamental 
assumptions of Chinese moderation: there was to be no Indian surrender. When the Chinese 
called the threatening move off, it was therefore seen as a major confirmation of the Forward 
Policy logic.
653
 When push came to shove, it appeared, Chinese reactions would as foreseen 
come to no more than empty threats. The Forward Policy could hence proceed unabashed. A 
second and even more dangerous litmus test came on 6 July. It was in the upper reaches of the 
Galwan valley where India had established a new forward post only two days earlier.
654
  The 
director of military operations described the Chinese reaction to the new post as "immediate 
and violent".
655
 After yet another fruitless note of complaint, 350 Chinese troops advanced 
within 45 metres range of the 30 Indian Gurkhas. Despite the Chinese being as close as 15 
metres on 12 and 13 July, the Gurkhas were ordered to hold their post without firing.
656
 
Amidst unusually heavy handed sabre-rattling from Beijing, they succeeded. Yet another 
time, superior Chinese forces had finally pulled back in the face of Indian steadfastness. 
Outwardly, it was seen as yet another victory for the "Napoleonic planning" of the Forward 
Policy, as one leading newspaper put it.
657
 Finally, it seemed, the government had adopted a 
policy which did what Indian public opinion had been calling for since the clash at Longju in 
1959. India was reclaiming its soil. 
 Within the government, however, Nehru and Menon were beginning to feel that the 
situation could be taking a dangerous turn.
658
 In July, Chinese reactions had been more severe 
than expected and the risk of serious clashes was now much more pronounced than 
anticipated. New and bolder diplomatic initiatives were taken in an effort to hinder further 
escalation.
659
 Unknown to the Indian government, however, its bargaining power – far from 
increasing in the wake of extended occupation – had actually eroded seriously; China's 
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strategic situation was improving markedly in summer 1962, particularly as the fear of  an 
invasion from Taiwan was relieved by assurances that such an undertaking would not have 
US support.
660
 Furthermore, Chinese suspicions about Indian Tibet policy had by now 
combined with anger at the visibly weak, but offensive military pressure of India's Forward 
Policy.
661
 China had lost faith in India.
662
 All new Indian efforts at diplomatic flexibility – on 
26 July even going so far as to suggest negotiations on the basis of China's 1956 line – were 
rejected by Beijing.
663
 Meanwhile, Nehru and the government were in the next turn severely 
criticised at home for having attempted to make diplomatic concessions at all. In the eyes of 
the public, the Forward Policy seemed to be working fine, so when new white papers revealed 
that Nehru had indeed attempted to meet the Chinese half-way through negotiations in July 
1962, reactions were intense. In an editorial named "The Road to Dishonour", Hindustan 
Times claimed that the government had "broken faith with the people of India" by having 
prostrated itself for negotiations with the Chinese "overlords".
664
 Nehru had effectively been 
trapped by his own Forward Policy.
665
 The government had been outflanked by distrustful 
China on one side and by a hard line Indian audience on the other. 
 Despite new and politically costly diplomatic efforts, however, neither Nehru nor 
Menon – who both thought it perfectly suitable to leave India for travels abroad – 
apprehended the full implications of the policy India still continued to follow. It would seem 
that the assumption of Chinese moderation remained fundamentally valid. After the July 
incident in the Galwan valley, general Kaul still spoke to the US ambassador of China being 
in a "mood of weakness" which was to be exploited by the establishment of even more Indian 
forward posts.
666
  
 By the time of the third trial for the Forward Policy in September, however, China was 
far more confident than it had been in the previous stages of India's Forward Policy. The new 
stand-off was to be the end of the Forward Policy and the beginning of an intense crisis that 
escalated into war in October.
667
 For the first time, China crossed what India interpreted to be 
the McMahon line in strength and challenged an Indian forward post established in June, at a 
place called Dhola.
668
 Around 300 heavily armed Chinese soldiers took up position opposite 
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50 Assam Riflemen in the Indian forward post.
669
 Like in the Chip Chap and Galwan valleys, 
it was decided to keep the Indian position at all costs. But this time the Chinese demonstrated 
unexpected resolve. By the end of September, the siege intensified into mortal clashes.
670
 
New Indian plans to coercively push the Chinese out of Dhola – i.e. an even more proactive 
avatar of the Forward Policy – escalated the situation to flash point. At dawn on 20 October, 
as the Soviet Union and the United States were getting entangled in the Cuban crisis, China 
unleashed war on India.
 671
 It would be perhaps the greatest shock in Nehru's political career 
and it would be the end of Menon's. 
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Conclusion 
 
Despite its ultimate failure, the Forward Policy was not without initial merits. Within 
relatively short time, the perceived Chinese expansion westward seemed to be halted. There 
was a general impression in public opinion that the tides were turning and that the situation on 
the frontier was finally going in India's favour.
672
 In July, just as China reacted in an 
unexpectedly strong fashion to India's newly opened forward post in the Galwan valley, the 
informed general public could take satisfaction in newspaper reports on "the unique triumph 
for audacious Napoleonic planning" which had led to "a general advance over a wide front of 
2,500 square miles".
673
 Menon claimed that one third of the Chinese held territory, i.e. 4000 
square miles, had been recovered under the new policy.
674
 It would thus not only appear that 
the fundamental assumptions of the Forward Policy were valid, but also that the policy 
fulfilled the immediate intentions of the Prime Minister's decision in November 1961.
675
 With 
the benefit of hindsight, it is now known that the appearance was shallow. In October 1962, 
the Forward Policy failed spectacularly. 
 Both the initial merits and the final failure of the policy have been reflected in 
posterior history writing. As late as 1971, director Mullik of the Intelligence Bureau warmly 
advocated Nehru's Forward Policy decision – in which, of course, he had played a crucial part 
himself.
676
 According to the Government of India's official history, the 2 November decision 
was "fully justified" in view of the vacant areas that "would have been occupied all the more 
easily by the Chinese, without firing a shot".
677
 In most other posterior accounts, however, the 
adoption of the Forward Policy is depicted in the unflattering light of erroneous naïveté – a 
self-contradictory Nehruvian version of the Great Game. The Forward Policy did certainly not 
ameliorate Nehru's bargaining power with China, as seems originally to have been intended. 
Rather, in the eyes of the CIA, "the border dispute was (...) transformed by the Indians from a 
primarily political quarrel to a serious military confrontation."
678
 The government's 
assumption of Chinese moderation has been denounced as either a civilian lack of 
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understanding of military affairs or as a fit of wishful thinking.
679
 As the military capabilities 
did not match the political ambitions, the policy finally failed. There was no plan B. 
 
The causes and origins of the Forward Policy decision 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to dismiss India's Forward Policy as a grave 
misjudgement.
680
 It is now known that Maoist China did not yield to India's pressure, that the 
forward posts were annihilated within an excruciatingly short time under the Chinese 
onslaught and – finally – that India was defeated by China in a humiliating war. 
Unsurprisingly, it has therefore often been asked what went wrong in the implementation 
phase, who was culpable, and, in India, what could have been done differently to prevent the 
débâcle. While some have argued that "the tragedy was that the Forward Policy lacked bite", 
others have criticised the policy in its conceptual and operational entirety.
681
 The nature of the 
Forward Policy as a military operation and its controversial role as the casus belli of 1962 has, 
in brief, been debated in a number of analyses dealing comprehensively with the border war.  
 A question which has less often been discussed, however, is why India settled for the 
Forward Policy in the first place. The question is important because it can potentially shed 
light on both the political nature of the Forward Policy and on the prelude to war in general. 
What underlying and proximate factors can account for the fact that the Government of India 
postulated Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai in 1958, but opted for the Forward Policy in 1961? In what 
contextual landscapes was the policy conceptualised and adopted? A variety of new primary 
and secondary sources have allowed the present analysis to grapple with these questions 
within a broad historical perspective. In order to contextualise the Forward Policy decision, a 
set of underlying origins anchored in a long time perspective were first identified. Secondly, 
the proximate causes that stimulated a turn in India's China policy in the period from 1959 to 
mid-1961 were discussed. In the third chapter, the principal preconditions and triggering 
events that underpinned the Prime Minister's 2 November decision were analysed. Seen 
together, these complex causes and origins add nuances to what was to become Nehru's 
deeply controversial Forward Policy decision. 
 The underlying origins of the decision can largely be traced back to the uneasy 
relationship between early independent India and the newly founded People's Republic of 
China. On the one hand, the pan-Asian light of independence radiated a sense of strong 
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optimism and a fresh start. On the other hand, the long shadows cast by Qing and British 
empire builders revived the unsettled geopolitical questions of the past. In this twilight the 
undisputed architect and primus inter pares of Indian foreign policy, Jawaharlal Nehru, chose 
to emphasise the light. It is absolutely essential to recall that early independent India was a 
poverty stricken developing country which had recently gone through the trials of partition 
and whose future as one entity could not yet be taken for granted. Both from an idealist pan-
Asian point of view and in terms of practical politics and development, the Prime Minister 
therefore considered co-operation and friendship with China to be essential for India. The 
India-China friendship was in short a cornerstone of the Prime Minister's grand strategy. 
Simultaneously, however, the policy of proactive friendship was challenged by geopolitical 
developments on India's northern frontiers. Beijing re-established its control over Tibet in 
1950–1951. The buffer so central to Lord Curzon's geopolitical vision of India was thereby 
effectively removed, while the question of the nebulous frontiers was silently revived – to 
hover on the horizon. Nehru tried to compensate for the geopolitical loss by constructing a 
psychological buffer, seeking to safeguard India's security by consolidating friendly relations 
with China. Rather than changing course, as argued by Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru considered 
the importance of friendship with China to be strengthened after the invasion of Tibet. For 
reasons of state the relationship must not be derailed by "petty issues" like the desolate and 
uninhabited territory of Aksai Chin. 
 In 1959, however, it was. The relationship changed in a manner so sudden and 
unexpected to Nehru that 1959 has aptly been called the annus horribilis of Indian China 
policy.
682
 It is within the period from the Tibetan rebellion of 1959 up to the failure of 
diplomacy in 1960–1961 that the proximate causes of the Forward Policy decision can be 
identified. Firstly, the Tibetan revolt from March 1959 led to militarisation on both sides of 
the previously neglected frontiers. The Dalai Lama's flight over the McMahon line and the 
pro-Tibetan attitude of Indian public opinion seem to have triggered a much deeper suspicion 
of India in Beijing than New Delhi realised.
683
 The combination of growing Chinese 
assumptions of ulterior Indian motives, high military activity on the frontier and undefined 
borders finally led to confrontations. The fatal clashes of August and October 1959 together 
with China's explicit and categorical rejection of Indian border claims in September changed 
the atmosphere of the bilateral relationship fundamentally. Most importantly, the external 
Chinese pressure triggered a severe domestic reaction in India. After the first clash at Longju, 
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Nehru broke the lid of confidentiality and for the first time informed parliament of the 
ongoing border dispute with China. Public reaction was intense. What had originally been 
portrayed in terms of "petty issues" now became symbols infused with nationalist passion. By 
continuously issuing white papers, the government exacerbated the public pressure and 
undermined its own diplomatic room for manoeuvre. Public opinion was a new, but powerful 
factor in Indian China policy – a fact that contradicts the widely held view that early Indian 
foreign policy was exclusively the domain of governmental élites.
684
 For the first time, Nehru 
was no longer serenely in charge of Indian China policy. The combination of external and 
internal pressure on the Prime Minister furthermore contributed to his growing personal 
conviction in early 1960 that India's claims were historically and legally "foolproof". Partly as 
a result of the new attitude to Aksai Chin, and partly as a result of massive public pressure, 
the highly controversial talks with Zhou Enlai in April 1960 were almost bound to fail – 
which they thoroughly did. Dialogue came to an end as both countries fortified their 
diplomatic trenches and refused to contemplate compromise solutions. India would not barter 
territories, neither would China give India the cosmetic benefit of a "shadow" sovereignty 
over Aksai Chin. When China at the next turn presented an even more forward claim line, it 
seemed to be the last nail in the coffin of talks. By the time of the failed diplomatic probe to 
Beijing in July 1961, a third solution, short of war but more compelling than traditional 
diplomacy, seemed to be called for.  
 From having been sceptical about exerting military pressure on China in June 1960, 
Nehru passed oral directives to initiate just that on the evening of 2 November 1961. This 
fateful decision was based upon the crucial assumptions that India's claims were indeed 
"foolproof" and that China would not respond in any large-scale violent manner under 
pressure. The immediate intentions driving the decision seem to have been anchored in the 
desire to retaliate and halt the perceived Chinese advance westward, to manifestly show 
steadfastness before the 1962 general elections and to improve India's bargaining power in 
future negotiations with China. The process leading to this remarkable change in attitude was 
contingent on the domestic as well as the international context of 1961. Domestic popular 
pressure sharpened the politically vulnerable Krishna Menon's inclination for a coercive 
strategy after the failure of talks in April 1960. Simultaneously, groundbreaking changes took 
place in the higher echelons of Army HQ. The most significant precondition for the 2 
November decision was nonetheless the Prime Minister's increased receptivity to alternative 
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solutions. The Intelligence Bureau convincingly argued that China was intent on expanding 
further. Mullik indicated to the Prime Minister the areas in which "the Chinese might intrude 
at any moment".
685
 This apparently authoritative information deepened the government's 
distrust of China. The Intelligence Bureau's ability to confidently propose an alternative and 
seemingly cost-efficient way out of the deadlock gave it significant influence at the highest 
level of the government.  
 These aspects of the domestic context put together furnished the fundamental 
preconditions for the 2 November decision. The international context pulled in the same 
direction. On the assumption that China faced a difficult strategic situation in the Far East, 
and on the assumption of Soviet and US sympathy for India vis-à-vis Maoist China, the 
Indian leadership deemed it safe to exert pressure on China. Nehru furthermore reckoned that 
a Sino-Indian war would necessarily lead to ruin and major global repercussions – and hence 
that neither India nor China could afford to overreact. Mullik's established credo that 
steadfastness and a "dozen men" would be sufficient to deter a Chinese advance thus fused 
with Nehru's grand strategic perspective to form the crucial assumption that China would not 
respond violently to a new brand of non-violent Indian pressure.  
 
Interpreting the prelude on its own premises 
A recurrent topic in the literature of the 1962 war has been the question of guilt, both in terms 
of national guilt and personal guilt. Firstly, did India's Forward Policy cause the 1962 war? 
Given, as argued, that the origins and causes of the Sino-Indian conflict have deep historical 
roots, this would appear not to be the case. These historical roots – the unsettled borders, the 
Tibetan question and Nehruvian India's and Maoist China's differing political cultures and 
world views – obviously constitute the fundamental causes of the war. The Forward Policy 
can be understood as a novel Indian response to some of these historical root problems, and 
may have triggered the war – but the new policy did not fundamentally cause it. 
 More specifically, a second question has been who fathered the Forward Policy. 
Several accounts have pointed at Kaul.
686
 While undoubtedly a key driver in the 
implementation phase, the Forward Policy concept – which preceded 2 November 1961 – 
nevertheless seems to have originated from the Intelligence Bureau as far as the available 
sources reveal. Interestingly, Kaul in his own memoirs distances himself from the policy 
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decision.
687
 Mullik on the other hand warmly defends the "No more surrender policy", as he 
termed it.
688
 In fact, the Intelligence Bureau had by and large adopted its own forward policy 
in the "broad" sense of the word already by 1959 – but was temporarily stopped by Army HQ 
under general Thimayya. By late 1961, however, the parameters of Indian China policy had 
changed substantially. Mullik's proposal found resonance at the highest level of government 
and was finally sanctioned in the "narrow" sense by the Prime Minister himself.  
 All in all, it is essential to approach the Forward Policy decision from a wide 
contextual perspective. This thesis has sought to do that and has thus attempted to fill a blank 
spot in a literature focussed on detailed military analyses and the border war itself. Rather 
than prejudging the policy as "illogical" based on our posterior knowledge of what would 
happen in October 1962, it should be interpreted as an historical product – on its own 
premises. The most important contextual backdrop of the Forward Policy decision was India 
as a newly independent developing country whose foreign policy was profoundly shaped by 
one individual. The abrupt turn of the Sino-Indian relationship in the wake of the Tibetan 
revolt of 1959 was sharper than Nehruvian India's ability to fathom and cope with it. Despite 
the major restructuring implied in paragraph (c) of the written Forward Policy directive, a 
substantial and costly reorientation of border defence only took place after 1962. The Forward 
Policy was thus in many ways a compromise solution in that it was seen as a form of safe and 
affordable pressure. It would be a cost-efficient via media catering both to the angered 
domestic audience and to the perceived Chinese threat, all supposedly without the risk of 
triggering a war. The precarious lack of military and logistical capabilities and a threat 
perception still dominated by Pakistan added to the minimalist logic of the Forward Policy 
concept. Finally, the lack of institutional checks and balances in India's foreign policy 
machinery and intelligence services opened the door to the Forward Policy decision. The 
Prime Minister and his closest associates had exceptionally strong policy influence. The 
civilian Intelligence Bureau, directed by Nehru's personal friend Mullik, practically had 
monopoly in assessing and supplying the intelligence premises on which the Forward Policy 
decision was made. To some extent, it was possible to speak of an attitudinal Nehru faction – 
unhindered by differing views and perceptions – as represented earlier by Vallabhbhai Patel 
and, partially, Army HQ before 1961.
689
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 In sum, the Forward Policy decision has more often been condemned or lauded than it 
has been critically analysed. It nonetheless has the potential to reveal important nuances if it is 
approached historically on its own terms. To that effect, shedding the "post-1962" perspective 
would seem fruitful. The benefit of hindsight must be employed sparsely if we are to avoid 
the fallacies of anachronism. No one at Teen Murthi Bhavan that November evening in 1961 
saw the Chinese attack of 1962 coming. Rather than searching for their mistakes, it must be 
the historian's task to try to understand their line of thought: a "pre-1962" perspective should 
be strived for. Adding shades of nuance to the painful past of the border dispute not only has 
historical significance; it also has clear policy relevance in a time when India and China 
simultaneously aspire for great power status – while the border dispute remains unresolved. 
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